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ABSTRACT 
 
A central issue in the study of primate communication is the extent to which individuals 
adjust their behaviour to the attention and signals of others, and manipulate others’ attention to 
communicate about external events. I investigated whether 13 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes spp.), 
11 bonobos (Pan paniscus), and 7 orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus pygmaeus) followed conspecific 
attention and led others to distal locations. Individuals were presented with a novel stimulus, to 
test if they would lead a conspecific to detect it in two experimental conditions. In one the 
conspecific faced the communicator, while another required the communicator to first attract 
the attention of a conspecific. All species followed conspecific attention, but only bonobos in 
conditions that required geometric attention following and that the communicator first attract 
the conspecific‘s attention. There was a clear trend for the chimpanzees to selectively produce a 
stimulus directional ‘hunching’ posture when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a 
conspecific rather than alone (the comparison was statistically non-significant, but very closely 
approached significance [p = 0.056]), and the behaviour consistently led conspecifics to look 
towards the stimulus. An observational study showed that ‘hunching’ only occurred in the 
context of attention following. Some chimpanzees and bonobos consistently and selectively 
combined functionally different behaviours (consisting of sequential auditory-stimulus-
directional-behaviours), when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive 
conspecific, although at species level this did not yield significant effects. While the design did 
not eliminate the possibility of a social referencing motive (“look and help me decide how to 
respond”), the coupling of auditory cues followed by directional cues towards a novel object, is 
consistent with a declarative and social referential interpretation of non-verbal deixis. An 
exploratory study, which applied the ‘Social Attention Hypothesis’ (that individuals accord and 
receive attention as a function of dominance) to attention following, showed that chimpanzees 
were more likely to follow the attention of the dominant individual. Overall, the results suggest 
that the paucity of observed referential behaviours in apes may owe to the inconspicuousness 
and multi-faceted nature of the behaviours.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1. Evolutionary perspectives 
1.1.1 Communication and language 
Contemporary models of hominid cognitive evolution and almost all formulations of 
the gestural theory of language origins have emphasized the importance of the capacity to 
monitor and manipulate social attention (e.g., Condillac 1728, cited by Hewes 1981; Corballis 
2002). The story of the evolution of language, however, overlaps with the story of the evolution 
of communication. Despite many and varied theories of human language origins, it seems clear 
that language did not appear fully-formed by virtue of a macro-mutation (e.g., Bickerton 1990, 
cited by Bickerton 2003), but emerged over an extended period of evolutionary time, and 
required a series of mutational changes. Still, speculations about the evolutionary origin of 
language and its possible precursors in animal communication systems remain controversial. 
Evidence of an evolutionary timeline for the emergence of capacities that paved the way for 
fluent language has been sought within a number of disciplines. 
 
1.1.2 Anthropology & neuroanatomy  
Much can be deduced about the lives of early hominids from their artefacts and fossils. 
Ancestral humans walked upright 3.6-3.75 million years ago (m.y.a.), and manufactured and 
used stone tools 2.6 m.y.a., and fire 400 thousands year ago (k.y.a.) (Leakey & Hay 1979; Brain 
& Sillent 1988; Semaw 2000). Moreover, anthropological studies have pinpointed the emergence 
of the only undeniable physical evidence of language, writing, to 6 k.y.a. While such physical 
evidence allows us to deduce an evolutionary timeline for the appearance of many distinctive 
human behaviours, the techniques are of limited use in determining the timing and earliest forms 
of language. 
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Endocasts of fossil skulls reveal traces on the bone left by the surface structure of the 
brain, and may thereby elucidate the association of brain structures and particular cognitive and 
communicative skills across extinct as extant species. It is well established that in humans, 
language comprehension and production are lateralised in particular regions within the left 
hemisphere, and that non-speech, gestural communication systems are controlled by the same 
areas (see e.g., Corballis 2002). Cranial endocasts of Homo habilis fossils reveal an enlarged 
Broca’s area in the left hemisphere (associated with fine oro-facial motor control and speech 
production), suggesting that neuro-anatomical changes associated with speech production had 
appeared by 1.6 m.y.a. (e.g., Ambrose 2001). In primates, vocalisations with a strong negative 
emotional valence appear to show a right hemisphere asymmetry (Hook-Costigan & Rogers 
1998, cited by Hopkins & Cantero 2003), which is consistent with the traditional interpretation 
that non-human primate vocalisations convey affective, rather than semantic and symbolic 
information. There are, however, many reports of left hemisphere dominance in non-human 
animals’ processing of species-specific sounds, and chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas, have a 
structure (Brodmann’s area 44) that resembles Broca’s area and exhibits a similar left-
hemisphere dominance (Cantalupo & Hopkins 2001).1 In chimpanzees, this Broca’s homologue 
is activated during communicative gestural and vocal signaling (Taglialatela et al. 2008), and 
chimpanzees (particularly those raised by humans), preferentially use the right hand (controlled 
by the left hemisphere) in gestural food begging contexts, and are more likely to use right hand 
gestures when accompanying them with a vocalisation (Hopkins & Cantero 2003). Given a 
Broca’s homologue in non-human apes (who do not possess fully-fledged language), the mere 
presence of an enlarged Broca’s area in Homo habilis fossils represents a necessary, yet not 
sufficient, condition for inferring modern language abilities. While fossil craniums represent the 
only direct evidence of the morphology of ancestral hominoid brains, they are thus of limited 
use in creating an evolutionary timeline for cognitive and communicative abilities, given the 
tenuous correlation between anatomical surface structure and their functions. Overall, however, 
these findings suggest that some of the neurological bases for intentional vocal and gestural 
communication were present in the last common ancestor of humans and non-human apes.  
                                               
1 Schenker and colleagues (Schenker et al. 2010), however, report contradictory results, and that 
although some chimpanzees have asymmetrical Broca’s areas (i.e., >10 % difference in the 
number or volume of neurons in the left and right hemispheres), there was no clear evidence of 
a group-wide Broca’s asymmetry across the chimpanzees they examined. The jury is thus 
somewhat ‘out’ with respect to homologous Broca’s asymmetries in non-human apes. 
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The characteristically descended larynx in the throats of adult humans has played a 
central role in theories about the evolution of speech (e.g., Diamond 1991), as it provides a 
sound-modifying space that allows a larger range of sounds to be produced faster than those in 
species with a high positioned larynx (e.g., Lieberman 2007). Recent findings that chimpanzees’ 
larynxes and hyoids bones (as those of modern humans), descend during infancy and the early 
juvenile period (Nishimura et al. 2003, 2006), however, suggest that the phenomenon is not 
unique to humans, and that this morphological foundation for speech evolved in a common 
ancestor of extant hominoids. 
1.1.3 Genetic markers 
 The discovery of a gene implicated in the processing and articulation of speech has 
narrowed the timeframe for the emergence of fully-fledged human language. Study of three 
generations of a large British family (KE) with heritable linguistic and grammatical impairments 
(Hurst et al. 1990) has uncovered the significance of FOXP2, a gene involved in grammar 
comprehension, sentence construction and the sequencing of oro-facial movement for fluent 
speech articulation (Lai et al. 2001). Based on the monomorphism of low-frequency alleles in the 
region around the FOXP2 gene across extant human populations (which is suggestive of genetic 
hitchhiking and reduction of variation as a result of strong positive selection), Enard and 
colleagues (Enard et al. 2002) dated the human FOXP2 to the emergence of anatomically 
modern humans, less than 200 k.y.a. Recent evidence that two Neanderthal remains carry the 
human variant of FOXP2, extended the evolutionary timeline, and suggested that the variant 
emerged in the last common ancestor of humans and Neanderthals, at least 400 k.y.a., only to 
become uniform, fixed and widespread in Homo sapiens, within the last 200 k.y.a. (Krause et al. 
2007).  The protein made by human FOXP2 shows almost no variation across vertebrates, and 
has changed by only three amino-acids (of a total 715) since primates diverged from the line 
leading to extant mice 130 m.y.a. Two of the mutations, however, emerged in the 5-7 million 
years after the human lineage separated from the ancestor shared with chimpanzees and 
bonobos, suggesting that human FOXP2 evolved recently and rapidly, and by implication, 
conferred a significant evolutionary advantage (Enard et al. 2002). There is thus a strong case for 
the argument that the two amino-acid substitutions were under positive selection by virtue of, 
possibly, their role in language.   
The human FOXP2 variant is, however, not a linguistic Rubicon, and neither a 
necessary, nor sufficient condition for spoken language. Despite burial rites, a human-like hyoid 
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bone (connecting the larynx and tongue), and the potential for a flexibly, descendible larynx2 in 
Neanderthals, the high mortality rate and paucity of symbolic expression and technological 
progress suggest that Neanderthals lacked modern human speech capacities. Likewise, despite a 
modern FOXP2 and some fossil evidence of a physiological capacity for speech in anatomically 
modern humans between 100-200 k.y.a., the lack of creative artifacts until about 50 k.y.a. 
implies an absence of some essential aspect of communication. FOXP2 may, however, have 
implications beyond spoken language. The gene regulates the expression of other genes, 
activating some while suppressing others, and triggers a cascade of changes in genes affecting 
brain development (Vernes et al. 2008). It drives genes to behave differently in humans and 
chimpanzees (Konopka et al. 2009)3, and, intriguingly, in humans, down-regulates a gene 
(CNTNAP2) involved in autism (Alarcón et al. 2008), a condition affecting a suite of 
communicative and cooperative skills related to joint attention, and the ability to form a theory 
of mind.  
 
1.2 Non-human primates 
1.2.1 Behaviour and genetics 
 While the fossil record and comparison of the languages of modern humans inform 
theories about the emergence of the modern human mind and language, they provide limited 
evidence as to the cognitive and communicative skills of ancestral hominids prior to the recent 
evolution of the Homo line. Recent disclosure of analysis of one of the earliest 4.4 million old 
hominid fossils, Ardipithecus ramidus (ARA-VP-6/500), has emphasized differences in the 
behaviour and social structure of early hominids and modern non-human apes, and that e.g., 
humans and chimpanzees evolved along different paths. While the implication is that modern 
apes are poor proxies for characterizing hominid evolution (White et al. 2009) (as they are, 
naturally, referential models and not representatives of human ancestors), considerable evidence of 
ape behaviours that reflect those of extinct as extant humans (aimed throwing, spatial cognition 
                                               
2 Demonstrations that the larynges of red and fallow deer (Cerrus elaphus & Dama dama), can 
flexibly descend during roaring (Fitch & Reby 2001), opens the possibility for a similar 
modifiability in other species, such as Neanderthals, which would have provided such species 
with a larger and more flexible range of sounds than traditionally attributed to them. 
3 While Konopka et al. (2009) showed that human and chimpanzee FOXP2 variants have 
different expressions in in vitro brain tissues, both FOXP2 variants were tested in human brain 
tissues, thereby allowing for a confound, as e.g., diet affects human and chimpanzee gene 
expressions (see e.g., Somel et al. 2008). 
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etc.), of which at least some have deep phylogenetic roots within the primate lineage, means that 
identifying cognitive and communicative homologies, as well as analogies and differences of 
modern humans and extant non-human primates can inform hypotheses about the social and 
mental lives our last common ancestor. Indeed, comparison of the natural communication 
systems of humans and other primates can help identify which specific capacities were present 
in our last common ancestor, and how they may have been deployed. 
The study of communication and cognition of extant primates has centered on the great 
apes, as they constitute the most recent evolutionary divergence from the human lineage. 
Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus and Pongo abelii) separated from the human lineage 10-12 m.y.a. 
(Stauffer et al. 2001), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla and Gorilla beringei) 7-9 m.y.a., and chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes and Pan paniscus) approx. 6 m.y.a. While fossil evidence of bipedalism inferred from the 
Toumaï cranium (Sahelanthropus tchadensis, one of the earliest dated human fossils), indicates a 
human-chimpanzee divergence of 6.5-7.4 m.y.a., differences in nuclear DNA protein coding 
genes (Kumar et al. 2005) and base pairs (Patterson et al. 2006) lead to estimations of 5-7 m.y.a. 
and less than 6.3 m.y.a., respectively. Human and great ape genetic similarity correspond to the 
duration of shared ancestry. While the average genome-wide DNA sequence difference between 
humans and other apes vary with as little as 1.2 % (chimpanzees), 3 % (gorillas) and 7 % 
(orangutans; King & Wilson 1975; Wildman et al. 2003), about 15 % of all genes have changed 
their expression level in at least one region of the brains of humans and chimpanzees (Pääbo 
2003), suggesting a possible non-linear and cascading expression effect of small genetic 
differences.  
Recent claims of episodic-like memory (Clayton & Dickinson 1998), planning (Raby et 
al. 2007), alliance formation (Emery et al. 2007), post-conflict third party affiliation (Seed et al. 
2006), and functional awareness of what others have seen in birds (Dally et al. 2006), 
demonstrate that behavioural complexity is by no means limited to primates4. Nonetheless, apes 
distinguish themselves from other species through their genetic proximity as much as cognitive 
affinity to humans. 
                                               
4 Rudimentary syntactical abilities, conceptual semantics and referential labeling have also been 
demonstrated in the auditory communication systems of a number of monkey species 
(Zuberbühler et al. 1999; Zuberbühler 2000; Arnold & Zuberbühler 2008; Ouattara et al. 2009). 
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1.2.2 Smoke and Mirrors 
 While monkeys and lesser apes react to their mirror reflection with hostility or affection, 
as if a conspecific (e.g., capuchins, Cebus apella: Anderson & Roeder 1989; de Waal et al. 2005; 
Roma et al. 2007; cotton-top tamarins, Saguinus oedipus: Hauser et al. 2001, though see Hauser et 
al. 1995 for non-reproducible positive findings; gibbons, Hylobatidae spp.: Suddendorf & Collier-
Baker 2009; macaques, Macaca mulatta: Gallup et al. 1980; marmosets, Callithrix jacchus: Heschel & 
Burkart 2006), current consensus is that all great apes species (although by no means every 
individual) connect their mirror reflections with themselves. Chimpanzees (Povinelli et al. 1993; 
de Veer et al. 2002; Bard et al. 2006) and orangutans (Suarez & Gallup 1981) pass the ‘mirror 
test’, in which subjects are covertly marked with a transparent and coloured dye spot on 
locations visible only with mirror assistance, and selectively inspect the coloured spot. Most 
studies have failed to produce convincing evidence of mirror self-recognition (MSR) in gorillas 
(despite efforts to eliminate methodological issues, such as avoidance of prolonged eye contact, 
argued by some researchers to represent a threatening signal in gorillas5: Suarez & Gallup 1981; 
Shillito et al. 1999), and studies with positive results have failed to include key control measures 
(e.g., anastesia and the sham-mark control condition: Posada & Colell 2007). Nonetheless, there 
is evidence that two gorillas with extensive human experience pass the mark test (Patterson & 
Cohn 1994; Allen & Schwartz 2008). While all studies of bonobos have lacked important 
controls (e.g., the experimental mark and sham-mark procedure: Westergaard & Hyatt 1994; 
Walraven et al. 1995; Inoue-Nakamura 1997), bonobos show evidence of mirror-mediated self-
exploration. Overall, these results suggest that MSR emerged in the great apes by virtue of 
common descent, after the split from the line leading to the lesser apes 14 m.y.a. Some 
suggestion of MSR in one dolphin, Tursiops truncatus (Reiss & Marino 2001; Sarko et al. 2002) and 
two of eight elephants tested (Elephas maximus, Povinelli 1989; Simonet 2000, cited by Nissani et 
al. 2007; Plotnik et al. 2006; Nissani et al. 2007)6 suggest that the skill may also arise in multiple 
taxonomic groups by means of convergent evolution. Interestingly, compelling evidence of 
MSR in corvids (two magpies, Pica pica: Prior et al. 2008; see also Thompson & Contie 1994 for 
non-reproducible positive findings in pigeons by Epstein et al. 1981) suggests that a neocortex 
(of which birds have none) is not a requirement for MSR.  
                                               
5 Eye contact has been argued by some researchers (e.g., Shillito et al. 1999) been claimed to 
represent a threatening signal in gorillas, yet there seem little evidence in support of this claim. 
6 While elephants (Povinelli 1989; and pigs: Broom et al. 2009) can use mirrors to guide their 
own reaching behaviour, only two of eight elephants tested passed the mark test. More than 
50% of chimpanzees tested, however, also fail the mark test, and the low proportion of elephant 
passes may be partly due to the limited number of subjects.   
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The exact significance of the MSR species differences remains to be elucidated, 
however, there is some evidence that MSR may be underpinned by the same skills as imitation 
recognition, which shows a similar dissociation across monkeys and apes, and is considered to 
engender a concept of self as different from others. While macaques recognise when imitated 
(i.e., show increased attention to experimenters who mirror their actions: Paukner et al. 2005), 
they do not, unlike apes (Nielsen et al. 2005; Haun & Call 2008), show explicit signs of imitation 
recognition (i.e., engage in so-called ‘testing behaviours’). The implicit imitation recognition by 
macaques may be akin to what de Waal and colleagues (de Waal et al. 2005) have termed the 
mental category of ‘Puzzling Other’, to describe the discomfort that capuchins exhibit in 
response to their mirror reflection, which they seem to understand is no stranger. 
Whether MSR qualifies as evidence of self-awareness remains controversial (Bard et al. 
2006). While an initial finding that chimpanzees reared in isolation from conspecifics failed to 
show MSR (Gallup 1977), linked MSR to a socially engendered self-awareness (Gallup 1977, 
1998) that enabled representation of other’s mental states (Gallup 1982), MSR has since been 
demonstrated in chimpanzees raised in a variety of environments. The ability of autistic 
children, who are unable to make complex social attributions (e.g., Leslie 1987), but nonetheless 
engage in mirror self-directed behaviours (Spiker & Ricks 1984), and the failure to do so of 
some Alzheimer patients (who are self-aware: Biringer & Anderson 1993), suggest that the 
cognitive prerequisites minimally necessary for MSR, were initially overestimated. Indeed, 
evidence converges to suggest that MSR reflects a kinaesthetic self-concept, allowing individuals 
to distinguish inputs deriving from their own bodies and elsewhere (e.g., Heyes 1998, p. 105). 
Individuals may therefore recognise themselves and their own bodies (as evidenced through 
MSR behaviours) without necessarily recognising that they have a ‘mind’ (different – as their 
body - from that of others). The linkage of MSR to non-human theory of mind skills may 
therefore largely represents a ‘red herring’.  
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1.3 Joint Attention in social cognition 
1.3.1 Joint attention 
Joint attention is considered the earliest manifestation of inter-subjectivity (the ability to 
represent others’ mental states in some form) and the initial mechanism for individuals to share 
mental states and experiences and negotiate shared meanings (Baron-Cohen 1995; Tomasello 
1995; Scassellati 1999). It is a crucial component for the normal growth of social skills in infants, 
for whom failure to respond to others’ gaze and pointing predicts autism at 18 months of age 
(Baron-Cohen 1994). Engagement in joint attention is also crucial to, and individual differences 
predictive of, children’s language acquisition and novel word-understanding (Tomasello & Todd 
1983; Tomasello & Farrar 1986; Mundy & Gomes 1998), as following a speaker’s gaze allows 
individuals to connect novel sounds to objects, and disambiguate the correct referent among 
several possible (Baldwin 1995; Brooks & Meltzoff 2005). Moreover, the patterns of attention 
of experienced individuals allow young ones to learn what is important in the environment, and 
joint attention is thus integral to social learning, active teaching, and theory of mind (ToM), 
which develops during joint attentional events (Bruner 1983; Whiten 1991; Tomasello 1999a, 
2003). Importantly, joint attention has been cast as an ontogenetic (for children) and 
evolutionary entry (for the human species) into a world of shared intentionality, where 
intentions, goals and experiences can be shared, coordinated and directed (Tomasello 2003).  
Joint attention to outside entities have thus bee en suggested to be a uniquely human form of 
social interaction (Tomasello 2003, 2008; Tomasello et al. 2005) 
 Joint attention has been diversely characterized as coordinated joint engagement 
about a third entity (Bakeman & Adamson 1984), shared attention (Adamson & Bakeman 
1991), a form of secondary inter-subjectivity (Trevarthen & Aitken 2001), and intentional co-
orientation towards a common focus (Leavens & Racine 2009). Critically, joint attention differs 
from parallel attention, in which co-focus arises from a series of independent, stimulus-driven 
events, and from passive joint attention (Bakeman & Adamson 1984), in which one individual 
has little or no awareness of the other’s involvement or even presence. Thus, while attention 
following, and the more narrow term, gaze following (defined as “looking where someone else is 
looking”: Butterworth 1991, p. 223), are critical components of the suite of behaviours that 
collectively comprise joint attention mechanisms, they do not independently constitute joint 
attention, as they do not necessarily entail that individuals are aware, that they are attending to 
Introduction 
 
 
9 
the same external thing (Astington 1993; Tomasello 1995).7 Joint attention requires not only that 
individuals attend to each others’ attentional states, but that they do so in a particular way, and 
understand that another’s attentional state is object-directed, and therefore ‘about’ the object 
(Gómez et al. 1993; Gómez 1998; Tomasello 2001). This entails that individuals not only 
respond to each other’s behaviour, but the underlying intentions. Importantly, joint attention is 
intentional, and involves at least one individual behaving in a goal-directed manner, so as to 
make its focus of attention accessible, by way of posture, gaze direction, pointing, and/or gaze 
alternation between the external locus and interlocutor, and in case of miscommunication, 
attempts to clarify the communication by persisting and/or elaborating its signaling (Bates et al. 
1975; Bard 1992; Leavens 2004). This creates a triadic relationship of attentional contact 
between the individuals that is related to the external phenomenon, thereby allowing individuals 
to interact about and through the phenomenon.  
 Since attentional states are reflected in publicly available cues (e.g., posture and gaze 
direction), individuals need, however, not represent the content of others’ mental states, in order 
to respond appropriately, or indeed to provoke a potentially predictable set of responses. As 
Gómez notes, one may “understand other people’s minds using first-order representations of 
behaviours that directly reflect mental states such as attention” (Gómez 1994, p. 72). Gómez 
and colleagues (Gómez et al. 1993) provide an example of a gorilla taking a person’s hand and 
leading the person to a goal (a door to be opened), while the two exchanged looks and gaze 
towards the goal (the door). This requires, minimally, that individuals associate attentional 
contact with action and, potentially, a predictable sequence of subsequent behaviours, meaning 
that higher-order, meta-representational, intentional states are not necessary to attain the 
behavioural consequences of joint attention. 
 
                                               
7 To minimise terminological confusion, the term joint attention (ought in the general literature 
and) is here reserved for actively shared attention, while visual co-orientation and gaze following 
(and the more general term, attention following) are termed joint attention mechanisms or 
behaviours.  
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1.3.2 Joint attention in children 
  The human adaptation to social interaction is evident in early ontogeny, and the 
development of joint attention skills follows an extended, mosaic trajectory in infants. Within 
few hours-to-days of parturition, infants engage in structured, social interactions and basic 
‘conversational’ turn-taking (for a review, see Trevarthan & Aitkin 2001), and (as chimpanzees: 
Myowa-Yamakoshi et al. 2003) show sensitivity to eyes and attentional cues, by e.g., 
discriminating and preferring faces that engage them in mutual rather than averted gaze (Farroni 
et al. 2002).  
 Gaze following, and the more complex skill of visual perspective taking, are ontogenetic 
precedents for joint attention and therefore often a starting point for studies thereof. They are 
both potential precursors to a ToM, as at least visual perspective taking, minimally, requires a 
functional understanding that others’ visual perspective may differ from one’s own.  
 Gaze following is a crucial, social skill that helps individuals gather information about 
danger, food locations and social interactions, and coordinate joint attention with others 
(Tomasello 1999). Following a pioneering study by Scaife and Bruner (1975) there has been 
considerable debate about the temporal emergence of gaze following skills in infants, although 
most approximations range from 3-12 months, with a developing level of sophistication that 
arises from a basic motion-cued tracking mechanism. While indications or precursors of gaze 
following are manifest from 2 months of age, there is little evidence of reliable gaze following in 
infants below 6 months (possibly related to poor visual acuity and the development of depth 
perception, which continues until at least 7 months of age: Arterberry et al. 1993, cited by Deák 
et al. 2006). Although newborns show a rudimentary form of gaze following, cued by the 
direction of eye shifts in (images of) faces (Farroni et al. 2003), and 2-6 month olds respond 
(albeit weakly) to adults’ gaze shifts by looking to the same side as the adults (D'Entremont et al. 
1997; Hood et al. 1998; Morales et al. 1998; Butterworth & Itakura 2000), this requires specific 
triggering conditions (such as proximity and continuous infant-directed speech) and largely rely 
on visual tracking mechanisms that respond to motion cues (Farroni et al. 2000)8. By around 6 
months infants follow gaze to distant targets (Butterworth & Itakura 2000) and consistently so 
to single targets between 7-9 months (Flom & Pick 2005). However, not until around 9 months 
of age do infants follow gaze independent of motion cues (i.e., a static head pose suffices: 
Moore et al. 1997), and reliably turn their head to the correct (rather than opposite) side that 
someone gazes (e.g., Corkum & Moore 1995, 1998).  
                                               
8 Motion cues alone are, however, insufficient to shift infants’ attention, as gaze shifts in the 
image of an inverted face fail to trigger gaze following (Farroni et al. 2003). 
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1.3.3 Butterworth’s Multiple Mechanism Model 
 Butterworth and Jarrett’s (1991) Multiple Mechanism Model suggests that joint attention 
in 6-18 months old children is successively mediated by an ecological, geometric and 
representational mechanism. The ecological mechanism, which operates from 6 months of age, 
is a primitive form of gaze direction detector, and triggers search in the appropriate direction, 
which, however, stops at the first target encountered, leaving infants unable to identify which of 
multiple targets an adult attends to. Towards 12 months of age a geometric mechanism emerges, 
by which infants can approximate a line between the adult and her gaze referent, and localise 
targets correctly, even when located behind a distracter object. While infants can infer 
directionality by 12 months, it is not until about 18 months, with the emergence of the 
representational mechanism, that they can infer intentionality and follow gaze to targets behind 
themselves (Butterworth & Jarrett 1991), implying that they can grasp that others may see things 
they cannot. This timing of Butterworth and Jarrett’s representational mechanism is consistent 
with evidence that 18 month olds represent the goals and intentions of adults attempting, but 
failing, certain object manipulations (Meltzoff 1995). The mechanism affords some degree of 
representation of other’s mental states, and consequently forms part of a ToM. Empirical data 
of e.g., the temporal emergence of the different types of gaze following skills are, however, not 
fully consistent with Butterworth’s theory, as infants follow points to peripheral targets, and 
gaze geometrically, around barriers, by 9 (not 12) months and follow adult gaze to targets 
behind themselves by 12 (not 18) months (Deák et al. 2000; Flom et al. 2004). 
 
1.3.4 Baron-Cohen’s Modular Mind Reading System  
Relatedly, Baron-Cohen (1994) has proposed that “mind-reading” comprises of four 
modules: the evolutionarily old Intentionality and Eye Direction Detectors (ID and EDD), and 
the evolutionarily more recent Shared Attention and Theory of Mind Mechanisms (SAM and 
ToMM). While the Intentionality Detector involves detection of intentional (i.e., animated: 
Tomasello et al. 2005) movement, the Eye Direction Detector allows individuals to detect that 
presence of eye-like stimuli (as demonstrated by infants’ preference for human faces and eyes) 
and gaze direction (e.g., towards self or something else), though not to represent what others 
attend to. The Shared Attention Mechanism, which begins to operate from 9-14 months of age, 
connects input from the Intentionality and Eye Direction Detectors, allowing individuals to 
interpret the gaze of others as an intentional goal state. While the Eye Detection Detector (e.g., 
mother sees toy) and Intentionality Detector (e.g., mother wants toy) can each build dyadic 
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representations (between mother and toy), the Shared Attention Mechanism allows for simple 
triadic representations, such as ‘mother sees that I see the toy’. Such detection of shared 
attention is foundational to that ability to manipulate others’ attention. Thus, while younger 
children pay attention to either another person (e.g., their mother) or an object (e.g., a toy), the 
interactions of older children are often triadic and involve coordinating attention between both 
objects and other individuals. From 18 months onwards, use of the Shared Attention 
Mechanism triggers and stimulates the Theory of Mind Mechanism, which interprets the 
representations formed by the ID, ED, and SAM, and uses these to interpret and predict the 
behaviours of others with reference to mental states (such as beliefs, thoughts, knowledge and 
pretense)9. 
While several studies have implicated the orbital and medial frontal cortex in ToM 
abilities (e.g., Fletcher et al. 1995; Baron-Cohen et al. 1994), there is little other neuro-
physiological evidence that Baron-Cohen’s modules exist in localised form in humans, and in a 
way that differs from other primates, and several contradictory findings exist. Indeed, while 
autists have attention-shifting difficulties compared to normal children (indicating a difference 
in a basic attention mechanism), initiate and engage in very little joint attention, and show ToM 
deficits, autism-spectrum disorders are associated with a number of brain differences, with no 
specific brain architectural abnormalities that directly that map onto Baron-Cohen’s distinctions. 
Given the lack of evidence of innate architectural modules, Baron-Cohen’s account seems most 
plausible if one allows for the possibility that relevant cells specialise though experience. This 
would contribute to the apparent socio-cognitive differences of mother-reared and human-
reared apes, and lends support to the general notion that experience ‘matters’. More specifically, 
it supports the ‘enculturation hypothesis’ (Call & Tomasello 1996; see also Bering 2004), which 
holds that ontogenetic engagement in a human socio-cultural environment (including triadic 
joint attention episodes, and being treated as an intentional agent, whose attention can be 
intentionally directed) produces cognitive changes in human-reared great apes more typical of 
human cognition, than of their own species, thereby affecting how they interpret the behaviour 
of others (e.g., engage in mental state attribution). 
 
                                               
9 Recently a fifth mechanism, the emphasizing system, which emerges around 14 months, has 
implicated cognitive and emotional empathy (Baron-Cohen 2005). 
Introduction 
 
 
13
1.3.5 Joint attention in non-human animals  
 Since joint attention is ontogenetically related to language acquisition in humans, and 
natural language has not been observed in species other than humans, many researchers have 
argued that joint attention is a species-specific human capacity (e.g., Butterworth, 2003; Povinelli 
& Davis, 1994; Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007). Recent research has, however, 
shown e.g., joint visual attention is not necessary for word learning in neither typical nor atypical 
(e.g., autistic) human development (Akhtar & Gernsbacher 2007), suggesting that the language 
and joint attention can be dissociated. Moreover, there is growing evidence that the 
developmental precursors for language, such as triadic interactions and other joint attention 
skills are indeed widely present in non-human primate interactions. 
 The phylogenetic roots of joint attention has received much research interest in the last 
two decades. Attention following in non-human animals has been studied using two paradigms; 
(i) The gaze following/visual co-orientation paradigm, which requires individuals to track 
others’ gaze to distal locations, and (ii) the object-choice paradigm, which requires them to use 
referential gaze and/or pointing cues provided by informed individuals to locate food hidden in 
one of several locations.  
 Visual co-orientation has been reported in a variety of non-human species, including 
goats, Capra hircus (Kaminski et al. 2005), dolphins (Tschudin et al. 2001; Pack & Herman 2004), 
quails, Colinus virginianus  (Jaime et al. 2009), and ravens, Corvus corax (Bugnyar et al. 2004). While 
the initial study of primate visual co-orientation found no evidence that either prosimians, Old 
or New World monkeys (macaques, capuchins, lemurs, Lemur catta, and squirrel monkeys, 
Saimiri sciureus: Itakura 1996) follow the gaze of humans, later studies have persuasively 
demonstrated spontaneous following of human gaze to distal locations in Old and New World 
monkeys (macaques: Anderson & Mitchell 1999; Ferrari et al. 2000; Tomasello et al. 2001; 
Goossens et al. 2008; capuchins & spider monkeys, Ateles geoffroyi: Amici et al. 2009), and of the 
head and gaze orientation of photographs of conspecifics by prosimians and Old World 
monkeys (lemurs: Shepherd et al. 2006; Ruiz et al. 2009; Diana monkeys, Cercopithecus diana diana: 
Scerif et al. 2004; macaques: Emery et al. 1997; Lorincz et al. 1999). Gaze following to distal 
locations by apes has mainly been studied in chimpanzees and orangutans. Chimpanzees 
brought up with extensive human contact follow the gaze of human experimenters to locations 
outside their visual fields, checking above and behind themselves, and to the experimenter when 
attention following leads to no interesting sights (Povinelli & Eddy 1994, 1996a, 1997; Itakura 
1996; Call et al. 1998; Tomasello et al. 2007). While the majority of studies have addressed the 
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ability to follow the gaze of humans, chimpanzees, soothy mangabeys (Cercocebus atys trquatus) 
and three species of macaques (Macaca mulatta, Macaca arctoides, Macaca nemestrina) also follow the 
attention of conspecifics, under conditions where the observed individual has been induced to 
raise its head to a distinctive 80 angle, to look towards food presented in an observation tower 
(Tomasello et al. 1998, Figure 1.1). In a recent study Pitman and Shumaker (2009) reported that 
all the great ape species followed the gaze of a human looking towards the ceiling (an 
experiment modelled on a study by Bräuer et al. 2005), and of one or multiple other apes, 
induced to raise their heads to a location approx. 2m above and immediately behind the subject 
(i.e., gaze-following individual, an experiment modelled on the study by Tomasello et al. 1998). 
       
Figure 1.1: Experimental set-up of intraspecific gaze following test of five primate species 
(images taken from Tomasello et al. 1998). (a) The experimenter presents a food item from the 
location of the camera, in view of two communicators (above, left and right); (b) The target 
(below) follows the attention of the communicators. 
 While apes are capable of following human gaze direction independent of head 
orientation, only 30% (Povinelli & Eddy 1996a) of ‘gaze-only’ trials conducted with 
chimpanzees, and 13% of trials in a study of chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas (Tomasello et 
al. 2007), elicited gaze-following responses to the correct side. Indeed, a comparison of non-
human apes’ and human infants’ gaze following of an experimenter who looked to the ceiling 
with either ‘eyes only’, or directed her head towards the ceiling while keeping eyes closed, 
suggest that while 12 and 18 months old human infants almost exclusively use eye direction in 
such gaze following situations, chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas rely primarily on head 
direction (Tomasello et al. 2007). Thus, while humans follow eye gaze from an early ages, non-
human apes initially and primarily respond to only head direction, and only later, in adulthood, 
begin to respond to eye gaze. This human reliance on eye direction, from every early in 
ontogeny is perhaps not surprising, as compared to non-human primates, humans have 
particularly conspicuous eyes (Kobayashi & Kohshima 1997), and represent the only primate 
species to universally have white scelara and a transparent conjunctiva (the membrane covering 
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the scelara) to contrast a darker coloured iris (thus facilitating detection of visual focus: 
Kobayashi & Kohshima 2001).  
 The tendency of humans (in contrast to other apes) to rely predominantly on eye direction 
lends support to the ‘cooperative eye’ hypothesis, which posits, that the highly conspicuous eyes 
of humans evolved under a selective pressure to facilitate close-contact joint attentional 
episodes and (silent) cooperative communication (during e.g., collaborative hunting), by aiding 
individuals to follow each others’ gaze direction (Tomasello et al. 2005, 2007).  That is, the 
hypothesis suggests that adaptations that promote joint attention may have evolved as ancestral 
humans became more interdependent. While the hypothesis accounts for non-human apes’ low 
reliance on eyes in gaze following contexts, it makes no predictions about their underlying 
cognitive understanding of other’s gaze. Although apes following human attention into empty 
space may be more inclined to use other indicators of attention, than eye gaze, there is 
considerable evidence that chimpanzees do recognise eyes as an important indicator of whether 
a human will respond to their food begging behaviour (Hostetter et al. 2007). In contrast to 
findings by e.g., Povinelli and colleagues (e.g., Povinelli & Eddy 1996a), Hosetter and colleagues 
have reported that chimpanzees are more likely to precede food begging gestures with a 
vocalisation, when faced with an experimenter with her eyes closed (versus eyes open), and use 
more visual gestures when faced with an experimenter with open eyes. 
 A more demanding test of visual co-orientation than gaze following into empty space (i.e., 
‘direct attention following’), consists of blocking an experimenter’s line of sight to the target with 
a barrier, forcing the gaze-follower to choose among several locations, as targets of the other’s 
gaze. The gaze-follower may erroneously look to or past the barrier, and ignore that it blocks 
the other’s view of objects behind it, or correctly follow the other’s gaze geometrically, by 
locomoting around the barrier to look to the other’s side of it. Ravens, capuchins, marmosets, 
spider monkeys and all the great apes follow human gaze geometrically (Tomasello et al. 1999; 
Bugnyar et al. 2004; Bräuer et al. 2005; Burkart & Heschl 2006; Amici et al. 2009), and tamarins 
(Neiworth et al. 2002) and chimpanzees (Hare et al. 2000, 2001, see also Melis et al. 2006), 
though not capuchins (Hare et al. 2003), also of conspecifics in competitive situations. While 
empirical data for most animal groups are still needed (and particularly evidence that gaze 
following represents more than an orienting reflex), gaze following seems to be a taxonomically 
widespread characteristic of social species (Zuberbühler 2008).   
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1.3.6 Models of gaze following  
Despite evidence that non-human species can follow the attention (and eye gaze) of 
others, there is considerable debate about what (if any) cognitive understanding they have of 
other’s gaze and attention. Two models have been advanced to describe the cognitive 
mechanisms governing gaze following. The orienting response model, a cognitively low-level 
interpretation, holds that animals may process gaze and orientational information without 
reference to mental states, and have an innate reflexive and/or learned tendency to look in the 
direction of others’ attention, that is reinforced over time by the usual presence of a visible 
target (Corkum & Moore 1998). A neurological basis for this is evidenced by cells in the parietal 
and temporal cortices of humans and monkeys that respond selectively to changes in gaze 
direction, and in humans, lesions in those areas impair gaze following (Emery 2000). Humans 
and macaques rapidly follow the direction of others’ gaze in a way suggesting such a social reflex 
(Perrett et al. 1985, 1992; Friesen & Kingstone 1998; Driver et al. 1999; Langton & Bruce 1999; 
Deaner & Platt 2003; Hietanen & Leppänen 2003). Such reflexive gaze following, however, 
involves (and is possibly ‘gated’ by) non-reflexive components related to e.g., relative status. 
Although low-status rhesus macaques reflexively follow the gaze of all familiar conspecifics, 
high-status macaques tend to follow the gaze of only other high-status individuals (Shepherd et 
al. 2006). According to the orienting model, however, neither direct nor geometric gaze following 
provide evidence that animals conceptualize others in terms of underlying mental states (i.e., 
what they can and cannot see). Indeed, according to the orienting model geometric gaze 
following is possible, given a semi-reflexive gaze following ability coupled with experience of 
geometry, objects and obstructions (Povinelli et al. 2002; Gómez 2004).  
The perspective taking model, a high-level interpretation, holds - as the orienting model 
- that gaze following is grounded in an orienting response, but also that individuals understand 
that others look because they see something. A high-level interpretation of geometric gaze 
following is therefore that individuals understand seeing as a psychological process, and attempt 
to take the visual perspective of others (Call et al. 1998; Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007a). Learning 
may influence both mechanisms. Individuals can learn, by means of classical conditioning, that 
the gaze direction of others is predictive of typical contingencies (e.g., the presence of an 
interesting event: the orienting response model), or may develop the understanding that others’ 
visual perspective may differ from their own (the perspective taking model). An intermediate 
possibility is that prolonged gaze may be perceived to indicate a connectedness to something 
external (without ascribing the mental experience of seeing to another individual), which 
combined with knowledge of contextual and social contingencies, can help predict subsequent 
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behaviour. The question becomes whether non-human animals, as children, progress from a 
contentless automatic gaze following reflex to understand the mental experience and 
intentionally referential nature of gaze. 
While it remains disputed whether non-human apes’ gaze and point following reflect an 
understanding of others’ mental states, there is considerable evidence that, in conjunction, 
suggests that apes do not simply respond automatically to others’ gaze. First, apes follow human 
gaze geometrically by locomoting around obscuring barriers, and ignore an interesting 
distracting object (a novel toy), while tracking a human’s gaze to an object behind themselves 
(Povinelli et al. 1996; Tomasello et al. 1999; Bräuer et al. 2005). Moreover, chimpanzees and 
bonobos (though not gorillas and orangutans) follow experimenter gaze more often when a 
clear barrier is placed in front of the experimenter’s line of light, compared to an opaque barrier 
(Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007a). This suggests an understanding of the effect of barriers and a 
connection between the observed individual and an external target.  
Second, like humans many primate species look back and forth between an 
experimenter’s face and gaze direction when attention-following leads to no interesting sights, 
and track their gaze direction a second time (e.g., Scaife & Bruner 1975). Such gaze alternation 
(also termed ‘double looks’ and ‘checking’) is widely used to determine the understanding of the 
visual experience of others by preverbal children (e.g., Bates et al. 1975) and primates (great 
apes: Call et al. 1998; Bräuer et al. 2005; Diana monkeys: Scerif et al. 2004; macaques, Macaca 
fascicularis: Goossens et al. 2008; spider monkeys and capuchins: Amici et al. 2009), and has been 
interpreted as evidence that the gaze follower comprehends that gaze is referentially connected 
to something external, and expects the other to look at something, and that this expectation is 
violated by the absence of a visible target (the reason, for which the gaze follower performs a 
second ‘checking’ look). A lower-level interpretation of double-looks, however, is that animals, 
upon seeing nothing of interest, stop gaze following, and that the second look represents merely 
an independent, second automatic orienting response (e.g., Call et al. 1998). Nonetheless, this 
low-level interpretation of gaze alternation seems rather improbable in the light of examples of a 
high number of gaze alternations during gorilla play interactions. For example, Tanner and 
Byrne (2010) found that gorillas repeatedly (up to 8 times in succession) alternated gaze between 
a conspecific and a play object or external event, thus suggesting an understanding that gaze, 
and consequent behaviour, is referentially connected to something external. 
Third, there is evidence of an ontogenetic progression of gaze following in chimpanzees 
(and macaques: Ferrari et al. 2000) comparable to that of children. Although there are temporal 
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differences in the onset of different ‘levels’ of gaze following in humans and chimpanzees, the 
development follows a similar trajectory. One chimpanzee with extensive experimental 
experience, reliably followed the head orientation of a human experimenter to targets within its 
own view by 11 months of age (compared to 9-10 months in children: Corkum & Moore 1995; 
Okamoto et al. 2002), of eye orientation alone by 13 months (compared to 14-18 months in 
children: Corkum & Moore 1998; Okamoto et al. 2002), and to locations behind itself by 20 
months (compared to 12 months in children: Deák et al. 2000; Okamoto et al. 2004). 
Chimpanzees with less experimental ‘training’ follow human head and gaze orientation to 
targets outside their own visual field between 36-48 months (Tomasello et al. 2001). Unlike 
infant chimpanzees, adults observing a human continuously looking into empty space, habituate 
and stop responding (i.e., stop gaze following; Tomasello et al. 2001), suggesting that, in contrast 
to infants, adults can go beyond the orienting response when they find nothing of interest 
(Bräuer et al. 2005; Gómez 2005). With respect to using experimenter-given cues to select one of 
several baited containers in an object-choice task, longitudinal study of three chimpanzees 
demonstrated improvement with age and experience, and an increasing responsiveness to less 
salient cues. The chimpanzees used tapping and touching cues by approx. 12 months of age, 
and point cues before 24 months, with an understanding of the salient whole-hand point 
preceding the less salient index finger point, and proximal points (5 cm distance to object) 
preceding distal (20 cm) points (Okamoto-Barth et al. 2008). While the longitudinal nature of the 
particular study makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of learning from age, and allows for 
the possibility that subjects may simply have formed associations between increasingly 
sophisticated/subtle cues and events, the overall body of research suggests a developing 
flexibility of gaze following, and that adult chimpanzees understand that others may have a 
different visual perspective. Overall, these lines of evidence suggest that apes do not simply 
respond automatically to others’ gaze. 
 
1.3.7 The object-choice paradigm  
While there is considerable evidence that many non-human primate species follow 
others ‘gaze to locations behind barriers and themselves, this contrasts almost strikingly with the 
failure of the same species (and indeed, often the same individuals of those species) to use human 
gaze and other deictic gestures as cues to the location of hidden food. Non-human primates 
almost invariably fail tests based on the cooperative object-choice task  (Itakura et al. 1999; Call 
et al. 2000; Povinelli et al. 2000; Hare & Tomasello 2004), which poses an evolutionary puzzle, as 
it raises the question as to the function of the animals’ seemingly strong gaze following skills, if 
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these are not used to locate hidden objects and food. Recent work, however, suggests that while 
primates may find it difficult to use human gaze cues in the object-choice task, they readily, 
though at low levels, use conspecific gaze cues to ‘prime’ their responses and choices. Research 
has shown that lemurs successfully co-orient to the gaze direction of conspecifics shown in 
photographs, and use those gaze cues to selectively choose boxes, containing hidden food, 
located in the direction that the conspecific in the picture looks (Ruiz et al. 2009). While the 
lemurs showed relatively low (and non-significant) levels of (i) following the depicted 
conspecific’s gaze and (ii) subsequently choosing the object, at which the conspecific gazed, the 
researchers suggested that this was a function of the overall low levels, at which the gaze of the 
individual in the static picture was followed. When the researchers examined the probability of 
choosing the object, at which depicted conspecific gazed in trials only, in which the subject had 
initially followed the conspecific’s gaze, the success rate was high. The researchers consequently 
pointed out that many previous studies have not properly taken this into account (i.e., low 
overall rates of gaze following of a static model), and that when reanalysed, data from many 
primate species are likely to show correct object-choice as a result of gaze following. Thus, there 
is thus some suggestion (and potentially increasing) evidence that non-human primates can 
deploy conspecific gaze cues to locate hidden resources.  
Moreover, perhaps importantly (although this was not tested in the lemur study and 
remains yet untested in general), animals may be more likely to deploy the gaze cues in an 
object-choice situation, when the cues are provided by a socially dominant individual of the 
animal’s group, rather than a human experimenter. While the experiment did not examine the 
potential effect of social dominance (and thus cannot provide direct evidence to this effect), the 
lack of consideration of the relative social dominance relationships of the individuals used and 
tested in most other object-choice tests is puzzling. 
While non-human primates’ are generally unsuccessful at using cooperative human cues 
to locate hidden resources, certain methodological issues improve their performance on the 
object-choice task. Chimpanzees, for example, perform marginally better when experimenters 
precede a gaze direction cue by either a nonsense word, a chimpanzee bark or a food grunt 
(Itakura et al. 1999; Call et al. 2000; Lyn et al. 2010). The experimenters thereby precede their 
directional cues by a clear ‘ostensive cue’ (which may be defined as “showing that one wants to 
show something”: Gómez 1996, p. 80). The animals’ may perform marginally better in this 
context simply because the experimenter provides a clear indications that (s)he wishes to 
intentionally communicate with the subject (i.e., provides a far more conspicuous cue to this 
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effect, than that of simply capturing the subject’s attention via mutual gaze and subsequently 
alternating gaze between the indicated object and the subject). 
Primates, moreover, seem to find proximal pointing easier than distal pointing, and 
proximal cues (10 cm: Itakura & Tanaka 1998, Peignot & Anderson 1999) typically produce 
more correct responses than distal cues (e.g. 40 cm) (for a review, see Miklósi & Soproni 2006). 
One possibility is that highly proximal pointing gestures (e.g., 2-10 cm distance) may implicate 
‘low level’ association learning processes (such as human-hand-food associations: Miklósi et al. 
2003; Reid 2009) and provide a salient local enhancement cue. Local enhancement is defined as 
the drawing of attention to objects (or the location of objects) that others interact with (see e.g., 
Heyes 1994). Since non-social cues (such as movement) near or of objects capture the attention 
of humans (e.g., Itakura 2001), successful use of highly proximal pointing gestures by non-
human primates may rest on ‘simple’ local enhancement, and thus deployment of, effectively, 
non-social cues, rather than reflecting an understanding of the referential and informative intent 
of the human experimenter.  
Alternatively, a recent finding that apes perform better when experimenters make highly 
distal rather than comparatively more proximal points (100 cm vs. 40 cm distance) to one of 
two containers positioned far (250 cm) apart, has led to the suggestion that apes’ typical poor 
performance rest on methodological rather than cognitive factors (Mulcahy & Call 2009). The 
authors observed that proximal pointing to one of two closely positioned containers entail that 
containers and experimenter cues “occupy the same visual plane, except that the containers 
occupy the foreground while the cues appear in the background” (Mulcahy & Call 2009, p. 307), 
The authors suggested that the typical association between the containers and food, and that the 
apes initially perceive only the containers, lead the prominence of the containers to override the 
apes ability to encode the experimenters cue. By contrast, distal points to widely spaced 
containers, lead the apes to initially perceive the cue, not the containers. Given the apes’ poor 
performance in the proximal, but not distal condition, and since the proximal pointing condition 
in the experiment (40 cm distance) was within the range typically used for primates (e.g., 10 cm: 
Itakura &z Tanaka 1998), and of what has been operationalised as distal points in other 
experiments (e.g., 50 cm, Wolves, Canis lupus lupus: Miklósi et al. 2003; 60 cm), the suggestion 
goes some way to elucidate the apes’ typical poor performance on the object-choice task. 
Chimpanzees, surprisingly, perform perfectly when tested under a procedure where 
subjects enter the experimental scene anew on each trial, to see the experimenter gazing at the 
baited box (Barth et al. 2005). While Barth and colleagues suggest that the typical object-choice 
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test (in which subjects remain in the experimental area between trials) masks otherwise present 
abilities to exploit cooperative human cues, that the ‘leave’ version reveals, it is more 
parsimonious to assume that subjects in the ‘leave’ version simply used adventitious cues as to 
the experimenter’s focus of attention, than comprehended the communicative intent of the gaze 
cue. Given the general primate ability to co-orient to the locus of others’ attention, and the 
uncertainty of the situation (for subjects who do not comprehend the experimenter’s 
collaborative, communicative intention), the logical choice is the box upon which the 
experimenter gazes, as gaze often signals interest. Insight into the communicative intention of 
the human pointer is therefore unnecessary, and skilful use of adventitious cues suffices. There 
is, however, some suggestion that gorillas (Peignot & Anderson 1999), one capuchin (Itakura & 
Anderson 1996), orangutans and chimpanzees (Itakura & Tanaka 1998; Byrnit 2004, 2009) can 
learn to use gaze cues, and improve after extensive training on the object-choice task. Indeed, 
both bonobos and chimpanzees, reared in socio-linguistically complex environments (where 
two-way communication with humans is promoted), select the correct container when 
experimenters produce a vocalisation, provide a proximal point (2-10 cm distance to the 
container), and alternate gaze between the subject and the correct container (Lyn et al. 2010).10 
Apes’ general poor performance on the object-choice task is puzzling, given evidence of 
some understanding of others’ visual perception and intentions. Apes, for example, 
preferentially produce visual gestures when their recipient faces them (e.g., Liebal et al. 2004a,b), 
and chimpanzees understand that what others see influence their behaviour, and behave 
differently in competitive situations if a competitor sees a contested food source. They pursue 
contested food only if a conspecific competitor cannot see it (Hare et al. 2000; Hare et al. 2001) 
and conceal their approach when competing against a human experimenter (Hare et al. 2006; 
Melis et al. 2006). Furthermore, chimpanzees and orangutans show some understanding of the 
intentions underlying others’ behaviour, and discriminate between the intentions of 
experimenters who accidentally or intentionally mark one of two boxes in an object-choice 
situation, or are unwilling or unable to give them food (Call & Tomasello 1998; Call et al. 2004). 
While chimpanzees fail to comprehend the human pointing gesture in cooperative food finding 
object-choice tasks, they are skilful at picking up adventitious referential information in 
competitive contexts. When an experimenter attempts to reach for a contested food source, 
                                               
10 One of six chimpanzees raised under standard conditions for captive apes (i.e., where regular 
human contact is limited to husbandry and cognitive tests have “no specific emphasis on 
understanding human communication”: Lyn et al. 2010, p. 361) also passed the object-choice 
test. The authors, however, provide not supplementary information or explanation for the 
individual’s performance.  
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chimpanzees successfully select the object the experimenter extends an arm towards, a gesture 
not unlike the cooperative pointing gesture (Hare & Tomasello 2004). 
Much attention has been devoted to the possibility of homologous human-like joint 
attention abilities in the phylogenetically distinct canid group. While domestic dogs, Canis lupus 
familiaris, do not follow human gaze into empty space (Agnetta et al. 2000), they are skilled at 
using gaze and points to locate hidden food (Hare et al. 1998; Miklósi et al. 1998; Hare & 
Tomasello 1999; Soproni et al. 2001; Udell et al. 2008), preferentially beg from people who face 
towards them and have open eyes (Gácsi et al. 2004), discriminate human visual access to 
objects behind transparent and opaque barriers (Kaminski et al. 2009), and are less likely to 
approach forbidden food in the presence of an attentive human, than when the human is absent 
or looking away (Call et al. 2003). A lack of difference in the point following skills of kennel- and 
hand-reared puppies, and of puppies across a 2-14 month age span (Agnetta et al. 2000; Hare et 
al. 2002; Riedel et al. 2008), suggest that exposure to human interaction has limited effect on 
dogs’ sensitivity to human communicative cues, and that this adaptation emerges spontaneously, 
at a young age. In contrast to domesticated species such as dogs, cats, Felis catus (Miklósi et al. 
2005), goats (Kaminski et al. 2005), horses, Equus caballus (Maros et al. 2008)11, and of captive 
foxes, Vulpes vulpes, selectively bred for fearlessness and non-aggression towards humans (Hare 
et al. 2005), some studies suggest that neither wolves raised in zoological settings (Agnetta et al. 
2000), nor those with considerable human experience (Hare et al. 2002; Virányi et al. 2008), 
respond to human pointing gestures. This has led to the ‘social domestication hypothesis’, 
which holds that domestication (rather than human exposure during ontogeny) has played a 
dominant role in shaping dogs’ sensitivity to human communicative cues (Hare et al. 2002). 
Through domestication dogs not only reduced their fear of humans, but also, over evolutionary 
time, applied and adapted general problem-solving skills to social interactions with humans 
(Hare & Tomasello 2005; Hare 2007). According to an extension of this proposal, dogs have 
thereby acquired insight into the intention of human pointers, and thus possess an aspect or 
precursor of a ToM (Miklósi et al. 2000, 2004). By extension, the hypothesis applies to non-
human primates who, by virtue of lack of domestication, are predicted to respond weakly to 
human cooperative, communicative cues. 
                                               
11 McKinley & Sambrook (2000) found that one of four horses used distal points to chose one 
of two buckets, and Marsos and colleagues (Marsos et al. 2008) that a group of 20 horses made 
use of momentary proximal, and sustained proximal and distal points (although not momentary 
distal points). Horses were, however, held on a lead-rein and encouraged by owners, leading to 
the suggestion that the ‘Clever Hans effect’ may have been implicated (Reid 2009).  
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Recently, however, the strength of empirical evidence supporting the social 
domestication hypothesis has been questioned on methodological and analytical grounds, and 
by contrasting data (see e.g., Wynne et al. 2008; Hare et al. 2010; Udell & Wynne 2010). While 
wolves perform poorly when tested under different experimental setups than dogs (i.e., with 
humans positioned outside their enclosures, requiring the wolves to move through multiple 
cages to get the reward, a condition found to limit the performance in dogs: Udell et al. 2008), 
hand-reared wolves tested under conditions comparable to dogs (with no fence separating 
subjects and experimenters), respond to human pointing at levels comparable (Gácsi et al. 
2009a) and superior to dogs (Udell et al. 2008). Moreover, recent study (and personal 
observation) suggest that ontogeny does contribute to dogs’ understanding of human 
communicative cues (Gácsi et al. 2009b; Costa et al. 2010), and that the failure of previous 
studies to demonstrate an effect of human interaction, owes to a methodological flaw of 
comparing subject groups with similar degrees of human experience and interaction (family- and 
kennel-reared dogs). As an alternative, van Rooijen (2010) suggests that responsiveness to 
human pointing cues separates along a species line of, not domestication, but cooperative 
foraging. Cooperatively foraging species include wolves, lions and dogs, though not 
chimpanzees who, despite hunting in groups, show little evidence of hunting cooperatively (for a 
cooperative interpretation of hunting by Taï chimpanzees, see e.g., Boesch 1994, 2002).12 Van 
                                               
12 According to the traditional definition cooperative behaviour (a behaviour whose outcome 
increases fitness of the participants: Hamilton 1964) chimpanzees a Taï National Park (Boesch 
& Boesch 1989, but no Gombe National Park: Busse 1978) hunt cooperatively. That is, hunting 
success increases with group size, and is larger for multi-male than single-male groups. While 
chimpanzees forage in groups and cooperate in a broad sense, there is little experimental and 
unequivocal observational evidence that they engage in collaboration (and by implication, true 
collaborative hunting), in the narrow sense, i.e., engage in interactions involving joint goals and 
intentions, and attend to things jointly, based on coordinated plans (Tomasello et al. 2005). For 
example, while Boesch argues that chimpanzee hunters perform complementary roles that may 
shift during hunts, thereby “demonstrating a capacity for role reversal and perspective-taking” 
(Boesch 2005, p. 692), such observations are plausibly explained with reference to lower-level 
cognitive processes, whereby the apes are responsive to others behaviourally, and individually 
assess the state of the hunt on a moment-to-moment basis (Tomasello et al. 2005). Indeed, 
controlled studies of captive, non-language trained chimpanzees, suggest that they perform 
poorly in role-reversal tasks, where individuals play different and complementary roles (for a 
role-reversal study see Povinelli et al. 1992, but also Tomasello & Call 1997 for an interpretation 
not involving understanding of role reversal). [In contrast, the two chimpanzees, Sherman and 
Austin, who had received extensive teaching in symbolic communication, nevertheless appeared 
to perform well on role reversal tasks: Savage-Rumbaugh 1986]. Moreover, while chimpanzees 
perform well in food-finding object-choice tasks structured around competition, they typically 
fail the cooperative version (e.g., Hare & Tomasello 2004); they show limited communication 
about third entities, and no ‘showing’ signals with an (unambiguous) declarative or informative 
motive. Furthermore, an observational study of captive chimpanzees revealed no inter-animal 
negotiation in general, and no negotiation over the intended meaning of signals, or requests for 
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Rooijen’s suggestion is, however, problematic, as there is there seems to be no directly 
comparable data to demonstrate that the cooperative hunting of wolves and dogs differ from 
that of chimpanzees in terms of underlying cognitive processes, such as shared intentionality.  
Demonstrations that both bonobos and chimpanzees, reared in socio-linguistically 
complex environments, pass an object-choice task involving highly proximal pointing (2-10 cm), 
suggest that either such proximal pointing produces an effective (essentially, non-social) local 
enhancement cue, or it lies within the capacity of at least two species of non-human great apes 
to deploy intentionally, purely informative, human social cues when the individuals have 
received particular rearing experiences (Lyn et al. 2010). While the social domestication 
hypothesis provides a nice framework, its explanatory strength, as applied to non-human 
primates, is somewhat questionable. Further research is required to elucidate the underlying 
differences within and between species passing object-choice tasks, and to disentangle the 
effects of domestication and ‘enculturation’ (and any potential interactive effect), and if, for 
example, enculturation overrides domestication effects, or if domestication simply has less 
explanatory value than originally granted. 
  
1.4. Triadic interactions, soliciting of interaction, help and information 
1.4.1 Referential looking and social referencing 
Referential looking has been defined as looks to another individual that are immediately 
preceded and/or followed (within 2s) by a look to an object (Russell et al. 1997; Roberts et al. 
2008), and some have suggested that the definition provides a means to determine if  an 
individual looks to another to seek information, or for other purposes, such as reassurance 
(Clyman et al. 1986, cited by e.g., Roberts et al. 2008). Indeed, in both human-reared 
chimpanzees and Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) older infants produce more frequent 
                                                                                                                                                 
clarification (Liebal et al. 2004b). While there is persuasive evidence that chimpanzees (Leavens et 
al. 2005) and orangutans (Cartmill & Byrne 2007) attempt to repair failed communication with 
humans who fail to give requested food items, Tomasello (1998) has argued that non-human 
primates’ signals lack the bidirectionality of human signals, whereby senders and receivers are 
aware that they can play both ‘roles’, and that apes “do not know it is the same signal when they 
send as when they receive it” (Tomasello et al. 2005, p. 685). These differences in definitions 
regarding what constitutes cooperation have led to different interpretations as to whether 
chimpanzees do (e.g., Boesch 2005) or do not (e.g., Tomasello et al. 2005; van Rooijen 2010) 
engage in actual cooperative hunting. 
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referential looks to caregivers in situations of  uncertainty, than younger infants do (Russell et al. 
1997; Roberts et al. 2008), which lends implicit support to this suggestion (i.e., a larger proportion 
of  referential looks by younger infants in situations of  uncertainty, would support a ‘reassurance-
interpretation’ of  ‘referential looks’). 
Social referencing is defined as the active seeking and subsequent use of  emotional 
information from others to evaluate ambiguous objects or events (Klinnert et al. 1986, cited by 
Russell et al. 1997). The simple triadic triangle encompasses (i) a subject, (ii) a referent (an 
ambiguous object or event), and (iii) an individual whose emotional state is sought and used, and 
includes (i) referential looks between the object/event and other individual, and (ii) behavioural 
regulation on the basis on the emotional information received. Such reading and use of  others’ 
emotional responses is highly adaptive, as it allows naïve individuals to learn the meaning of  
novel objects and situations, without engaging in potentially costly trial-and-error learning. 
In normally developing human infants, social referencing emerges towards the end of  
the first year, when infants begin to coordinate looks between people and objects. This ability of  
infants to guide their behaviour on the basis of  the emotional cues of  others, has by some (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen 1995) been considered a simple behavioural manifestation of  the understanding 
that others have intentions and emotions that may be directed towards external things, and 
consequently viewed as a basic precursor for later emerging theories of  mind. Traditional social 
referencing paradigms involve exposing subjects to ambiguous situations, strangers or novel 
objects, and let caregivers provide different emotional messages. While two experimental studies 
of  captive mother-infant chimpanzee pairs found little evidence of  infant social referencing 
(Itakura 1995; Tomonaga et al. 2004), human-reared chimpanzees exposed to a novel toy look 
referentially to their human caregivers and adjust their behaviour according to the valence of the 
message they receive (Russell et al. 1997). The significance of  the potential effect of  human 
enculturation on social referential engagement, however, remains poorly understood. 
 
1.4.2 Triadic interaction, and soliciting of help and objects 
Controversy remains regarding apes’ ability to share attention in a coordinated, triadic 
manner. For example, human-raised chimpanzees do not coordinate attention with humans in 
neither role-reversal nor object-choice tasks (Tomasello & Carpenter 2005), and a comparison 
of children, and human- and mother-reared chimpanzees and bonobos suggest that children 
spend far more time engaged in joint attention behaviours (e.g., gaze following, pointing, and 
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gaze alternation) than non-human apes, with human-raised apes falling in between children and 
mother-reared apes (Carpenter et al. 1998).  
Moreover, while chimpanzee infants engage in mutual gaze with their mothers, and follow 
human gaze, there is little evidence that they actively coordinate attention between objects and 
humans (Okamoto-Barth & Tomonaga 2006) or conspecifics (Bard & Vauclair 1984). Indeed, 
chimpanzee and bonobo mothers rarely manipulate objects in the presence of their offspring, 
and when observed to do so, infants do not coordinate attention between the objects and their 
mothers (Bard & Vauclair 1984). Recent research, however, suggests that juvenile and adult 
individuals of all the great ape species alternate gaze between humans (and conspecifics) and an 
object held by the human (Pitman & Shumaker 2009). Moreover, chimpanzees engage in gaze 
alternation during imperative food and object requests (Leavens & Hopkins 1998), and gorillas 
when requesting that a human perform an action for them (e.g., Gómez 1996). The actual 
meaning of these stimulus-other-stimulus gaze shifts, however, remains debated. 
Joint attention (versus joint attention behaviours) is widely defined as involving the mutual 
awareness that two or more individuals attend to a common focus (e.g., Tomasello 1995; 
Leavens & Racine 2009). While Tomasello initially suggested that gaze alternation implies such 
awareness, such a rich interpretation of gaze alternation has been questioned on the basis of e.g., 
the nature of gaze alternation of non-human primates. For instance, human infants engage in 
longer (almost twice as long) and more frequent episodes of gaze alternation than chimpanzees 
(Carpenter et al. 1995), and while human joint attention episodes are often accompanied by 
infant smiling (interpreted as implying a desire to share an experience), lack of smiling during 
non-human joint attention episodes has given rise to the (rather surprising and tenuous) 
suggestion that apes look to others to simply monitor and predict their subsequent actions 
(‘checking looks’: Tomasello & Carpenter 2005), rather than to e.g., share a mental experience 
(‘sharing looks’: ibid.).  
The seeking of emotional information and behavioural adjustment according to the 
valence of the message received by chimpanzees during tests of social referencing (Russell et al. 
1997), however, suggest that apes’ looks to others may be based on more than mere ‘surface’ 
predictions of others’ behaviour, and that the apes may understand some of the underlying 
elements involved in some form of basic, coordinated attention (for example, that emotions can 
be directed at external things). 
Since much ape social interaction around objects in has been suggested to be 
competitive, some of the most successful studies of possible coordinated attention in apes have 
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examined contexts, in which competition is limited and cooperation already manifest. That is, in 
play contexts and mother-offspring interactions. In these contexts, apes may sometime actively 
solicit aid and other forms of interaction from others. For example, Plooij (1978) described 
examples of a chimpanzee (in the wild) picking up an object, and beginning to run away from 
another individual, while looking back at the individual, which might then give chase. Moreover, 
in the context of playing social games, bonobos sometimes re-engaged a suddenly passive 
human partner by means of e.g., head bobbing, stomping, and grabbing and touching the 
human’s hand (Pika & Zuberbühler 2008), suggesting that the bonobos were aware of the joint 
activity and actively tried to re-engage the human therein. Furthermore, Tanner & Byrne (2010) 
reported a number of cases, in which juvenile and adult gorillas engaged in joint attention, and 
collaborative and triadic interactions during play with conspecifics. The gorillas frequently 
engaged in repeated bouts of gaze alternation between a play object and a social partner. While 
gaze alternation does not represent an unequivocal sign of joint attention (as it may simply 
function to check the interest, proximity and movement of others), the gorillas engaged in 
repeated bouts of gaze alternation to the same social partner, suggesting that they were actively 
sharing an experience (i.e., the game). Moreover, the authors report a number of cases in which 
objects were intentionally held up, shaken and shown to the conspecific.  
Gorillas will sometimes take a human’s hand, and lead a person to a door to be opened, 
while exchanging looks between the door and human (Gómez et al. 1993), and in a task 
requiring cooperation by two individuals to retrieve food, chimpanzees readily solicited help 
from a human partner, by whimpering, taking the hand and looking at the face of the human 
partner (Hirata & Fuwa 2007). While the chimpanzees did not spontaneously solicit help from 
conspecifics in a similar cooperative task (Hirata & Fuwa 2007), they may learn to do so. In a 
classic study of cooperation (upon which the aforementioned cooperation task was based), 
Crawford (1937, cited by Hirata & Fuwa 2007) reported that some chimpanzees eventually, 
actively, began to encourage conspecifics to cooperate, by means of gaze, gestures and physical 
contact. Finally, a recent study has shown that, when placed in two adjoining cages, where one 
chimpanzee had access to an out-of-reach food item, and its nearby conspecific was supplied 
with a tool to retrieve the food, individuals spontaneously requested the tool (by means of e.g., 
whole-hand reaching/gesturing), and the tool was subsequently delivered by the conspecific 
(Yamamoto et al. 2009). The complex experimental history of the chimpanzees (who had 
participated in numerous cognitive studies, including tasks involving reciprocity, and food- and 
token-sharing), however, raises the possibility that the behaviour may reflect cooperative capacities 
and expectations that do not necessarily extend to interactions between less ‘trained’ individuals.  
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The ‘Enculturation Hypothesis’ (Call & Tomasello 1996) posits that rearing and 
engagement in a human socio-cultural environment allows great apes to acquire cognitive 
abilities more typical of human cognition than that of their own species. Undeniably, some of 
the apes that engaged in the instances of triadic interaction reported above had received much 
such human interaction during ontogeny (e.g., Gómez et al. 1993; Hirata & Fuwa 2007; 
Yamamoto et al. 2009). Others, however, interacting with conspecifics, did not have such similar 
histories (see Pooij 1978; Tanner & Byrne 2010), and extensive human influence during 
ontogeny (and an ‘updating’ of their abilities to somewhat match those of human infants), does 
therefore not seem to have been the case. Non-human apes will, thus, under some 
circumstances, solicit aid and interaction from others. Still, controversy remains regarding apes’ 
sharing of attention in a coordinated, triadic manner, as does the argument that particular joint 
attention behaviours are qualitatively different in humans and non-human apes (e.g., Tomasello 
& Carpenter 2005). Since joint attention is most convincingly demonstrated if one individual 
spontaneously initiates re-direction of another’s attention, the next section examines the 
occurrence of this in non-human primates and human development and communication. 
 
 
1.5 Pointing without deixis  
1.5.1 Identifying communicative gestures  
 A pivotal issue in the study of primate communication is the understanding that 
individuals have of the communicative signals they and others produce. A subset of 
communicative acts suggests that individuals make informed choices about the effects of the 
their communicative signals. These entail that signallers intentionally adjust their communicative 
gestures for the purpose of influencing others. Given, however, the intricacy of establishing 
intentionality in non-linguistic communication, distinctions are typically made on the basis of 
the following criteria: (i) establishing mutual gaze to control recipient visual attention, (ii) gaze 
alternation, (iii) flexibility of communicative means (i.e., that individuals may use different 
means towards the same end, and the same means towards different ends), (iv) goal orientation, 
(v) response-waiting (waiting after the signal has been produced, expecting a response), and 
most importantly, (vi) that signals are used socially and adjusted to the attentional state of the 
audience (e.g., Piaget 1952; Bates 1976; Bruner 1981, cited by Pika et al. 2007; Gómez 1991; 
Bard 1992; Tomasello et al. 1994; Leavens & Hopkins 1998; Hosetter et al. 2001). These criteria 
help distinguish intentional gestures as an important and flexible subset of communicative 
behaviours, compared to many more stereotypic gestures 
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1.5.2 Definitions of pointing 
In human daily interaction, the canonical pointing gesture is ubiquitous and serves as a 
foundational building block for declaring, referring, asking and making a point. While head pose 
is an adventitious and often unintended consequence of visual attention, pointing provides a 
more explicit directional cue and is usually intended for attention direction (Deák & Triesch 
2006). Pointing is considered an important component of joint attention, and has, by virtue of 
its triadic referential function (by including a signaller, a recipient and establishing a connection 
to a third entity or event), been cast as a behavioural stepping-stone for labelling, symbolic 
reference and language development (e.g., Bates et al. 1975; Butterworth 1998; Goldin-Meadow 
& Butcher 2003). 
Bates, Camioni and Volterra (1975) suggested a distinction between proto-imperative 
and proto-declarative pointing (henceforth imperative and declarative), and that while 
imperative pointing involves using another individual as a means to an end (obtain objects, be 
picked up etc.), the object pointed to in declarative communication is the means, and the actual 
interaction with the other individual the end (“laughter, comment, smiles and eye contact – which 
we have termed attention”: Bates et al. 1975, p. 216). Crucially, Bates and colleagues explicitly 
defined both gesture types as instrumental acts, i.e., both were defined as a subset of imperative 
signals, used to provoke some form of behavioural response. Since then, imperatives and 
declaratives have received different interpretations, with the majority of formulations (though 
by no means all, see e.g., Gómez et al. 1993; Racine et al. 2008) suggesting that they reflect a 
considerable difference in the underlying psychological processes. Some argue that the main 
difference between the gestures lies in representational ability (Baron-Cohen 1991; Tomasello 
1995; Camaioni et al. 2004), others in motivation (e.g., Gómez et al. 1993). The ‘representational 
difference’ view has given imperative gestures a behaviourist interpretation (‘give me that’) and 
declarative gestures a mentalistic interpretation (‘look at that’). Accordingly, imperative gestures 
are held to reveal a causal understanding of others’ physical agency and may be a simple physical 
interaction, in which the sender acts to change the recipient’s behaviour (rather than state of 
mind), and may be learned by virtue of contingencies. Since both autistic children and many 
primates use imperative (and not declarative) signals, the ‘representational difference’ view has 
cast imperatives as fairly trivial. In contrast, declarative gestures have been interpreted as 
revealing sensitivity to others’ mental agency and a desire to share attention, experiences and 
interest, thus implying an ability to represent others’ mental states. Declarative gestures have 
thus been cast as a precursor to a ToM (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1991) a behavioural stepping-stone 
for symbolic reference (Bates et al. 1975; Butterworth 1998), the development (e.g., Butterworth 
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2003) and evolution of language (Hewes 1981), and a species-specific human trait (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt 1989; Donald 1991; Povinelli & Davis 1994), reflecting an evolutionary and 
ontogenetic entry into a world of shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007), and an 
evolutionary discontinuity in the understanding of meaning as communicated in an inter-
subjectively shared world (Brinck & Gärdenfors 2003; Tomasello 2006). 
This classical view of imperative and declarative pointing has, however, created a 
seemingly false dichotomy, that understates any possible consideration of others’ attentional and 
mental states involved in imperative pointing, and overstates the pro-social and cooperative 
motive underlying declarative pointing (Gómez et al. 1993; Southgate et al. 2007). Alternatively, 
the ‘motivational difference’ view holds that imperative and declarative gestures do not differ at 
the level of required representation, but in motivation. Accordingly, declarative gestures need 
not involve an understanding of others’ mental agency, and can be used simply to elicit an 
emotional and/or attentional reaction in others (Gómez et al. 1993). Both emotional and 
attentional states are reflected in overt facial expressions and behaviours, and the desire to 
provoke them in others does therefore not require an ability to represent mental states, and a 
wish to elicit a mental experience. All it requires are intentional states about others’ attentional 
states (as reflected in overt behaviours), and an understanding of a link between the overt 
manifestations of attentional and emotional states of others. According to this view, individuals 
may point declaratively, to monitor the addressee’s attentional and emotional responses to 
objects or events (Gómez et al. 1993), and the difference between the two gesture types 
therefore lies in making others react behaviourally (imperative) versus look to and react emotionally 
(declarative). Imperative and declarative pointing are thus viewed as equally good ToM 
precursors and their cognitive equivalence supported by their temporal co-emergence in 
children around 12 months (e.g., Carpenter et al. 1998). Although one study suggested that 
imperatives and declaratives emerge in sequence, with declaratives appearing later and being 
related to the emergence of intentional understanding (Camaioni et al. 2004), the study 
contained a significant methodological flaw13, and all other studies have indicated a 
simultaneous emergence of the two types of pointing.  
 
                                               
13 While the study’s imperative condition required 9-17 month olds to point to proximal targets 
(1m distance), the declarative condition required pointing to distal objects (3m). As there is some 
suggestion that proximal pointing emerges earlier in human development (and is more frequent) 
than distal pointing (e.g., Lock et al. 1990), the study confounded proximity and point type. 
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The different interpretations produce different and, in some cases, contradictory notions 
about the cognitive capacities required for declarative communication. For clarity, the main 
suggested motivations for pointing are listed below: 
1. Pointing for imperative purposes: Pointing to request an out-of-reach object, or spur 
another on to perform some action on an object (Bates et al. 1975; Gómez 2004). 
2. Pointing for informative purposes: Pointing to change others’ knowledge about e.g., the 
location of an object, i.e., to “helpfully provide information for the other” (Liszkowski 2005, 
p 147).  
3. Pointing for declarative purposes:  
a. Pointing to show, but not possess an object (Bates et al. 1975); Pointing to obtain an 
interaction with the other individual (“laughter, comment, smiles and eye contact – 
which we have termed ‘attention”: Bates et al. 1975, p. 216). 
b. Pointing to elicit interactions and appealing behaviour from and with social partners 
(Moore & Corkum 1994). 
c. Pointing to share attention, attitudes (Liszkowski et al. 2004), emotions and 
experiences with the addressee (Tomasello 1999); Pointing to influence the mind of 
a social partner (Baron-Cohen 1989, 1995) 
4. Pointing for social referencing purposes: Pointing to provoke an attentional response that 
can be used to monitor the addressee’s attentional and emotional responses, and thereby 
discern ambiguity in situations of uncertainty, and provide information about an object or 
event, and how to respond (see e.g., Gómez et al. 1993). While this type of pointing has thus 
far been assigned a declarative label, it seems reasonable to treat it as an independent 
category. Social referential pointing neither functions to ‘share’ attention, attitudes or 
emotions, nor to elicit an ‘interaction’ as such, but simply to provoke an attentional/ 
emotional response, that the subject can deploy for social referencing purposes. 
Thus, while imperative pointing, minimally, involves a behavioural-based understanding 
that attentional states can produce behaviours that can be used to attain object-related goals, 
declarative and informative pointing is taken to entail some understanding of the interlocutor’s 
perceptual and informational states (Liszkowski et al. 2007). By contrast, social referential 
pointing, minimally, suggests that one conceives others as having emotional and/or behavioural 
responses towards the environment, that may be elicited by manipulating their attention 
(without necessarily representing the mental implication thereof).  
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The behavioural criteria that distinguish the different forms of pointing rest on whether 
the ‘pointer’ seems ‘satisfied’ with the reaction of the other individual, and indeed modifies his 
or her behaviour as a function of the other’s response to the pointing.  An imperative motive in 
human infant pointing is typically inferred if the subject stops pointing if the other individual 
performs some form of action on the indicated object (e.g., gives the object to the subject). In 
contrast, the criteria for establishing a declarative motive is typically based on whether the 
subject is satisfied (i.e., ceases pointing), if the other individual simply looks to the indicated 
location and subsequently emotes positively to the infant (i.e., engages in an interaction with the 
subject about the indicated object).  
Since social referential pointing is not about eliciting an interaction with the other, so as to 
share e.g., attitudes and experiences, but simply to provoke an attentional/emotional response, that 
the subject can use for social referencing purposes, pointing can be said to fall into this category 
if the subject adjusts its behaviour according to the valence of the other’s emotional response 
the indicated object. For example, a fearful response in the other is predicted to evoke similar 
fearful behaviours in the subject, while approach and inspection of the object is predicted to 
make the subject more likely to do the same. 
 
1.5.3 Non-verbal deixis in human development 
Human infants show an extraordinary ability to follow the attention of their social 
partners, and, later in ontogeny, to intentionally secure and redirect the attention of others. The 
propensity to flexibly read and use pointing cues in communicative contexts develops around 9-
12 months, before children acquire language (Tomasello & Rakoczy 2003), but around the time 
when they begin to use single-word utterances (e.g., Butterworth 2003). There is some 
disagreement about the relative timing of the emergence of point and head/gaze cue 
understanding. While many studies suggest that infants to respond to head and gaze changes prior 
to manual pointing (e.g., Butterworth & Jarrett 1991; Butterworth & Itakura 2000), others 
studies suggest that points and gaze are understood simultaneously towards the end of the first 
year (e.g., Corkum & Moore 1995), reflecting the emergence of an understanding of the 
referential nature of multiple cues. More recent studies suggest that understanding of pointing 
slightly precedes understanding gaze cues (Triesch et al. 2006), and when added to a gaze and 
head cue, increases attention following (Flom et al. 2004), and results in more accurate 
peripheral target localisation (Butterworth & Itakura 2000), possibly due to the higher 
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discriminative validity and salience provided by the motion of manual points (Deák & Triesch 
2006). 
Comprehension of pointing occurs towards the end of the first year, slightly in advance 
of production of the gesture. In typical human development, infants follow pointing to near 
objects around 9 months of age, and more distant objects around 12 months (e.g., Butterworth 
& Jarrett 1991). Although infants as young as 18 days have been observed to spontaneously 
extend the index finger from a closed fist (Hannan & Fogel 1987, cited by Kita 2003), these are 
undirected motor acts, not communicative acts. Longitudinal and cross-sectional studies show 
that infants begin to produce the canonical pointing gesture at an average of 11 and 12 months, 
respectively (longitudinal: Butterworth and Morissette 1996; Carpenter et al. 1998; cross-
sectional: Leung and Rheingold 1981), although infants as young as 8.5 months have been 
observed to point communicatively (Butterworth & Morisette 1996). The pointing gesture 
emerges suddenly, as if after a stage transition (Butterworth 2003), and constitutes more than 
60% of all infant gestures by 12 months (Lock et al. 1990).  
 
1.5.4 Non-verbal deixis in non-human apes 
Primates who are reared with human contact and have been explicitly (through 
teaching), or implicitly exposed to the functional aspects of human pointing, are able to attract 
and redirect others to things that they want (e.g., chimpanzees: Gardner & Gardner 1985; 
Woodruff & Premack 1979; Leavens et al. 1996, 2005; Krause & Fouts 1997; Leavens & 
Hopkins 1998; gorillas: Patterson 1978 cited by Racine et al. 2008; Gómez et al. 1993; 
orangutans: Miles 1990; Call & Tomasello 1994; macaques: Hess et al. 1993; Kumashiro et al. 
2002; squirrel monkeys: Anderson et al. 2001). While however, there are numerous reports of 
apes spontaneously engaging in pointing to request objects, monkeys have only been reported 
to engage in pointing following explicit training, suggesting that the behaviour may come more 
easily to apes than monkeys. 
Given the typically confined environment of captive primates, it is not surprising that 
they learn to use humans as an effective social tool to obtain out-of-reach objects (‘social tool 
use’: e.g., Bard 1990, Leavens et al. 1996, 2005, 2008). The traditional low-level interpretation of 
non-human pointing holds that animals learn to point to desired objects outside the confines of 
their cages by means of blind trial-and-error learning. Captive chimpanzees, however, frequently 
combine multiple communicative signals (e.g., manual pointing gestures and repeated head/gaze 
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shifts) when requesting objects from humans, and take into account the attentional states of 
experimenters (e.g., Leavens et al. 2004) suggesting some understanding of others’ attention and 
visual perspective.  
It has been widely argued that apes do not point amongst themselves (e.g., Povinelli 
2003; Moll & Tomasello 200714). Nonetheless, there are numerous examples of apes in both 
captivity and the wild using manual pointing gestures and other forms of referential behaviours 
during communication with conspecifics. While observations from wild populations are, 
exceptionally rare (captive populations: Savage-Rumbaugh et al.  1977; de Waal 198215; Bard & 
Vauclair 1984: Savage-Rumbaugh 198616; Tanner & Byrne 1996; Tanner et al. 2006; 
Zimmermann et al. 2009; wild populations: bonobos: Veà-Sabater-Pi 1998; chimpanzees: Pika & 
Mitani 2006), recent study has shown that chimpanzees in the wild consistently, indicate parts of 
their own bodies that they seemingly want others to groom, by means of exaggerated scratching 
behaviours (Pika & Mitani 2006), suggesting that non-verbal deixis may be a more frequent 
component of the natural communication of wild ape populations than previously assumed. All 
of these gestures, however, are imperative and about spurring others into action to do 
something for the subject. 
Zimmermann and colleagues (Zimmermann et al. 2009) found that bonobos and 
orangutans guided a human experimenter to the location of a hidden tool that was needed to 
retrieve food for the animals. The tool was hidden in the presence of the animal, but in the 
absence of the human experimenter. While bonobos and orangutans who participated in the 
experiment had extensive experience with the request and delivery of food and other items from 
and by humans (for details, see Appendix 3), the experiment demonstrated an ability to adjust 
communication in accordance to the human’s knowledge/ignorance of the tool’s location, and 
point to the location when needed. The proximate mechanisms and cognitive sophistication 
                                               
14 “there has not been a single reliable documentation of any scientist in any part of the world of 
one ape pointing for another”(Moll & Tomasello 2007, p. 643). 
15 E.g., de Waal reported the following interaction: “On a hot day two mothers, Jimmie and 
Tepel, are sitting in the shadow of an oak tree while their two children play in the sand at their 
feet. Between the two mothers the oldest female, Mama, lies asleep. Suddenly the children start 
screaming, hitting, and pulling each other’s hair. Jimmie admonishes them with a soft, 
threatening grunt, and Tepel anxiously shifts her position. The children go on quarrelling, and 
eventually Tepel wakes Mama by poking her in the ribs several times. As Mama gets up Tepel 
points to the two quarrelling children. As soon as Mama takes one threatening step forward, 
waves her arm in the air, and barks loudly the children stop quarrelling. Mama then lies down 
again and continues her siesta.” (de Waal 1982, p. 34). 
16 Savage-Rumbaugh (1986) observed one chimpanzee request food from another on repeated 
occasions during a cooperative laboratory task. 
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underlying this pointing behaviour remain obscure, and it is unclear if the pointing was 
motivated by an intention to inform the human experimenter about the tool’s location 
(informative pointing: Liszkowski 2005), or a complex imperative request that the human 
recover and use to tool to retrieve food (Gómez 2004; Tomasello et al. 2007; Zimmermann et al. 
2009). Overall, however, the capacity of apes to request absent objects (such as food or tools) 
does not require an informative explanation (Gómez 2007).  
Declarative gestures have only been reported for human-raised and language-trained apes 
(Patterson 1978; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986, 1998) and one wild bonobo extending an 
outstretched arm towards some poorly hidden nearby scientists and alternating gaze between 
the humans and its conspecifics (Veà & Sabater-Pi 1998)17. Importantly, these reports are 
anecdotal; in all cases interpretation is at issue, and the declarative intention may exist only in 
the eyes of the human beholder. Moreover, experimental measures that reliably educe 
declarative behaviours from human infants, have failed to do so from chimpanzees interacting 
with humans (Tomasello & Carpenter 2005). The conclusion typically drawn is that while non-
human apes gesture imperatively, they do not share the human ability and/or motivation to 
communicate declaratively (e.g., Gómez et al. 1993; Povinelli & O’Neill 2000; Tomasello & 
Carpenter 2005). Despite an understanding of others’ goals and intentions, it is widely argued 
that apes do not understand communicative intentions, do not know what is informationally new for 
others, and/or lack a motivation to share experiences, goals and intentions with others, and to 
help them by informing them about objects and events  (Tomasello 2006).  
A key component of intentionally referential behaviour is the ostensive component, 
(“showing that one wants to show something” Gómez 1996, p. 80). There is some evidence that 
human-reared gorillas engage in eye contact to control the attention of human experimenters, 
and follow such by requestive behaviours (Gómez et al. 1993), and that chimpanzees use mutual 
gaze to signal ostension before encouraging conspecifics to follow them to the location of 
hidden objects (Menzel 1973, 1974; Menzel & Halperin 1975).  Moreover, eye contact and gaze 
                                               
17 “February 24, 1989. 13:09 h. Noises are heard coming from the vegetation. A young male 
swings from a branch and leaps into a tree […]. He emits sharp calls, which are answered by 
other individuals who are not visible. He points - with his right arm stretched out and his hand 
half closed except for his index and ring fingers - to the position of the two groups of 
camouflaged observers who are in the undergrowth (30 m apart). At the same time he screams 
and turns his head to where the other members of the group are. 13:12 h. The same individual 
repeats the pointing and calling sequence twice. Other neighbouring members of the group 
approach. They look towards the observers. The young male joins them." (Vea & Sabater-Pi 
1999, p. 289). 
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alternation combined with imperative gestures have provisionally (though never officially18) 
been reported for bonobos presented with a human or conspecific holding a novel object 
(O'Connell 1994). De Waal (2001)19 has consequently suggested that bonobos may use gaze as 
an intentional referential signal, in lieu of imperative manual pointing, by engaging in ostensive 
behaviour (i.e., establish attentional contact to signal communicative intent), and subsequently 
alternate gaze between the interlocutor and a desired object.  
There are, a few series of studies that suggests that apes do produce spontaneous, 
complex referential behaviours to elicit an attentional reaction in conspecifics. For example, 
gorillas have been observed to repeatedly use apparent deictic manual gestures to seemingly 
draw conspecifics’ attention to distal locations (Tanner & Byrne 1996)20. Moreover, Menzel and 
colleagues (Menzel 1973, 1974; Menzel & Halperin 1975) reported that when a lone chimpanzee 
was shown where food, or a frightening object, was hidden in an outdoor enclosure, the rest of 
its group grasped the valence and approximate location of the object when let into the 
enclosure. While most chimpanzees were led to the location by the adventitious, referential 
information that the informed chimpanzee emitted, some informed chimpanzees seemingly 
actively directed conspecifics to the appropriate locations by walking towards the spots, looking 
back at the others, waiting until they began to follow, and if not, pulling their arm or body and 
leading them towards the objects. Neither Menzel’s nor de Waal’s suggestions have, however, 
been “substantiated as more than personal impressions” (Tomasello 2006, p. 521).  
                                               
18 O’Connell (1994, cited by Gómez 1996) reported the occurrence eye contact, gaze alternation 
and imperative gestures in bonobos presented with either a conspecific or a human holding a 
novel object, and argued that bonobos use gaze to regulate interactions with conspecifics. 
O’Connell also reported that bonobos frequently use gaze to regulate every-day (non-
experimental) dyadic play interactions with conspecifics. The observations were reported at a 
conference, though never published. A number of flaws relating to the research program 
(R.I.M. Dunbar, personal communication) may account for the lack of publication, and suggests that 
the observations be treated with caution.  
19 Nikkie had gotten used to my throwing wild berries to him across the moat at the zoo where 
I worked. One day, while I was recording data about the apes, I totally forgot about the berries, 
which hung on a row of tall bushes behind me. Nikkie hadn't forgotten. He sat down right in 
front of me, locked his red-brown eyes into mine, and -- once he had my attention -- abruptly 
jerked his head and eyes away from mine to fixate with equal intensity on a point over my left 
shoulder. He then looked back at me and repeated the move. I may be dense compared with a 
chimpanzee, but the second time I turned to see what he was looking at, and spotted the 
berries” (de Waal 2001, p. B7). “Show us the cases where apes point things out to one another, 
the skeptics say. Unfortunately, they mean manual pointing, not Nikkie's pointing with his eyes, 
or the whole-body point noted by Menzel -- methods that are far more common.” (de Waal 
2001) p. B8). 
20 E.g., Kubie a male gorilla at San Francisco Zoo, occasionally produced “[a manual knocking 
gesture that] in some cases seemed to indicate, or at least draw attention to, a particular 
[location]” (Tanner and Byrne (1996, p. 169). 
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These findings raise two relevant issues; first, that apes may engage in an inconspicuous, 
multi-faceted form of body pointing (rather than using a specialised referential signal, such as an 
extended arm and/or finger: e.g., Menzel 1973), or point with their eyes, by using gaze as an 
intentional referential signal (de Waal 2001). Second, while the question remains, as to whether 
the apes in Menzel’s studies behaved to encourage others to act upon the target (imperative 
intention) or to influence their mental states (declarative intention, as defined in more recent 
formulations, see above), or to evoke an attentional and/or emotional reaction, as reflected in 
overt manifestations (social referential pointing intention), the results suggest that apes may, 
under some circumstances, direct conspecifics to hidden objects to, minimally, elicit an 
attentional response.  
 
1.5.5 The morphology of non-verbal deixis 
Pointing is broadly defined as a communicative movement that projects a vector from 
the body to indicate a direction, object, event or location (Kita 2003). Researchers of non-
primates (e.g., dogs) have typically deployed a broad definition of deixis (the ability to locate, a 
specific entity or location for another), consisting of (i) an attention-getting and (ii) a directional 
component (Miklósi et al. 2000), while studies of humans and other primates (with arms and 
hands!) have often used a more narrow definition of simultaneous extension of the arm and 
index finger, with the remaining fingers curled under the hand (e.g., Franco & Butterworth 
1996; Butterworth 2003; Povinelli et al. 1997, 2003). Butterworth and colleagues have advocated 
a distinction between children’s referential gestures with and without index finger extension, 
with only the former reflecting an understanding of the psychological states of the 
communicative partner (Franco & Butterworth 1996)21, and suggested that the arm and pointing 
hand have become specialised for referential communication, due to salience and usefulness in 
taking attention to the ‘peripheral’ (Butterworth 2003). While longer levers are superior in terms 
of conspicuousness and reduction of the distance between the pointer and indicated entity, and 
index fingers exceed other digits in terms of attention directing efficiency (Ariga & Watanabe 
2009)22, experiments into attentional shifts evoked by various hand gestures, however, suggest 
no advantage of experimentally manipulated longer versus shorter fingers (ibid.).  
                                               
21 The authors argued that while human whole-hand points serve to request objects, or actions 
on objects, index finger points serve to comment (Franco & Butterworth 1996; Butterworth 2003). 
22 Ariga & Watanabe (2009) examined the functional significance of index finger extension by 
studying the efficacy of different manual pointing gestures (fist with no finger extended, index 
Introduction 
 
 
38
In human interaction, referential index finger pointing is ubiquitous, and has been cast 
as a biologically engendered (Povinelli & Davis 1994), universal from of human reference that 
reflects neurobiological adaptations, unique to the human lineage (Butterworth 1995). The 
gesture is widely considered independent of social transmission, which is supported by its cross-
cultural stability (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989) and ability to elicit automatic shifts of attention (Ariga & 
Watanabe 2009) in a manner similar to that found in comparable gaze following paradigms 
(Emery et al. 1997). Despite the prevalence of index finger pointing in the West, and the 
consequent typical inclusion of index finger extension in the definition of pointing, manual 
pointing, however, differs cross-culturally in function, semantics and types of referents 
indicated. The function typically ascribed in the West is cross-culturally, frequently and 
conventionally, achieved by other morphological forms of pointing, e.g., whole hand-, elbow-, 
head-, eye- and lip-pointing23. In multiple societies lip and index finger pointing coexist (e.g., 
Arrente, Awtuw & Ewe: see Wilkins 2003), and in some, index finger pointing is infrequent 
(Kuna and Awtuw) and purportedly non-existent (the Barai, Watam & Yimas populations of 
New Guinea), with its function subsumed in ubiquitous and conventionalised lip pointing24. The 
prevalence, dominance and, in several groups on one island, exclusivity of lip pointing, casts 
doubt on the hitherto untested assumption that other forms of deixis but index finger pointing 
are inferior and less precise (as suggested by e.g., Hewes 1981 & Butterworth 2003). Individuals 
in these cultures most probably neither lack, nor have a different understanding of deixis and 
referential intent.  
Moreover, human declarative gestures have different semiotic (including semantic) 
features, suggesting that pointing encompasses multiple or additive phenomena. Within for 
example the culture of Naples, Italy, different forms of manual pointing carry different semantic 
                                                                                                                                                 
finger extended, little finger extended). All gestures triggered automatic attentional shifts 
towards the pointing direction, in a manner similar to that found in comparable gaze following 
paradigms (Emery et al. 1997), however the index finger point produced a larger cueing effect, 
leading to the overall suggestion that the processing of hand gestures form part of a primitive 
orienting reflex. Whether index finger advantage in modulating reflexive attention has a genetic 
or ontogenetic origin (as proposed by Butterworth [1998], who suggested that the habitual use 
of pointing gesture shapes the brain) remains unknown.  
23 Lip pointing consists of quickly shifting the eyes toward an intended entity, and raising the 
eyebrows and head, during which the mouth is first opened, and then closed with the lower lip 
thrust outward from the face (e.g., Wilkins 2003). 
24 Absence of index finger pointing has been reported for the Yimas and Watam New Guinean 
populations (Foley, reported by Wilkins 2003), and failure to understand the referential intent 
typically inferred from deictic index finger points for the Barai: “The Barai [of Papua New 
Guinea] were confounded when Olson used index-finger points with respect to objects as a 
means for getting names for them” (pers. com. with ethnographer Mike Olson reported by 
Wilkins 2003, p. 176).  
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connotations that are related to the way the object referred to, is presented within the speaker’s 
dialogue (Kendon & Versante 2003).25 Six types of declarative pointing (including three whole-
hand points, morphologically similar to chimpanzee whole-hand pointing gestures) have been 
identified, distinguished by the shape of the hand and rotation of the forearm, and associated 
semantic differences in meaning, leading to the suggestion that the pointing type provides 
information, as to how a speaker wishes an indicated object to be considered (Kendon & 
Versante 2003). If so, gestural deixis can function as more than an indicating tool, with its exact 
meaning interpreted on the basis of features that accompany the directional component.  
The plurality of form, and the in some cases subtle, morphological differences in 
pointing gestures and associated changes in meaning, and the apparent lack of use and/or 
understanding of the referential intent of index finger pointing among the multiple human 
groups, have implications for the study of non-human comprehension and production of 
referential gestures. If the form of pointing gestures is culturally specified (as per the suggestion 
that the gesture is acquired through imitation: Scassellati 1999; Brinck 2004), and not universally 
understandable, the implication is that no single phylogenetic and ontogenetic laws can be 
presupposed from the prevalence (and possibly, comprehension) of particular forms of deixis 
(Wilkins 2003). If index finger pointing is a socially transmitted gesture, and declarative gestures 
implicate the same cognitive capacities as true imitation (e.g., Brinck 2003, 2004), the limited 
imitative abilities of chimpanzees (e.g., Whiten et al. 2004) could be argued to underlie the 
scarcity/absence of chimpanzee declarative gestures. Nonetheless, the near universality of the 
human index finger pointing gesture, and the emergence of declarative index finger pointing in 
early human ontogeny (at a time when the ability to engage in full and ‘true’ imitation has not 
developed), raises serious doubt as to the claim that declarative gestures implicate the same 
cognitive abilities as true imitation (e.g., Brinck 2003).  
If a species has the ability to produce referential deixis, it should (irrespective of how 
inconspicuously the capacity may be expressed) be capable of manipulating conspecific 
attention as efficiently, as a human pointing with the index finger (e.g., Menzel 1973).26 Thus, 
                                               
25 Kendon & Versante (2003) found that in Naples, whole-hand points serve to direct the 
attention of the addressee to something on account of its implication for the interaction. For 
instance, whole-hand points with the palm facing upwards, offer something for examination, 
while points with the palm oriented obliquely indicate the relationship between the indicated 
entity and the speaker’s interlocutor. 
26 Indeed, this is supported by recent neuroimaging studies, showing that different forms of 
pointing (pointing manually, or with gaze) are grounded in a common cerebral network (i.e. 
both manual and ocular pointing activate the posterior parietal and frontal cortecies, see 
Løvenbruck et al. 2009) 
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research into ape production of nonverbal deixis should place less emphasis on arm (and finger) 
extensions (e.g., Menzel 1974), and look for behaviours in general that may function as deictic 
gestures. The key features of pointing lie in function and directionality, not morphology.  
 
1.6 This study  
Despite considerable attention to the ‘enculturation hypothesis’ (Call & Tomasello 
1996), ontogeny and environment frequently receive short shrift in studies and conclusions 
drawn regarding ape social communication, where the behaviours of typically developing 
children are frequently compared with those of animals with rearing histories untypical of their 
own species. The vast majority of cognitive studies of ape social attention have been conducted 
with a few groups of apes, raised in close contact with humans, and who have participated in 
numerous experimental studies in joint attentional contexts (see Appendix 3). Ontogeny, 
however, is as important as phylogeny in the expression of phenotypic characters, and 
(perhaps, particularly) also of cognitive-communicative skills that develop in social contexts. 
For example, cooperation, emotional engagement and joint attention behaviours vary in 
chimpanzees as a function of early experience, and differ across individuals who are raised with 
cohorts in standard nursery conditions, experience a stressful first 4 weeks of life (after which 
they were removed from their mothers for safety reasons), and those who have received an 
additional four hour daily human caregiver interaction (Bard & Gardner 1996; Bard et al. 2005; 
van Ijzendoorn et al. 2009), suggesting that care should be exercised when attributing socio-
cognitive performance to species differences, without careful consideration of ontogeny. 
 This research program had three main aims. First, (i) I wished to assess the conspecific 
attention following skills of experimentally naïve bonobos and orangutans, for whom little 
systematic information exists (see, however, Kaplan & Rogers 2002 for two observations of 
conspecific orangutan gaze following, and Pitman & Shumaker 2009 for a recent study of 
conspecific gaze following). Moreover, while chimpanzee conspecific attention following has 
been demonstrated under conditions where multiple observed individuals have been induced to 
raise their heads at an 80 angle to look towards food presented in an observation tower 
(Tomasello et al. 1998), and in more subtle interactions between humans and chimpanzees with 
substantial experimental experience, little is known about its occurrence during every-day 
interactions with conspecifics, towards locations where no interesting events (such as human 
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presence) typically occur. Primates may be more interested in what conspecifics than humans 
attend to, and to motivate joint attention behaviours, subjects in the present research program 
were therefore tested in naturalistic settings during interactions with conspecifics. 
 Second, (ii) I wished to test the hypothesis that experimentally naïve bonobos, 
chimpanzees and orangutans are able and inclined to geometrically follow the attention of 
conspecifics (rather than humans) around barriers in non-competitive situations. The decision 
to test this emerged during the analysis of data from the ape population first tested 
(chimpanzees at Copenhagen zoo). ‘Direct attention following’ and ‘geometric attention 
following’ were therefore not designated conditions from the study outset, but emerged out of 
the opportunistic nature of the experimental set-up and data collection, which sometimes 
required the animals to locomote around a barrier, so as to co-orient to conspecific visual 
attention. In trials conducted with other chimpanzee populations, bonobos and orangutans 
(which were tested using the same basic methodology, detailed in Chapter 2), I sought an even 
distribution of ‘direct’ and ‘geometric’ trial conditions. Given the rarity of opportunities to 
conduct trials (which had to fulfil a number of requirements), there was, however, some 
variation in the relative proportions of ‘direct’ and ’geometric’ trials across the species. 
Visual replicas of predators (e.g., leopards, eagles and snakes) have been presented to a 
number of species (e.g., chimpanzees: Menzel 1974; vervet monkeys, Cercopithecus aethiops: 
Cheney & Seyfarth 1985; fowls, Gallus gallus: Evans & Evans 2006; Barbary macaques: Roberts 
et al. 2008; Putty-nosed monkeys, Cercopithecus nictitan martini: Arnold & Zuberbühler 2008; 
Campbell’s Monkeys, Cercopithecus campbelli: Ouattara et al. 2009) and have, in some cases, elicited 
functionally referential vocalisations and directional behaviours towards the replicas, that 
conspecifics have used to guide their own behaviour. The question of the animals’ consideration 
of others’ visual access to the replicas, and potentially intentional re-direction of conspecifics to 
the replicas, however, remains debated, and have widely been dismissed. One way to disentangle 
intentional signals from the unintentional, adventitious, stimulus-directional cues that frequently 
accompany fear responses is to present objects that evoke interest and/or uncertainty, rather 
than fear or want, and record if behaviours (and combinations thereof) differ as a function of 
conspecific presence and visual attention to the objects. 
 While social referencing studies have presented apes with non-frightening, novel objects, 
the mother’s/caregiver’s visual access to the stimulus has typically obviated any need for the 
infants to actively redirect the mother’s/caregiver’s attention to the object. The one social 
referencing study, which has included trials, in which the infant saw a novel (though potentially 
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frightening) object before its mother did (macaques: Roberts et al. 2008), did not examine the 
presence of attention getting behaviours, and neither intentional nor adventitious (functional) 
attention directing. To fill this gap in the literature, the present study presented chimpanzees, 
bonobos and orangutans with a novel stimulus of potential but ambiguous significance (a laser 
image or pattern), predicted to evoke interest rather than fear or want, so as to test if the apes 
would lead conspecifics to detect the stimulus. The third (iii) aim of this research program was 
therefore to identify possible behaviours that consistently act as cues triggering intra-specific 
attention following, and test if the apes engaged in directional signalling that, although not 
necessarily corresponding to hand-pointing, might be meaningful to the animals. That is, 
whether the apes might engage in non-verbal deixis when during interactions with conspecifics. 
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CHAPTER 2: Attention following in chimpanzees 
 
Summary 
 Following others’ attention is an adaptive skill that enables individuals to obtain and share 
useful information. This study investigated whether chimpanzees follow conspecific attention to 
distal locations. Ten adult and three infant chimpanzees were presented with a novel visual 
stimulus to test if they would lead an ignorant conspecific to detect it under two experimental 
conditions. In one, the conspecific faced the communicator, while another required the 
communicator to first attract the attention of a non-attending conspecific. Five control conditions 
tested the likelihood that conspecifics detected the stimulus on their own, and the influence of 
conspecific presence, and one examined audience effects. Adult chimpanzees failed one control 
condition (which however showed the right tendency), yet all comparisons support the notion of 
attention re-orientation in response to both adult and infant conspecific behaviour. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A central issue in the study of primate communication is the extent to which individuals 
share the attention of others. Chimpanzees follow the gaze of humans to distal locations outside 
their own visual fields, looking behind barriers and themselves in the process, in a manner 
suggesting that gaze following is not an inflexible stimulus-response (Povinelli & Eddy 1997; 
Tomasello et al. 1998; Call et al. 1998; Tomasello et al. 1999; Bräuer et al. 2005). Chimpanzees 
also follow the attention of conspecifics under conditions where other individuals have been 
induced to raise their head at an 80 angle (Tomasello et al. 1998; Pitman & Shumaker 2009) and 
in competitive contexts (Hare et al. 2000; Hare et al. 2001). Importantly, however, while 
chimpanzees show flexible and sophisticated cognitive abilities in tasks involving competition, 
these are typically not expressed in cooperative contexts when a helpful a human or conspecific 
provides gaze or other directional cues about the location of hidden food (Povinelli et al. 1996; 
Tomasello et al. 1997; Povinelli et al. 1997; Call et al. 1998; Itakura et al. 1999; Povinelli & 
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Bierschwale 1999; Call et al. 2000; Hare & Tomasello 2004). Recently, however, researchers have 
argued that environmental and methodological differences greatly influence chimpanzees’ (and 
other great apes’) use of declarative human gestures in the object-choice task (Mulcahy & Call 
2009; Lyn 2010), and have shown that chimpanzees (and bonobos) reared in socio-linguistically 
complex environments, do deploy proximal human points to a baited container (2-10 cm 
distance to the container), when these are accompanied by additional cues, such as a 
vocalisations and gaze alternation between the subject and the indicated container (Lyn et al. 
2010). 
 
2.2 Study 1: Adult chimpanzees 
2.2.1 Introduction 
 The study had two aims. First, chimpanzee conspecific gaze-following has been 
demonstrated under conditions where the observed individual has been induced to raise its head 
at an 80 angle to look towards food presented in an observation tower (Tomasello et al. 1998) 
or to a location approx. 2m above and immediately behind the subject, and indeed in more 
subtle interactions (involving less conspicuous head movements between humans and 
chimpanzees with substantial experimental experience (Bräuer et al. 2005). Yet, little is known 
about its occurrence during more naturalistic interactions with conspecifics. Second, the 
experiment tested the hypothesis that experimentally naïve chimpanzees are able and inclined to 
geometrically follow the gaze of conspecifics (rather than humans) in a non-food related and 
non-competitive context. 
Participants were tested in naturalistic settings during interactions with conspecifics and 
presented with a laser stimulus of potential, but ambiguous significance, predicted to evoke 
interest rather than want or fear. One individual in a dyad (the communicator) was presented 
with a moving laser pattern or image to test if a conspecific (termed, ‘the target’) would co-
orient to the communicator’s attention to the stimulus under two experimental conditions. In 
the first condition the target animal faced the communicator who viewed the stimulus, while in 
the second condition, it faced away from the communicator. The first condition tested attention 
following, while the second required the communicator (by some means, adventitious or 
intentional cues) to first attract the conspecific’s attention. Five control conditions examined 
whether conspecifics detected the stimulus on their own and the influence of the presence of 
conspecifics. It was predicted that there would be a difference between targets’ looks to the 
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stimulus area during a 30s pre-stimulus and 30s stimulus phase in experimental but not control 
trials, and a difference between targets’ looks to the stimulus area during the 30s stimulus phases 
of experimental and control trials. In attempt to distinguish between target looks to the stimulus 
area occurring by chance and due to expectation of a point of interest (as a consequence of a 
conspecific looking to the stimulus area), the duration of time that targets spent looking to the 
stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of experimental trials was recorded.  
 
2.2.2 Methods  
2.2.2.1 Participants 
Participants consisted of ten adult chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes spp.), four males and six 
females ranging from 10 to 34 years of age (mean = 24.40, s.d. = 7.55, Table 2.1). Five 
individuals were previously housed at a medical facility, yet none had previously participated in 
behavioural experiments and all were experimentally naïve. Initially, the study was designed for 
sixteen individuals, but six individuals were excluded from the analysis. One died during the 
course of data collection and five spent insufficient time alone in the experimental enclosures to 
receive sufficient control trials. Moreover, one individual (Jonnie, Whipsnade Zoo, see Table 
2.1) served only as a ‘target’ individual in experimental trials, but was otherwise omitted from 
the study, due to time restrictions. 
Table 2.1: Chimpanzee participants.  
 
 
Husbandry 
All chimpanzees were housed in social groups between two and 13 individuals in 
enclosures separated from the public areas by large windows.
Individual Sex Date of birth Age Rearing history Zoo
Carl M 18-07-87 19 Parent Copenhagen
Cindy F 27-10-87 19 Parent Copenhagen
Coco F 04-06-73 34 Unknown Whipsnade
Jolly F 21-10-77 30 Hand Twycross
Jonnie M 20-05-09 41 Unknown Whipsnade
Kip M 22-04-76 31 Unknown Twycross
Mati F 16-10-87 19 Parent Copenhagen
Olga F 12-08-84 22 Parent Copenhagen
Trunte F 1970 36 Parent Copenhagen
William M 30-06-82 15 Unknown Twycross
Yoran M 31-10-87 19 Parent Copenhagen
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Copenhagen Zoo 
The group at Copenhagen Zoo comprised of eight adult chimpanzees and three infants. 
Six of the eight adults (see Table 2.1) participated in the study, while two were excluded; One 
died during the course of data collection and one spent insufficient time alone in the 
experimental enclosures so as to receive sufficient control trials. The animals had access to four 
adjoining indoor enclosures (Figures 2.1 & 2.2), of which one was secluded from public view 
(Figure 2.1, enclosure 4). The chimpanzees had auditory access to the public areas, as enclosures 
were separated from these by a 4 m high glass window with a 2 m opening towards the ceiling. 
Enrichment consisted of trees, climbing structures, ropes, an artificial termite mount and a 
Plexiglas structure, from which food could be extracted with sticks. In addition, the keepers 
provided the chimpanzees with leafy branches, animal carcasses and food frozen in water. Two 
individuals (of which one was excluded from the data pool) regularly engaged in regurgitation 
and the eating of faeces, yet no other stereotypic behaviours were observed. The exhibit 
received the majority of its visitors between the hours of 10.30-14.00, during which school 
children frequently engaged in calm interactions with primarily the infants and one old female 
(excluded from the data pool).  
 
Figure 2.1: Enclosures at Copenhagen Zoo. Dotted lines indicate windows to public areas and 
illustrations depict a termite mound (enclosure 1), a Plexiglas structure (enclosure 2) and trees. 
   Figure 2.2: Experimental enclosures at Copenhagen Zoo (enclosures 1-3). 
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Twycross Zoo  
The group at Twycross Zoo comprised of seven adult chimpanzees, of which three 
participated in the study (i.e., received trials as both ‘communicators’ and ‘targets’). The 
remaining individuals were excluded, as they spent insufficient time either alone and/or as part 
of a dyad in the experimental enclosures to receive sufficient and important control trials. The 
apes had access to one outdoor enclosure and two adjoining indoor enclosures separated by a 
sliding door and wire-mesh (Figures 2.3 & 2.4). Neither the indoor nor outdoor enclosures 
provided a place for the chimpanzees to be out of view of the public. The indoor enclosures 
contained a large mirror, a metal climbing structure, hanging baskets, rubber ropes, a car wheel 
and a television screen (tuned to the BBC). In addition the keepers provided the apes with a 
variety of enrichment in the form of plastic bottles, cloth and boxes made from cardboard and 
plastic. Between the hours of 11.00-14.00 several family or school groups observed the 
chimpanzees at any one time, and the exhibit was exposed to more visitors and noise than those 
at either of the other zoos. Members of the public frequently attempted to engage with the 
chimpanzees, which often resulted in animals charging, banging on, or throwing items at the 
windows. Two chimpanzees engaged in seemingly more frequent and more types of stereotypic 
behaviour (rocking, glass-licking, the eating of faeces and regurgitation) than individuals at either 
of the other zoos. 
 
Figure 2.3: Inside enclosures at Twycross Zoo. Dotted lines indicate windows to public areas 
and the illustration a metal climbing structure (enclosure 1). 
 
Figure 2.4: Experimental enclosures at Twycross Zoo. 
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Whipsnade Zoo  
The group at Whipsnade Zoo comprised of two adult chimpanzees that had recently 
transferred from London Zoo and were therefore separated from conspecifics. One individual 
(Coco) participated in the experiment (i.e., received experimental and control trials, serving both 
as a ‘communicator’ and ‘target’, see following sections for clarifications of the terms), while the 
individual with whom it was co-housed (Jonnie, male, 41 years) served only as a ‘target’ 
individual in experimental trials (see descriptions of the conditions in following sections and 
Table 2.3), but was otherwise omitted from the study, due to time restrictions. During the day 
the chimpanzees were housed in one large indoor enclosure, in which they had continual visual 
and auditory access to one another (Figures 2.5 & 2.6). Enrichment consisted of logs, a metal 
climbing structure, ropes and cardboard boxes. The exhibit received few visitors and no 
stereotypic behaviours were observed.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Experimental enclosure at Whipsnade Zoo. Large dotted lines indicate windows to 
public areas and illustrations a wooden log and a climbing structure. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Experimental enclosure at Whipsnade Zoo. 
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2.2.2.2 Data collection 
The chimpanzees were tested between August 2004 and July 2007 during a total of 
1,390 hours of observation time. Trials were conducted outside opening hours and at times 
when there were few members of the public present, between the hours of 6.30-10.30 and 14-
19.30 at Copenhagen Zoo, 7.30-11.00 and 14-16 at Twycross Zoo and 8.30-16.00 at Whipsnade 
Zoo. Testing took place primarily in inside enclosures. Ninety-eight percent of the trials (125 
trials) were conducted inside, while 2 % (3 trials) were conducted outside. In none of the trials 
conducted outside did the participants view the stimulus (see Appendix 1 for pictures of the 
outside enclosure). The experiment was recorded by two camcorders (Panasonic NV-GS120 
and Sony DCR-HC40/DCR-PC55E). The miniDV videotapes were digitised into IMovie on a 
Macintosh IBook and converted into QuickTime files, from which the individuals’ looks to the 
stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases were scored and transferred into an 
Excel spreadsheet.  
 
2.2.2.3 Design, materials and procedure 
The experiment used a repeated measures design with two experimental and four 
control conditions. The apes were tested during normal interactions with conspecifics; 
opportunistically, when the inter-animal distance and spatial constellations required for the trials 
were met. The experimenter projected a visual stimulus into the participants’ enclosure; a red or 
green laser dot that, when moved, produced a light pattern within an area of approx. 0.5m2 
(using a commercial laser pointer, OnPoint GR532: red: 635 nm; green: 532 nm, power output: 5 
mW, laser-point diameter at 4m distance to display surface: approx. 2cm, Figures 2.7a and 2.7b). 
Laser beam invisibility was established in a pilot study, where the stimulus was projected across 
the line of sight of participants to a point outside their visual fields (N = 8). No chimpanzee 
interrupted its behaviour or showed signs of detecting the beam. Four participants (housed at 
Whipsnade and Twycross zoo) received all trials with a more powerful green laser (3b laser; 
Extreme Fusion: 532 nm; power output: 125 mW, point diameter at 4m distance: approx. 3cm) 
with an optical diffractive element attached, so it produced an image of an insect. The 
diffractive element weakened the stimulus brightness, but increased the size of the stimulus to 
approx. 0.5 m2 (Figure 2.7c). Prior to the study St Andrews University provided extensive 
training in the use of laser pointers. Care was taken to ensure that the apes never looked directly 
into the laser pointer, and that the laser beam was not aimed at, or displayed anywhere on the 
bodies of individual animals. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
 (c) 
 
Figure: 2.7: Stills of stimuli; (a) red laser stimulus (a dot) moved so as to produce a moving light 
pattern of approx. 0.5 m2 (a line, rather than the pattern is visible in the still), (b) green pattern 
stimulus, (c) image stimulus. 
 
The stimulus was projected so that it was visible to the communicator for 30s, but 
removed earlier if the target looked to the stimulus area. To preserve the novelty value of the 
stimuli (for targets who also served as communicators, see below for further details), it was 
removed immediately after a target reoriented towards it, but before the stimulus area came 
within the target’s ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ field of vision (see Figure 2.12). If the stimulus fell 
within the target’s ‘open’ field of vision, the trial was scored as the target having oriented to the 
stimulus. To prevent detection of the origin of the stimulus, it was temporarily removed if a 
participant looked towards the experimenter (located in the public area). To ensure consistent 
stimulus projection across trials, the stimulus was removed for 5s in all trials, due to either 
natural interruptions (a brief removal to prevent detection of the stimulus origin, if a participant 
looked towards the experimenter), or during 5 1s intervals during the last 10s of stimulus 
presentation. The duration of the pre-stimulus and stimulus presentation phases considered for 
analysis was 30s, the latter commencing at the beginning of stimulus presentation. The stimulus 
was projected from the public areas onto 27, 12 and 4 different locations in the experimental 
enclosures at Copenhagen, Twycross and Whipsnade Zoo, respectively (Figures 2.8-2.10). 
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Figure 2.8: The use of the experimental enclosures at Copenhagen Zoo. Dotted lines indicate 
stimulus projection points at 27 locations, projected from the public areas. 
 
Figure 2.9: The use of the experimental enclosures at Twycross Zoo. Dotted lines indicate 
stimulus projection points at 12 locations. 
 
Figure 2.10: The use of the experimental enclosures at Whipsnade Zoo. Dotted lines indicate 
stimulus projection points at 4 locations. 
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Experimental Condition 1: Target Faces Towards Communicator (Experimental-
Towards) 
The condition was designed to test if targets followed the gaze of a conspecific, during 
naturalistic interactions, to a point where no interesting events frequently occurred. A 
communicator and target faced each other at a 1-5m distance during a minimum of 80% (24s) 
of the 30s pre-stimulus phase and at the start of the stimulus projection. Relative head and gaze 
orientation of the animals were divided into ‘open’ (facing directly towards), ‘peripheral’ (facing 
sideways to), or ‘closed’ (one’s back to) the other animal. The ‘closed’ category included cases 
where an environmental feature obstructed the target animal’s view of the communicator 
animal. A target was defined as facing a communicator when its ‘open’ visual field was oriented 
towards the communicator’s ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ visual field (Figures 2.11 and 2.12), and as 
looking to the stimulus location when this fell within the target animal’s ‘open’ field of vision 
(Figure 2.12). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11: ‘Target (T) faces towards communicator’ (C). (a) Target (T) is required to turn around, so 
as to look to the stimulus. (b) Target is required to locomote around an obstacle, so as to look to 
the stimulus. 
  
       Open (0-45°) 
       Peripheral (45-110°) 
       Closed (110-180°)               
       Stimulus 
    Communicator          Target 
 
Figure 2.12: Animal orientational constellation at the start of the ‘Target faces towards communicator’ 
condition. Yellow, orange and red colours indicate visual fields measured from the saggital plane 
between the animals’ eyes. 
T TCC
(a) (b) 
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Experimental Condition 2: Target Faces Away from Communicator (Experimental-
Away) 
This condition was designed to test if, when a target was unable to detect any visual 
behaviour exhibited by the communicator, the communicator would attract the attention of the 
target, and (inadvertently or intentionally) lead the target to look to the stimulus location. That 
is, if the communicator considered the target’s visual attention, and upon viewing the stimulus, 
behaved differently as a function thereof. The condition was identical to the ‘Target faces towards 
communicator’ condition, except that the target faced away from the communicator during a 
minimum of 80% (24s) of the 30s pre-test phase and at the start of the stimulus projection. A 
target was defined as facing away from a communicator when the back of its head (‘closed’ 
visual field) was oriented towards the communicator’s ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ visual field, or if the 
communicator was occluded from the target’s view by an environmental obstacle (Figures 2.13 
and 2.14).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13: ‘Target (T) faces away from communicator’ (C). (a) Target (T) is required to turn around, 
so as to look to the stimulus. (b) Target is required to locomote around an obstacle, so as to 
look to the stimulus. 
 
  
      Open (0-45°) 
      Peripheral (45-110°) 
      Closed (110-180°)              
      Stimulus 
 Communicator                  Target 
Figure 2.14: Animal orientational constellation at the start of the ‘Target faces away from 
communicator’ condition. Yellow, orange and red colours indicate visual fields measured from the 
saggital plane between the animals’ eyes. 
CC TT
(a) (b) 
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Control Conditions 1 and 2: No Stimulus - Target Faces Towards/Away from 
Communicator (No Stimulus-Towards & No Stimulus-Away) 
The ‘No Stimulus’ control conditions were identical to the experimental conditions, 
(Figures 2.11 and 2.13), except that no stimulus was projected (Figure 2.15). At the start of a 
trial the experimenter aimed the laser pointer and specified vocally where the stimulus would 
have been projected (a location similar to that in an experimental trial). Targets’ looks to the 
stimulus location were recorded during the 30s pre-stimulus and stimulus phases. The 30s pre-
stimulus phase of ‘No Stimulus’ conditions provided the same baseline measure as the pre-
stimulus phase of experimental trials (i.e., participants were in the same orientational constellation, 
and no stimulus was projected). The stimulus phase of the ‘No Stimulus’ conditions, however, 
contained the added factor that the experimenter aimed (though did not project) the stimulus at 
a specified location, thus providing a ‘Clever Hans Control’, as changes in experimenter body 
tension, and/or movement of the stimulus projector might provide inadvertent cues as to the 
location on which the stimulus was aimed. The ‘No Stimulus’ conditions thus (a) measured the 
probability that targets looked to the stimulus location in the absence of the stimulus, while in 
the presence of another individual (as the presence and/or orientation of a conspecific might 
influence scanning frequency and thus looks to the stimulus area [identical to the function of 
the pre-stimulus phase of experimental conditions), (b) provided a baseline for comparison of the 
communicators’ behaviour during the experimental conditions, and (c) tested for possible 
inadvertent cuing by the experimenter (the ‘Clever Hans Effect’). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.15: ‘No Stimulus – target faces towards communicator’. (a) The stimulus is aimed on a location 
behind the target (T). Target is scored as looking to the stimulus location, if it turns, and the 
stimulus location falls within its ‘open’/’peripheral’ field of vision. (b). The stimulus is aimed on 
the left side of the obstacle. Target is scored as looking to the stimulus location, if it locomotes 
around the obstacle, and the stimulus location falls within its ‘open’/’peripheral’ field of vision. 
 
 
TC C T
(b) (a) 
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Control Condition 3: Target Alone 
This condition provided a baseline-measure of chance stimulus detection, by testing the 
likelihood that a target looked to the stimulus by itself and chance (i.e., looked to the stimulus 
location in the absence of a communicator potentially providing information as to the presence 
of the stimulus). The stimulus was projected to a point outside the view of a target alone in an 
enclosure, in a way similar to that in the experimental conditions (Figures 2.11 and 2.13), but 
with no communicator present (Figure 2.16).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16: ‘Target Alone’. (a) Target is scored as looking to the stimulus location, if it turns 
around. (b) Target is scored as looking to the stimulus location if it locomotes around the 
obstacle and the stimulus location falls within its ‘open’/’peripheral’ field of vision. 
 
Control Condition 4: Target and Ignorant Communicator  
This condition tested the probability of targets detecting the stimulus by chance when 
accompanied by a communicator, ignorant as to the presence of the stimulus. That is, it tested 
chance detection (as the ‘Target Alone’ control), but with the added consideration that scanning 
rates (and thus chance stimulus detection) might increase as a consequence of conspecific 
presence. Thus, this condition was predicted to provide a more conservative measure of chance 
stimulus detection in the absence of a communicator viewing the stimulus than ‘Target Alone’. 
The stimulus was projected to a point outside the view of a target and communicator (Figure 
2.17). If the communicator oriented towards the stimulus, it was removed before it fell within 
the animal’s peripheral field of vision and the trial abandoned. If the target oriented towards the 
stimulus (i.e., if the stimulus fell within the target’s ‘open’ field of vision), the stimulus was also 
removed, but the trial scored as the target having looked to the stimulus area.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17: ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’. (a) Target is required to turn around, so as to look 
to the stimulus. (b) Target is required to locomote around an obstacle to look to the stimulus. 
 
C T
T
T T
C
(b) (a) 
(b) (a) 
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Control Condition 5: Communicator Alone (Audience effect, COM) 
This condition tested if behaviours produced by communicators in experimental trials 
(ground slapping, stimulus directed behaviours, etc.) reflected a heightened state of arousal or 
possessed a communicative function, i.e., if the communicator took conspecific presence into 
account. The stimulus was projected onto a location within the ‘open’ visual field of a lone 
communicator in a manner as during an experimental trial (Figure 2.18). The communicator was 
allowed to examine the stimulus for 30s, yet the stimulus was removed before 30s had elapsed if 
a) the communicator left the enclosure, or b) a conspecific entered the enclosure. The 
communicators’ behaviour in experimental and control conditions are examined in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.18: ‘Communicator Alone’ condition. 
 
Trials requiring targets to turn versus locomote to detect the stimulus 
Seventy-eight percent (103 of 132) of experimental and control trials required targets to 
only turn around to look to the stimulus area, while 22% (29 of 132) required targets to first 
locomote around a structure (Table 2.2). ‘Locomote’ trials reduced adventitious stimulus detection, 
and experimental ‘locomote’ trials provided information about geometrical conspecific attention 
following. The two trial types were not designed conditions, but a result of the opportunistic 
nature of the experimental set-up and data collection. While all trials within the different conditions 
were analysed together, ‘turn’ and ‘locomote’ trials were also considered and analysed separately.  
Table 2.2: Trials requiring targets to locomote around a visual barrier (‘Locomote’) and turn 
around (‘Turn’) to look to the stimulus area. The ‘Experimental’ and ‘No Stimulus’ conditions each 
consisted of two trial types (where targets faced either towards or away from the communicator at 
the start of stimulus projection). 
Turn Locomote Turn Locomote
Experimental 59 41 22 15
No Stimulus 76 24 29 9
Target Alone 90 10 36 4
Target and Ignorant Communicator 94 6 16 1
Total 78 22 103 29
Condition
NPercent
C
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2.2.2.4 Trial sequences 
The conditions were presented sequentially in an order determined by means of Latin 
Squares technique and counterbalanced so that equal numbers of participants received a 
‘Communicator Alone’ trial before the first experimental trial, and vice versa. Each sequence consisted 
of 7 trials, two experimental- and five control conditions, with the ‘Target Alone’ condition 
presented twice, to get a reliable estimate of the baseline detection-rate (Table 2.3). Five 
participants received two sequences and two received an additional trial sequence (for one 
participant, bar one experimental trial, i.e., the individual received all control trials). Three 
individuals received only one trial sequence. Two of these were housed at a facility (Twycross 
Zoo) with small inside enclosures, where dyads were rarely alone and inconspicuous stimulus 
projection hard-won. After more than 330 hours collecting data from these participants, I decided 
to include only one trial sequence for the individuals. Some targets with dependent offspring 
were rarely alone and at one facility (Whipsnade) a target could not be tested individually; for 
these individuals, ‘Target Alone’ trials were substituted by ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ trials 
(predicted to produce higher levels of scanning and provide a higher, more conservative 
baseline measure of adventitious stimulus detection in the absence of a communicator viewing 
the stimulus). For the individual at Whipsnade Zoo the ‘Communicator Alone’ trial was excluded. 
 
Table 2.3: Trial sequences and order of presentation. EXP = ‘Experimental’, NOS = ‘No Stimulus’, 
TAR = ‘Target Alone’, TAR+ = ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’, COM = ‘Communicator Alone’, T 
= Target faces towards communicator, A = Target faces away from communicator. Cph = 
Copenhagen Zoo, Tw = Twycross Zoo, Wh = Whipsnade Zoo. Coloured text indicates trials 
involving a stimulus and stimulus colour. Highlighted trials were not conducted. 
Individual
Trial 
Sequence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Carl (Cph) 1 TAR NOS A EXP A EXP T TAR NOS T COM TAR+
2 COM NOS T TAR NOS A EXP T TAR EXP A TAR+
3 NOS T TAR COM NOS A EXP A TAR+ TAR EXP T
Yoran (Cph) 1 NOS T TAR NOS A EXP A EXP T TAR TAR+ COM
2 TAR COM EXP A TAR+ EXP T NOS T NOS A TAR
3 TAR EXP T NOS T TAR EXP A TAR+ COM NOS A
Cindy (Cph) 1 COM NOS A EXP T TAR NOS T TAR TAR+ EXP A
2 TAR NOS T COM EXP T EXP A NOS A TAR TAR+
Jolly (Cph) 1 COM TAR NOS T TAR+ NOS A EXP A TAR EXP T
2 TAR EXP T TAR NOS T TAR+ NOS A EXP A COM
Marti (Cph) 1 NOS A TAR EXP T COM TAR TAR+ NOS T EXP A
2 TAR TAR EXP A TAR+ NOS T COM EXP T NOS A
Olga (Cph) 1 EXP A TAR EXP T NOS A TAR NOS T TAR+ COM
2 TAR COM TAR EXP A EXP T NOS T NOS A TAR+
Trunte (Cph) 1 COM NOS T NOS A EXP A EXP T TAR TAR+ TAR
2 EXP T NOS A TAR COM NOS T TAR TAR+ EXP A
Kip (Tw) 1 COM TAR+ TAR NOS A EXP A TAR+ EXP T NOS T
William (Tw) 1 TAR EXP T EXP A TAR+ TAR NOS A COM NOS T
Coco (Wh) 1 NOS T TAR+ NOS A EXP T TAR+ EXP A TAR+ COM
Chimpanzee Attention Following 
 
 
58
2.2.2.5 Scoring and reliability 
All trials were scored from videotapes. I coded whether the stimulus area fell within 
targets’ ‘open’ field of vision during the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases, respectively, and a 
second coder coded 89% (118 of 132) of trials to assess inter-observer reliability (100% of 
experimental trials [N = 37] and 85% [N = 95] of a random selection of control trials). 
Statistical analysis of agreement was made using Cohen’s Kappa, a measure of the degree of 
non-random agreement between ratings of the same categorical variable. There was 97% 
agreement between the coders on both the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases (Cohen’s kappa = 
88.87 = very good agreement; Altman 1991).  
2.2.2.6 Statistics  
For the data analysis I took into account that the conditions compared contained 
unequal numbers of observations due to (i) missing values (see Table 2.3), (ii) that some subjects 
received more trial sequences than others, and (iii) that conditions comprised of different 
numbers of trials (i.e., each trial sequence contained two experimental trials, two ‘No Stimulus’ 
trials, three ‘Target Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ trials and one ‘Communicator Alone’ 
trial). To overcome these constraints the data were analysed in two ways; (1) I used a repeated 
measures binomial logistic regression (fitted by the Laplace approximation) with a binomial 
error structure to test the likelihood of target animals looking to the stimulus location during the 
pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of experimental and control conditions, respectively (‘pre versus 
post’ control), and to compare looks to the stimulus area during the stimulus phases of 
experimental and control conditions. The binomial logistic regression is a generalised linear 
mixed model (GLMM), which offers the key advantage over other statistical techniques, that it 
takes into account repeated observations of the same individuals, by allowing one to include 
participant as a random factor in the model (Pinheiro and Bates 2000). Including individual 
identity as a random factor dealt with the issue of potential pseudo-replication of repeated 
measures and of unequal numbers of observations (and hence unequal contribution to the 
dataset) for different subjects. In addition, (2) the first trial that individual participants received 
in each of the conditions was analysed by means of non-parametric McNemar tests for repeated 
measures and nominal data. To prevent pseudo-replication of observations (e.g., by subjects 
contributing two observations to the analysis of collapsed experimental and No Stimulus measures 
[one trial in which they faced towards and one where they faced away from the communicator at 
the start of the stimulus phase, respectively], McNemar testes were used to analyse performance 
in the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of only the first trial received in individual conditions.  
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Null-hypotheses were rejected at an alpha level of 5%, and all tests were two-tailed. 
GLMM were performed using the statistical software ‘R’ (2009 edition, R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing), all other statistics were carried out in PASW 18 and Microsoft Excel. 
Inter-animal distance was estimated by the number of adult animal body-widths between 
individuals, multiplying the number by 50 to convert it to centimetres. 
 
2.2.3 Results 
There was no significant difference between targets orienting towards red, green or 
image stimuli (experimental trials, Fisher’s Exact test: N = 37, p = 0.76, control trials: N = 57, p = 
0.17), and trials involving the three types of stimuli were therefore analysed together. 
Chimpanzees followed the attention of conspecifics to the stimulus in 50% (10 of 20) of 
experimental trials, 60% (6 of 10) and 40% (4 of 10), respectively, in trials where they faced 
towards and away from the communicator at the start of stimulus projection (percentage based on 
the first trial that communicators received in the two experimental conditions, Table 2.4a).  
Communicators produced a visible behaviour (approached, extended a hand towards or 
touched the stimulus, alternated gaze between the stimulus and target, repositioned its body 
while looking to stimulus, or arrested current behaviour) in 80% (16 of 20) of experimental trials 
(percentage based on only the first trial that communicators received in the two experimental 
conditions). Conspecifics followed the communicators’ attention in 78% (7 of 9, Table 2.4b) of 
experimental trials where conditions were comparable to those under which the intra-specific 
attention following of five primate species has been tested (Tomasello et al. 1998); That is, when 
(i) trials where the communicator appeared to ignore the stimulus were excluded (as judged by 
the absence of visible responses to the stimulus), and the communicator produced a visible 
behaviour while being within the targets’ ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ field of vision, (ii) targets faced 
towards the communicator at the start of stimulus projection, and (iii) were required to only turn 
around so as to co-orient to the communicator’s attention (rather than first ‘locomote’ around a 
visual obstruction). 
Table 2.4: Attention following. Percent cases of attention following in (a) all first received 
experimental trials, (b) first received experimental trials where conditions were comparable to 
those of Tomasello et al. 1998).  
Trial type (a) All
% reorientation N % reorientation N
Towards 60.00 10 75.00 8
Away 40.00 10 100.00 1
All 50.00 20 77.78 9
(b) Communicator produces visible behaviour while 
within targets' open or peripheral field of vision & 
targets are required to only turn around to look to the 
stimulus
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Comparisons within conditions (of pre-stimulus and stimulus phases / ‘Pre vs. post’ control) 
Targets were significantly more likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus 
than pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials (GLMM with ‘phase’ and ‘look/no look’ variables 
entered as factors, and participant as a random factor; All trials received: Estimate = 1.93, SE = 
0.69, z = 2.79, p = 0.005). When the conditions where the target faced towards and away from the 
communicator at the start of the stimulus phase were analysed separately, targets were more 
likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase of trials where they faced towards but 
not away from the communicator (‘Experimental-Towards’: All trials received, GLMM: Est. = 1.91, 
SE = 0.90, z = 2.12, p = 0.034; Analysis of first trial received, McNemar test: 2 = 4.05, N = 10, 
p = 0.044; Experimental-Away: All trials received, GLMM: Est. = 7.59, SE = 6.94, z = 1.09, p = 
0.274; Analysis of first trial, McNemar test: 2 = 0.45, N = 10, p = 0.502). There was no 
significant difference between targets looking to the stimulus when displayed outside the view 
of a ‘Target Alone’ and ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ (comparison of the stimulus phases of all 
trials of the two conditions: Fisher’s Exact test: N = 57, p = 0.55). Therefore, and since ‘Target 
Alone’ trials for some subjects were substituted by the more conservative ‘Target and Ignorant 
Communicator’ trials, the two conditions were collapsed. There was no significant difference in 
the likelihood of targets looking to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and stimulus 
phases of any of the control trials (‘No Stimulus-Towards’: All trials received, GLMM: Est. = 0.00, 
SE = 19050027, z = 0, p = 1, Analysis of first trial, McNemar test: 2  = 0.03, N = 10, p = 0.871; 
‘No Stimulus-Away’: All trials received, GLMM: Est. = 0.00, SE = 1.77, z = 0.00, p = 1, Analysis 
of first trial, McNemar test: 2 = 0.03, N = 10, p = 0.871; ‘Target Alone’/’Target and Ignorant 
Communicator’: All trials received, GLMM: Est. = 0.00, SE = 0.85, z = 0, p = 1; Analysis of first 
trial, McNemar test: 2  = 0.08, N = 10, p = 0.779, Figure 2.19). 
Considering the duration of looks, targets overall oriented significantly longer (i.e., the 
stimulus fell within the targets’ ‘open’ field of vision) towards the stimulus area during the 
stimulus phase (mean = 8.13s, s.d. = 5.55) than pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials 
(repeated measures t-test conducted on trials where targets oriented to the stimulus area during 
either the pre-stimulus or stimulus phase: mean = 4.88s, s.d. = 7.15, t(15) = -2.45, p = 0.027). 
 
                                               
27 The GLLM produces large standard errors in cases where only the value zero is entered into 
the model for a given factor. In the case of the ‘No Stimulus-Towards’ condition targets looked to 
the stimulus location in zero cases of either the pre-stimulus nor stimulus phase.  
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Comparisons across conditions (of looks to the stimulus area during stimulus phases) 
Targets were more likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase of 
experimental trials than control trials (All trial received, GLMM with ‘look/no-look’ and 
‘Experimental’, ‘No Stimulus’ and ‘Target Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ conditions 
entered as factors, and participant as a random factor: ‘Experimental’ vs. ‘No Stimulus’: Est. = -
3.12, SE = 1.07, z = 2.92, p = 0.004; Experimental’ vs. ‘Target Alone’/’Target and Ignorant 
Communicator’: Est. = -2.30, SE = 0.68, z = 3.50, p = 0.001, Figure 2.19, Table 2.5a). 
 
 
Figure 2.19: Target looks to the stimulus area. Percent target looks to the stimulus area during 
the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of experimental and control conditions (percentages are 
based on the average response to the trials that individual subjects received). Asterisks indicate 
significant differences between target looks to the stimulus location during the pre-stimulus and 
stimulus phase of ‘Experiment-Towards’ trials, and during the stimulus phases of experimental and 
control trials. 
 
Trials requiring targets to only turn around to look to the stimulus 
Considering only the subset of trials that required targets to turn around so a to look to 
the stimulus (i.e., no obstacle), targets were more likely to look to the stimulus area during the 
stimulus than the pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials (GLMM: Est. = 2.12, SE = 0.86, z = 
2.48, p = 0.013). This result remained for trials, in which target animals faced towards (GLMM: 
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Est. = 2.57, SE = 1.17, z = 2.20, p = 0.028; Analysis of first trial, McNemar test: 2 = 5.06, N = 
9, p = 0.024), but not away from the communicator at the start of the stimulus projection when 
the two experimental conditions were considered separately (Est. = 15.25, SE = 60.74, z = 0.25, 
p = 0.802; Analysis of first trial, McNemar test: 2 = 0.75, N = 6, p = 0.387). There were no 
significant differences between targets looking to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and 
stimulus phases of controls trials that required targets to only turn around (‘No Stimulus–
Towards’: GLMM: Estimate = 0.00, SE = 130000, z = 0, p = 1; Analysis of first trial, McNemar 
test: 2 = 0.03, N = 7, p = 0.871; ‘No Stimulus–Away: Est. = 0.00, SE = 1.78, z = 0, p = 1; 
Analysis of first trial: 2 = 0.07, N = 7, p = 0.789; ‘Target Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’: 
Est. = 0.00, SE = 0.84, z = 0, p = 1; Analysis of first trial: 2 = 0.05, N = 10, p = 0.823).  
Targets were more likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase of 
experimental than control conditions (‘Experimental’ vs. ‘No Stimulus’: GLMM: Est. = -3.15, SE = 
1.10, z = 2.85, p = 0.004; ‘Experimental’ vs. ‘Target Alone’/’Target and Ignorant Communicator’: Est. = 
-2.61, SE = 0.73, z = 3.56, p = 0.000, Figure 2.20, Table 2.5b). 
 
Figure 2.20: Turn trials. Percent target looks to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and 
stimulus phases of experimental and control trials that required targets to only ‘turn’ (measure is 
based on the average response to all ‘turn’ trials that individual subjects received). Since some 
subjects did not receive any ‘turn’ trials, N vary. Asterisks indicate significant differences. 
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Trials requiring targets to locomote around a visual barrier to look to the stimulus 
Comparisons within conditions (of pre-stimulus and stimulus phases - ‘Pre versus post’ control):  
Considering only the subset of trials that required targets to first locomote around a 
visual barrier so as to look to the stimulus, there was no statistically significant difference 
between target looks to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and stimulus phase of neither 
experimental trials nor of any of the control trials (‘Experimental-Towards’, GLMM: Est. = 0.00, SE 
= 25.37, z = 0.00, p = 1; ‘Experimental-Away’: Est. = -32.40, SE = 662006, z = 0.00, p = 1; 
Experimental trials analysed jointly: Est. = 1.71, SE = 1.25, z = 1.37, p = 0.172; ‘No Stimulus–
Towards’: Est. = 0.00, SE = 152700, z = 0,  p = 1; ‘No Stimulus–Away’: Est.= 0.00, SE = 1376600, 
z = 0, p = 1; ‘Target Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’: Est. = 0.00, SE = 1376600, z = 0, p 
= 1; for analyses of first trials received [yielding non-significant differences across all 
conditions], see Table 2.5c).  
Comparisons across conditions (of looks to the stimulus area during stimulus phases):  
Comparing only trials that required targets to locomote around a barrier to look to the 
stimulus, there was no significant difference between targets looking to the stimulus area during 
the stimulus display phases of Experimental and control trials (‘No Stimulus’: GLMM: Est. = -
18.56, SE = 5910, z = 0, p = 0.998; ‘Target Alone’/’Target and Ignorant Communicator’: Est. = -
18.56, SE = 7929, z = 0, p = 0.998, Figure 2.21, Table 2.5C).  
 
Figure 2.21: Locomote trials. Percent target looks to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus 
and stimulus phases of experimental and control trials that required targets to first locomote 
around an obstacle (i.e., geometrical attention following trials; measure is based on the average 
response to all ‘locomote’ trials individuals subjects received). 
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Table 2.5: Results summary. Statistics for all trials (Table a), and for the data-subsets where 
targets were required to either only ‘turn’ (Table b), or to ‘locomote’ around a barrier to look to 
the stimulus (Table c). The hypotheses predicted a difference between target looks to the 
stimulus locations in comparisons 1-3 and 7-8, and none in comparisons 4-6. Significant 
differences are highlighted in grey. 
 
 
Trial type(s) compared Intervals
compared
Estimate SE z P  P
1 Experimental (all trials) Pre- & Stimulus 1.93 0.69 2.79 0.005
2 Exp. - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 1.91 0.90 2.12 0.034 4.05 0.044
3 Exp. - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 7.59 6.94 1.09 0.274 0.45 0.502
4 No Stimulus - Target faces towards com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 190500 0.00 1.000 0.03 0.871
5 No Stimulus - Target faces away from com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 1.77 0.00 1.000 0.03 0.871
6 Target Alone / Target & Ignorant com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 0.85 0.00 1.000 0.08 0.779
7 Exp. & No Stimulus Stimulus -3.12 1.07 2.92 0.004
8 Exp. & Target Alone/Target & Ign. com.Stimulus -2.30 0.68 3.50 0.001
(first trial received)
McNemar Test 
a) All trials
GLMM
Trial type(s) compared Intervals
compared
Estimate SE z P  P
1 Experimental (all trials) Pre- & Stimulus 1.71 1.25 1.37 0.172
2 Exp. - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 25.37 0.00 1.000 0.13 0.724
3 Exp. - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus -32.40 662006 0.00 1.000 0.45 0.450
4 No Stimulus - Target faces towards com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 152700 0.00 1.000 0.03 0.871
5 No Stimulus - Target faces away from com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 136600 0.00 1.000 0.03 0.871
6 Target Alone / Target & Ignorant com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 136600 0.00 1.000 2.50 0.617
7 Exp. & No Stimulus Stimulus -18.56 5910 0.00 0.998
8 Exp. & Target Alone/Target & Ign. com.Stimulus -18.56 7929 0.00 0.998
GLMM McNemar Test 
(first trial received)
c) 'Locomote' trials
Trial type(s) compared Intervals
compared
Estimate SE z P  P
1 Experimental (all trials) Pre- & Stimulus 2.12 0.86 2.48 0.013
2 Exp. - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 2.57 1.17 2.20 0.028 5.06 0.024
3 Exp. - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 15.25 60.74 0.25 0.802 0.75 0.387
4 No Stimulus - Target faces towards com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 130000 0.00 1.000 0.03 0.871
5 No Stimulus - Target faces away from com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 1.78 0.00 1.000 0.07 0.789
6 Target Alone / Target & Ignorant com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 0.84 0.00 1.000 0.05 0.823
7 Exp. & No Stimulus Stimulus -3.15 1.10 2.85 0.004
8 Exp. & Target Alone/Target & Ign. com.Stimulus -2.61 0.73 3.56 0.000
b) 'Turn' trials
McNemar Test GLMM
(first trial received)
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Inter-animal distance 
Given the possibility of increased conspicuousness of communicator cues at high inter-
animal proximity, the effect of proximity on attention following was examined. There was no 
significant difference in inter-animal distance at the start of the stimulus phase of experimental 
trials where targets looked (mean rank = 20.56) and did not look (mean rank = 17.53) to the 
stimulus area (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 143, N1 = 18, N2 = 19, p = 0.408), nor was there a 
difference between the smallest inter-animal distance during the stimulus phase of experimental 
trials where targets looked (mean rank = 18.75) and did not look (mean rank = 19.24) to the 
stimulus area (U = 166.50, N1 = 18, N2 = 19, p = 0.893). 
 
2.2.4 Discussion 
Chimpanzees followed conspecific attention when they faced another viewing a novel 
visual stimulus. This corroborates findings by Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello et al. 1998). 
These authors, however, considered only trials, in which a primate communicator provided a 
“visible cue”, such as raising its head at an 80º angle towards a presented food item, and 
excluded trials, in which communicators ignored the stimulus. In contrast, the present study 
included analysis of all received trials. If criteria similar to those used by Tomasello and 
colleagues were applied, and only trials where the communicator produced a visible cue were 
included, chimpanzees followed the attention of conspecifics in 78% of trials, comparable to the 
80% found by Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello et al.  1998). In contrast, when trials where 
the communicator did not produce a visible cue were included in the analysis, the percentage of 
gaze following (60%) was somewhat higher than that found by Pitman & Shumaker (35% 
chimpanzee conspecific gaze following) who applied a similar criteria. Chimpanzees in the 
present experiment, however, frequently produced behavioural cues to their attention, other 
than head and gaze direction. The effect of cues associated with detection of a novel stimulus 
are examined in the next chapter. 
Naïve targets were more likely to orient towards the stimulus area when in the presence 
of a conspecific who viewed the stimulus, than in the control conditions, i.e., in the absence of a 
communicator or in the presence of a communicator ignorant as to the presence of the stimulus 
(‘Target Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ control), and in the absence of the stimulus, 
while orienting either towards or away from a communicator (‘No Stimulus’ controls). A further 
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control (‘pre versus post’ control) compared targets’ looks to the stimulus location during the 30s 
that the stimulus was shown, and the preceding 30s when it was not. In this case, targets were 
more likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase than pre-stimulus phase, 
when they faced towards, although not away from the communicator when the stimulus was 
initially shown. The lack of statistical significance (despite showing the right tendency) did not 
reflect a low frequency of targets looking to the stimulus area, but that targets also frequently, by 
chance, looked to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus phase (i.e., often, turned around an 
looked to the communicator, and thereby, by consequence, the stimulus located in front of the 
communicator). While this raises the possibility that looks to the stimulus area during the 
stimulus phase resulted from chance rather than attention following, several points (see below) 
suggest attention re-orientation in response to conspecifics’ behaviour. 
In addition to testing for direct attention following, the experiment tested the hypothesis 
that experimentally naïve chimpanzees are able and inclined to follow the attention of 
conspecifics geometrically, in a non-competitive context. These analyses were performed post-
hoc, and the proportions of trials requiring targets to either turn around or first locomote 
around a barrier to look to the stimulus therefore varied. There were, for example, 14 
experimental trials, in which the target faced towards the communicator and was required to only 
turn around to look to the stimulus area (turn trials), while only 4 trials required the target to first 
locomote around a visual barrier to look to the stimulus area (locomote trials). While targets 
followed conspecific attention when they needed only turn around to look to the stimulus, there 
was no evidence of geometrical attention following, though the sample size, on which these 
analyses were based, was too small to produce meaningful results. Moreover, previous studies 
have demonstrated that chimpanzees are capable of taking conspecifics’ visual perspective, 
geometrically in competitive food-related contexts (Hare et al. 2000, 2001). 
The stimulus was removed immediately before it area fell within the targets’ peripheral 
field of vision. While it remains a possibility that targets may have detected a flicker of the 
stimulus light immediately prior to its removal, accidental detection due to experimenter error 
was identified in two only trials, which were abandoned and excluded from the analysis. Targets 
oriented longer towards the stimulus area during the stimulus than pre-stimulus phase of 
experimental trials, suggesting an expectation of a point of interest. Thus, although the control 
measure comparing targets’ look to the stimulus area during experimental trials where the target 
initially faced away from the ‘communicator failed to reach significance (yet showed the right 
tendency), a seeming expectation of a point of interest and targets’ performance in other control 
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trials suggest that, overall, chimpanzees re-orientated in response to a conspecific attention to 
the stimulus.  
A significant limitation of the study was that subject dyads were not pre-selected, but 
chosen opportunistically. While dyad pre-selection, involving permutations of a subordinate 
communicator and dominant target, and vice versa, is preferable for a comparison of e.g., the effect 
of rank relationships on attention following, this was unfeasible due to the rarity of favourable 
experimental constellations and the preferred interactions and locations of the animals. 
 
2.3 Study 2: Infant chimpanzees 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The visual interaction between primate mothers and infants has received much attention 
in developmental psychology. Chimpanzees pay attention to others’ eyes and gaze direction 
shortly after birth, show neonatal facial imitation within one month of birth (Myowa-Yamakoshi 
et al. 2004) and engage in mutual gaze during the first 3 months of life  (Plooij 1984; Bard et al. 
2005; Okamoto-Barth & Tomonaga 2006). Chimpanzees tested below the age of 13 (Okamoto-
Barth & Tomonaga 2006) and 36 months (Tomasello & Carpenter 2005) follow human gaze 
and pointing cues to one of several objects placed in front of them. By 20 months one infant 
studied longitudinally (without explicit differential reinforcement) followed experimenter-
pointing cues to a target located next to its mother, behind the infant’s back (Okamoto-Barth & 
Tomonaga 2006). In contrast, infants below the age of 36 months do not use head-turn cues 
when an experimenter looks to a point at the ceiling outside the infants’ visual field (Tomasello 
et al. 2001). While not explicitly tested, this suggests that, although infants may co-orient to 
locations outside their own visual field where potentially interesting events might occur (given 
e.g., conspecific presence), they do not readily follow gaze cues to locations where no events are 
expected to occur. As humans, mother-infant chimpanzee dyads compensate decreased 
proximity and loss of physical contact with an increase in visual contact, and mutual gaze varies 
across chimpanzees groups as a function of physical contact (Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007b; 
Leavens 2009). While mutual gaze (synchronous looking) and non-synchronous looking may 
reduce the discomfort caused by increased distance between individuals (Okamoto-Barth et al. 
2007b), it may also increase in ambiguous situations to simply reduce stress and discomfort.  
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When exposed to a novel object human-reared chimpanzees look referentially to their 
caregivers and adjust their behaviour according to the valence of the message they receive  
(Russell et al. 1997). Such social referencing is, however, more about disambiguating the 
significance of situations or objects, than about the sender and recipient, and it has been 
suggested individuals may apply the message they receive to only the object, without 
understanding the other’s mental connection to the object (Egyed et al. 2004, cited by 
Liszkowski 2005). Twelve to twenty-four months old chimpanzees produce intentionally 
communicative gestures (C. Hobaiter, pers. Com.), yet engage in few triadic interactions around 
objects and third entities (Bard & Vauclair 1984; Tomonaga et al. 2004). While apes do engage in 
triadic interactions with conspecifics (e.g., beg for food and incorporate objects in collaborative 
play: e.g., Tanner & Byrne 2010), and even more so when interacting with human 
experimenters, systematic observations of mother-infant interactions (Bard & Vauclair 1984; 
Tomonaga et al. 2004) and experiments involving human experimenters (Tomasello & Carpenter 
2005) reveal little communication about third entities and none that express a declarative or 
informative motive. Little is known about infant-to-infant attention following and no previous 
experiments have exposed infants to novel/interesting objects to test if they may bring about 
conspecific visual co-orientation through intentional or adventitious behaviours. This study 
followed the rationale and general method of the study involving adult chimpanzees, and tested 
if infant chimpanzees presented with a novel visual stimulus would bring about conspecific co-
orientation. 
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2.3.2 Methods 
2.3.2.1 Participants 
Participants were three infant female chimpanzees between 20 and 31 months of age 
(Table 2.6), housed in a social group with 8 adult chimpanzees at Copenhagen Zoo. 
Table 2.6: Infant chimpanzee communicators. 
 
 
2.3.2.2 Design and Procedure 
The experiment used the same general methods as the study with adult chimpanzees, 
although some conditions were excluded. Due to close proximity to and near-continual 
attention from mothers it was unfeasible to conduct the ‘Communicator Alone’ and ‘Target Alone’ 
controls, which required infants to be alone in the experimental enclosures. All participants 
received two trial sequences consisting of one ‘Experimental-Towards’ trial, one ‘Experimental-
Away’ trial, one ‘No Stimulus-Towards’ trial and two ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ trials 
presented in a randomised order (Table 2.7). As mothers paid close attention to their infants, 
few occasions transpired, in which mothers faced away from their infants. All participants 
therefore received two additional ‘Experimental-Towards’ trials (Table 2.6).  
Table 2.7: Number and types of trials where infants served as communicators (Experimental and 
‘No stimulus’ trials) and targets (Target and ignorant communicator’ trials). 
 
No Stimulus Target & Ignorant
Towards Away Towards Communicator
Malou 4 2 2 4
Semliki 4 2 2 4
Vega 4 2 2 4
Individual
Experimental
Individual Sex Date of birth
Age at time of 
experiment (months)
Father Mother
Malou Female 29.09.03 20-22 Carl Mati
Semliki Female 07.01.03 26-31 Carl Cindy
Vega Female 07.03.03 26-28 Carl Olga
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2.3.3 Results 
Targets followed the attention of infants who viewed the stimulus in 83.33% (N = 12) 
and 50% (N = 6) of trials when they faced towards and away from the infant, respectively. 
Comparisons within conditions (of pre-stimulus and stimulus phases - ‘Pre versus post’ control):  
Targets were more likely to look to the stimulus location during the stimulus phase than 
pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials (GLMM: Estimate = 2.56, SE = 0.82, z = 3.12, p = 
0.002). This effect remained when the condition, in which the target faced towards the infant 
communicator at the start of stimulus projection, was considered separately, but not when the 
target faces away from the communicator (GLMM, ‘Experimental-Towards’: Est. = 5.21, SE = 
1.68, z = 3.01, p = 0.002; ‘Experimental-Away’: Est. = 0.89, SE = 1.28, z = 0.70, p = 0.486, Table 
2.8). There were no significant differences between targets looking to the stimulus area during 
the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of any of the control trials (‘Target and Ignorant 
Communicator’: Est. = 0.79, SE = 1.32, z = 0.60, p = 0.632; ‘No Stimulus-Towards’: Est. = 0.49, SE 
= 1.53, z = 0.53, p = 0.466, Figure 2.22). 
Table 2.8: Trial and target types and results. The number of experimental trials that infants 
received, and trials in which targets  (adult female, alpha male, peer) looked to the stimulus area. 
 
Comparisons across conditions (of looks to the stimulus area during stimulus phases) 
Targets were more likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase of 
experimental than ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ trials (GLMM: Est. = 2.56, SE = 0.82, z = 
3.11, p = 0.002), however, the difference between target looks to the stimulus area during the 
stimulus phase of experimental and ‘No Stimulus’ control trials was non-significant, although it 
approached significance (GLMM: Est. = 2.26, SE = 0.93, z = 1.86, p = 0.064).  
 
 
Trial Type
N Look No Look N Look No Look N Look No Look
Towards 9 8 1 1 0 1 2 2 0
Away 5 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 0
Target
Adult Female Alpha Male Peer
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Figure 2.22: Target looks to stimulus area. Percentage of trials, in which targets looked to the 
stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of experimental and control 
conditions. Asterisks indicates a significant differences between conditions. 
 
Inter-animal distance 
Given the possibility of increased conspicuousness of communicator cues at high inter-
animal proximity, the effect of proximity on attention following was examined. There was no 
significant difference in communicator and target distance at the start of the stimulus phase of 
experimental trials where targets looked (mean rank = 9.23) and did not look (mean rank = 
10.20) to the stimulus area (Mann-Whitney U test based on all received trials: U = 29, N1 = 13, 
N2 = 5, p = 0.775). Nor was there a difference between the smallest inter-animal distance during 
the stimulus phase of experimental trials where targets looked (mean rank = 9.65) and did not 
look (mean rank = 9.10) to the stimulus area (U = 30.50, N1 = 13, N2 = 5, p = 0.849). A similar 
pattern emerged when only trials, in which targets were the infant communicators’ mother 
(inter-animal distance at the beginning of experimental trials: U(4,8) = 2.75, NS; inter-animal 
distance at the closest point during experimental trials: U(4,8) = 2.88, NS). 
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2.3.4 Discussion 
Chimpanzees followed the attention of infants who viewed a novel stimulus in 83% of 
the trials when they faced towards the infant and in 50% when they faced away from the infant. 
They were more likely to look to the stimulus area when in the presence of an infant viewing the 
stimulus than in the control conditions, i.e., in the presence of an infant ignorant as to the 
stimulus (‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’), and in the absence of the stimulus, while orienting 
towards the infant communicator (‘No Stimulus’). Moreover, targets were also more likely to 
orient towards the stimulus display area during the 30s that the stimulus was presented, than the 
preceding 30s when it was not when the target initially faced towards though not away from the 
infant communicator. Conclusions regarding the latter should, however, be treated with caution, 
given the small number of trials of this type (two observations for each of three subjects). There 
was no difference in the distance between targets and communicators in experimental trials 
where targets looked/did not look to the stimulus area; neither when all trials and only trials in 
which the target was the communicator’s mother were considered independently. This suggests 
that conspecific attention following was not a function of mother-infant proximity, and that 
adult females were no more likely to look and co-orient to infant’s focus of attention when they 
were further away. Unfortunately, few trials (n = 3) involved infants as both communicators 
targets, however, the rare occasion of two infants found alone in an enclosure (without their 
mothers) limited the opportunity to conduct infant-to-infant attention following trials. 
Nonetheless, infant targets co-oriented to the attention of infant communicators in all three 
trials. Overall, the results suggest that infant chimpanzees consistently bring about conspecific 
co-orientation when presented with a novel/interesting visual stimulus.  
 
2.4 Adult versus infant communicators 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 The chimpanzees’ performance in the experimental conditions of study 1 and 2 were 
compared to (1) test for differences in visual co-orientation to infant and adult communicators, 
and (2) explore whether any such difference might be influenced by variance in the inter-animal 
distance of mothers-infant and adult dyads, as a predicted higher proximity of mother-infant 
dyads, might make the infants’ behaviours more conspicuous, and consequently account for a 
higher percentage of co-orientation to infant communicators. 
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2.4.2 Results and discussion 
Targets looked to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase of experimental trials in 
44.44% (8 of 18) and 83.33% (10 of 12) trials when they faced towards an adult and infant 
communicator viewing the stimulus, respectively, and in 31.58 (6 of 19) and 50% (3 of 6) of 
trials when they faced away from an adult and infant communicator, respectively (percentages 
based on all trials that the two subject categories received). There was, however, no significant 
effect of communicator category (infant/adult) on target looks to the stimulus area, when 
analysed by means of logistic regression, taking into account the repeated measures (GLMM: 
Est. = 0.71, SE = 2.86, z = 0.02, p = 0.999), most likely because of the very small sample size 
(N = 3) of infant communicators. 
There was no overall difference in inter-animal distance at the start of the stimulus 
phase of experimental trials involving infant and adult communicators (Mann-Whitney U test: U 
= 316.50, N1 = 18, N2 = 37, p = 0.766), nor of experimental trials where targets looked (U = 
273.50, N1 = 13, N2 = 18, p = 891) and did not look (U = 41.50, N1 = 5, N2 = 19, p = 0.679) to 
the stimulus area. The inter-animal distance at the closest point during the stimulus phase of 
experimental trials was smaller in trials involving infant (mean rank = 21.28, median distance = 
62.50 cm) than adult communicators (mean rank = 31.27, median distance = 150 cm; U = 212, 
N1 = 18, N2 = 37, p = 0.029). Considering only trials where targets looked to the stimulus, there 
was, however, no significant difference in the inter-animal distance between those involving 
infant (mean rank = 13.31, median distance = 75.00 cm) and adult communicators (mean 
rank=17.94, median distance = 175.00 cm; U = 82.00 n1 = 13, n2 = 18, p = 0.164). 
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2.5 General Discussion  
Overall, chimpanzees followed the attention of both adults and infants who viewed a 
novel stimulus. While previous research has demonstrated that chimpanzee conspecific 
attention following may occur under rather extreme circumstances, such as when a conspecific 
is induced to raise its head to an 80 upwards angle, and during more subtle interactions 
between humans and chimpanzees with much experimental experience (Povinelli & Eddy 1994, 
1996b, 1997; Tomasello et al. 1998, 1999; Bräuer et al. 2005) the present experiment shows that 
co-orientation also occurs in interactions between experimentally naive animals to points that 
require only a small reorientation on the part of the communicator.  
The experimental design did not require target animals to re-orient to points where 
interesting events (e.g., human or conspecific presence, see Tomasello et al. 1998; Okamoto-Barth 
& Tomonaga 2006; Pitman & Shumaker 2009) frequently occurred (but to walls or the ground 
upon which the stimulus was projected), which might be expected to otherwise increase 
readiness to co-orient on the basis of observed adventitious cues. For example, while Okamoto-
Barth & Tomonaga (2006) found that one infant chimpanzee followed human gaze and pointing 
cues to a target located next to its mother, behind the infant’s back, Tomasello and colleagues 
(Tomasello et al. 2001) found no evidence that infant chimpanzees follow human gaze cues to a 
point on the ceiling outside the infants’ visual field (i.e., to a point without human/conspecific 
presence). Study 2 (infants) involved only three trials where infants served as (both 
communicators and) targets, and the results regarding infant attention following are therefore 
treated with caution. Infant targets, however, co-oriented to communicator attention in all trials, 
suggesting that infants (as adults) readily follow conspecific attentional cues to locations behind 
themselves where no events were expected to occur. 
Although the stimulus was removed immediately before detected, targets in trials 
involving adult communicators oriented longer towards the stimulus area during the stimulus 
than pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials, suggesting an expectation of a point of interest.28 
While one control measure (comparison of targets’ looks to the stimulus area during the pre-
stimulus and stimulus phases of experimental trials where targets faced away from the 
communicator at the start of stimulus projection) failed to reach significance (yet showed the 
right tendency) a seeming expectation of a point of interest, and targets’ performance in all 
                                               
28 The orientation of some targets (facing away from the video camera) in trials involving infant 
communicators did not allow for unambiguous coding of the duration of looks to the stimulus 
area, which was therefore not analysed for infant-communicator study. 
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other comparisons and control conditions suggest that, overall, chimpanzees re-orientated in 
response to conspecific attention to the stimulus. 
The results match those found by Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello et al. 1998), who 
compared the likelihood of several species, including chimpanzees, to detect food presented by 
an experimenter in an observation tower, while alone (with their back to the experimenter, 
equivalent to the ‘Target Alone’ control used in the present design), or in the presence of 
conspecifics viewing the experimenter and food. Tomasello and colleagues did, however, not 
include the key baseline control (‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ deployed in the present 
experiment) that examined the probability of targets detecting the stimulus by chance, when 
accompanied by a conspecific ignorant as to the stimulus. As this control was predicted to 
produce a slightly higher proportion of target chance looks to the stimulus area (as a result of 
increased scanning due to conspecific presence), the use by Tomasello and colleagues of a less 
conservative condition (‘Target Alone’) as their only control measure may (amongst other things) 
have contributed their design yielding significant effects. Tomasello and colleagues did also not 
examine target looks to the stimulus area while in the presence of a conspecific but absence of 
the stimulus (controlled in the present experiment by means of the ‘No Stimulus’ control and ‘Pre 
vs. Post’ control, comparing target looks to the stimulus area during and prior to the presentation 
of the stimulus). As the experimental pre-stimulus phase seemed to evoke somewhat higher 
proportions of looks to the stimulus location than both the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of 
the control conditions, it is likely that pre-stimulus vs. stimulus phase control yields slightly 
different information, and thus represents a crucial measure for comparisons in gaze following 
paradigms. Finally, Tomasello and colleagues’ inclusion of several individuals as communicators 
in any one trial (see Figure 1.1) precludes conclusions as to whether targets responded to the 
attention of one or several individuals; Viewing multiple individuals sharing a visual referent may 
reduce the threshold for initiation of automatic visual co-orientation. In contrast, the present 
experiment systematically controlled for possible alternative explanations by the inclusion of 
multiple control conditions and comparisons that overall suggest that chimpanzees re-orientated 
in response to conspecific attention to the stimulus, both when they faced towards and away form 
the communicator at the start of stimulus presentation. 
While intra-specific geometrical gaze following has been implicitly demonstrated in 
competitive contexts (Hare et al. 2000; Hare et al. 2001), chimpanzees in the present experiment 
did not follow communicators’ attention under unfavourable geometric conditions that required 
targets to locomote around a visual obstruction. The small sample size of ’locomote’ trials, 
Chimpanzee Attention Following 
 
 
76
however, precludes conclusions regarding intra-specific geometrical gaze following. 
Overall, the rate of following the attention of infant communicators was higher than 
that of adults, however, the comparison of conspecifics’ responses to infant and adult 
communicators failed to yield a statistically significant difference, probably in part due to the 
very small number of infant communicators tested (N = 3). While the proximity of mother-
infant dyads was higher at the closest point during experimental trials (though not at the 
beginning of trials), there was no difference in the proximity of mother-infant and adult dyads, 
respectively, in trials where targets followed and did not follow the communicators’ attention to 
the stimulus area. Considering the comparatively higher proportion of attention following to 
infant communicators, this suggest that target conspecifics did not look to the stimulus 
presented to infant communicators as a function of proximity, but may pay closer attention 
and/or be more responsive to infants than adults, or alternatively, that the behaviours that 
infants produced upon viewing the stimulus were more conspicuous than those of adults (e.g., 
involved a higher degree of auditory or motion related behaviours). The next chapter will 
explore whether (and if so, which) behaviours produced by communicators consistently led to 
conspecific attention re-orientation, and if individuals intentionally redirected conspecifics 
attention. 
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CHAPTER 3: Chimpanzee manipulation of conspecific attention 
 
 
Summary 
Directing others’ attention to distal locations is an adaptive skill that enables individuals 
to share and obtain useful information. This chapter aimed to identify possible behaviours that 
may act as cues triggering intra-specific attention following, and examined if the behaviour of 10 
adult chimpanzees viewing a novel visual stimulus (see Chapter 2) differed as a function of 
conspecific presence and visual attention. Chimpanzees were more likely to produce stimulus 
directed behaviours when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attending conspecific 
than alone, and conspecifics were more likely to look to the stimulus area when the 
communicator did so. There was a (non-significant but) clear trend for the chimpanzees to 
preferentially adopt a stimulus directional ‘hunching’ posture when viewing the stimulus in the 
presence of conspecifics, who were, in such cases, more likely to look to the stimulus area. 
Chimpanzees were more than twice as likely to produce an auditory behaviour in experimental 
trials where the conspecific faced away rather than towards them, and six times more likely to 
do so than when they viewed the stimulus on their own, although this difference was statistically 
non-significant. There was no species-wide evidence for active attention calling followed by 
directional behaviours, yet there were noticeable individual differences, with some chimpanzees 
consistently combining functionally different behaviours (an auditory component followed by a 
stimulus directed component) and consistently leading conspecifics’ attention to the stimulus 
location. While the design did not eliminate the possibility of an interrogative social referencing 
motive underlying the attention directing (‘look and help me decide how to respond’), the 
consistent production, by some animals, of sequential auditory-stimulus directional behaviours 
when viewing a novel stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific, is consistent with 
a declarative and social referential pointing interpretation. The results suggest that the paucity of 
observed pointing behaviours in chimpanzees may owe to the inconspicuousness and multi-
faceted nature of the signals.  
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3.1 Introduction 
There is an extensive number of examples of chimpanzees pointing in apparent requests 
for the delivery of food and other objects from humans, and considerable evidence that their 
pointing behaviours are referential and goal-directed (Leavens et al. 2005; for comprehensive 
reviews, see Leavens 2004; Leavens & Hopkins 1998)29. Savage-Rumbaugh (1986) reported 37 
episodes involving pointing between two language (symbol)-trained chimpanzees (Sherman & 
Austin) in the context of a food-sharing task, where individuals frequently pointed to the food 
they wished the other to deliver. Although wild chimpanzees indicate parts of their own bodies 
(by means of exaggerated scratching behaviours) that conspecifics subsequently groom (Pika & 
Mitani 2006), pointing to distal objects has not been reported among wild populations, and 
without exception, the reported instances of chimpanzee pointing are subject to an imperative 
interpretation, i.e., they are about spurring others into action to do something for the subject. 
Apparent behaviours produced to elicit an attentional or emotional (and not necessarily 
immediately behavioural) reaction in conspecifics have been reported by Menzel (e.g., 1974) for 
chimpanzees covertly presented with various objects, that they later, actively, lead conspecifics 
to detect. Menzel suggested that chimpanzees may engage in postural and other forms of 
directional bodily deixis that may be inconspicuous, but meaningful to the animals. This 
suggestion has received much theoretical interest, but little empirical support. 
This chapter aims to identify behaviours consistently produced by chimpanzees viewing a 
novel stimulus, which may act as cues triggering intra-specific attention following, and tests the 
hypothesis that chimpanzees have the ability and motivation to direct conspecifics to a novel, 
distal object and engage in signalling other than necessarily hand-pointing. To test if 
communicators actively called the attention of non-attentive conspecifics, and led them to look 
to a stimulus that only they observed, it was recorded whether communicators produced 
different behaviours or combinations thereof when: (1) in the presence of the stimulus but 
absence of a conspecific (‘Communicator Alone’), (2) in the presence of the stimulus and an 
attentive or non-attentive conspecific (Experimental conditions, where the target faced towards or 
away from the communicator at the start of stimulus projection), (3) in the absence of the 
stimulus while in the presence of an either attentive or non-attentive conspecific (‘No Stimulus’ 
controls), and while in the presence of the stimulus, undetected by themselves, either alone or in 
                                               
29 As language trained birds (e.g., Pepperberg 2009), chimpanzees will also indicate the location 
of a named object, e.g., point to its nose when asked “show me your nose, where is your nose” 
(Kellogg & Kellogg 1933, cited by Leavens 2009). 
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the presence of a conspecific (‘Target Alone’ and ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ controls). It 
was predicted that communicators would behave differently as a function of conspecific 
presence and visual attention.  Specifically, it was predicted that there would be  
(i) A difference in the frequency of auditory behaviours produced when in the presence of 
the stimulus and an attentive or non-attentive conspecific (experimental conditions). 
(ii) A difference in the frequency of visual stimulus directional behaviours when in the 
presence of the stimulus and either presence (experimental conditions) or absence of a 
conspecific (‘Communicator Alone’ condition). 
(iii) No difference in the frequency of other visual behaviours (arrest current behaviour, head 
bobbing etc.) in experimental and ‘Communicator Alone’ conditions.  
It was predicted that targets’ looks to the stimulus area would be influenced by communicators’ 
behaviour, and that there would be 
(iv) A difference in the likelihood of non-attentive conspecifics looking to the stimulus area 
when communicators did or did not produce auditory behaviours. 
(v) A difference in the likelihood of conspecifics looking to the stimulus area when 
communicators did or did not produce stimulus directional behaviours. 
(vi) No difference in the likelihood of conspecifics looking to the stimulus area when 
communicators did or did not produce behaviours not directed towards the stimulus. 
The chapter indirectly examined the suggestion that apes may use gaze as a communicative 
signal (de Waal 2001) by examining communicators’ and targets’ gaze behaviour. It was 
predicted that there would be: 
(vii) A difference in the likelihood that a target conspecific looked to the stimulus area when - 
while within a target’s ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ field of vision - a communicator looked to the 
target within 2s of looking away from the stimulus, followed by a look to the stimulus 
within 2s of looking away from the target (communicator gaze sequence: stimulus-target-
stimulus, while being within a target’s ‘open’/‘peripheral field of vision). Due to the 
difficulty of distinguishing such behaviour from social referencing (where chimpanzees 
exposed to a novel object look referentially to their caregivers and adjust their behaviour 
according to the valence of the message they receive: Russell et al. 1997), only experimental 
trials, in which communicators also produced an auditory cue, were examined to test this 
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prediction. Thus, the hypothesis that chimpanzees might use gaze as a communicative 
behaviour would be supported if targets were more likely to look to the stimulus location 
when communicators produced an auditory behaviour, followed by stimulus-target-
stimulus gaze behaviours while being within the targets ‘open’/’peripheral’ field of vision. 
(viii) There would be a difference in the likelihood of conspecifics looking to the stimulus area 
when communicators produced the above behaviours. 
 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Design and procedure 
The analyses were based on the experiment described in Chapter 2, involving 10 adult 
chimpanzees. The key comparisons involved the ‘Communicator Alone’ and experimental conditions, 
to test if behaviours produced by chimpanzees who viewed the stimulus while alone, or in the 
presence of an either attentive, or non-attentive conspecific, reflected a heightened state of 
arousal, or possessed a communicative function, i.e., if communicators took conspecific 
presence and attentional state into account. The conditions were presented in a predetermined 
order (see Figure 2.3), in which 50% of participants received a ‘Communicator Alone’ trial before 
the first experimental trial (one participant, co-housed with a conspecific in one enclosure could, 
however, not be tested alone and did therefore not receive the ‘Communicator Alone’ condition). 
A second coder coded 30% (11 of 37) of experimental and 53% (9 of 17) of ‘Communicator Alone’ 
trials to assess inter-observer reliability in terms of (1) auditory cues, (2) stimulus directional 
cues and (3) ‘hunching’ behaviour (see below for definitions). Inter-observer reliability with 
respect to all cues was very good (Cohen’s kappa = 0.80 n = 20) 
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3.2.2 Coding of Communicator Behaviour  
The following communicator behaviours were coded: (1) auditory behaviours (vocalise, 
stamp or knock on the ground, clap, audibly move object), (2) visual non-stimulus directional 
behaviours (arrest current behaviour, bipedal swagger, shake arm or leg silently, bob head, move 
head back rapidly), (3) visual stimulus directional behaviours (touch, lean torso towards, move 
extremity or head in the direction of the stimulus), (4) locomotory stimulus directional 
behaviour (approach stimulus area), and (5) behaviour directed at conspecific (looks to the 
conspecific that were preceded within 2s of a look to the stimulus, and instances where 
communicators produced an auditory behaviour and subsequently shifted gaze from the 
stimulus to the conspecific and back to the stimulus, Table 3.1). Only trials, in which the 
communicator’s gaze behaviour could be reliably coded were included. A stimulus directional 
‘hunching’ posture’ (see Table 3.1 for definition), observed during the second trial conducted, 
was scored (if it occurred) in all trials. Cues were analysed as part of a behavioural category, 
apart from conspecific directed behaviours and the ‘hunching’ posture, which were analysed 
individually. Communicator behaviour was recorded during the 30s stimulus phases, yet 
presence/absence of the cues ‘swagger’, ‘shake extremity’, ‘shake object’, ‘bob head’, ‘head 
back’, approach stimulus area’ (cues f-j, p, Table 3.1) were scored as being present or absent 
during both the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases, and recorded if they occurred in stimulus 
phase only. Auditory cues were recorded by two camcorders (i.e., not a separate microphone). 
 
3.3.3 Statistics 
 While the experiment used a repeated measures design, the conditions compared 
contained unequal numbers of observations30. The distribution of communicator behaviours 
across the conditions, and of targets’ look to the stimulus area when communicators produced 
particular behaviours, were therefore analysed by means of repeated measures binomial logistic 
regressions (fitted by the Laplace approximation) with a binomial error structure. 
Communicator identity was included as a random factor in the GLMM to deal with the issue of 
potential pseudo-replication of repeated measures, and of unequal numbers of observations 
(and hence, unequal contribution to the dataset) for different subjects. Gaze behaviours were 
                                               
30 For example, for every non-social trial (‘Communicator Alone’) there were two social trials 
(‘Experimental-facing towards’, ‘Experimental-facing away’), and one participant co-housed with a 
conspecific could not receive the ‘Communicator Alone’ control trial (see section 2.2.2.3 and 
2.2.2.4 for further details regarding unequal number of trials across the conditions and analyses). 
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analysed by means of binomial tests. Null-hypotheses were rejected at an alpha level of 5%. 
Table 3.1: Behaviour definitions and classes.    
  
Behavioural Class Definition
(1) Auditory (a) Vocalise Signaller vocalises
(b) Stamp
(c) Knock Signaller knocks on the ground
(d) Move object Signaller audibly moves object
(2) Visual non-stimulus directional (e) Arrest behaviour Signaller arrests current behaviour
(f) Swagger
(g) Shake extremity Signaller shakes hand or arm
(h) Shake object Signaller shakes object silently
(i) Bob head     
(j) Head back
(3) Visual stimulus directional (k) Touch
(l) Lean 
(m) Extend extremity
(n) Move head Signaller pushes head forward towards stimulus
(o) Hunch
(4) Locomotory stimulus directional (p) Approach Signaller approaches simulus area
(5) Conspecific directional (q) Gaze 1
(r) Gaze 2
Behaviour
Signaller reorients so that its torso leans towards 
the stimulus or stands up on all four orienting 
towards the stimulus
Signaller looks to conspecific within 2s of looking 
to the stimulus
Signaller stamps on the ground, repeatedly while 
shifting its weight from foot to foot
Signaller moves head rapidly up and down two or 
more times
Signaller touches the stimulus with its hand or 
mouth
Signaller extends arm or hand towards the 
stimulus
Signaller moves head backwards and upwards 
rapidly
Signaller sways from side-to-side with shoulders 
hunched, hair bristling and arms held (slightly) out
A stimulus-directed action-based behaviour, in 
which the animal rounds its back, tilts its body 
towards the stimulus, so it is within 20 degrees to 
either side of the saggital plane between the 
animal’s shoulders, draws its head into its 
shoulders and pushes its chin forward towards the 
stimulus. 
Signaller produces an auditory behaviour and 
looks to a conspecific within 2s of looking to the 
stimulus, followed by a look to the stimulus within 
2s of looking away from the conspecific (gaze 
behaviour: stimulus-target-stimulus). Only trials 
scored unequivocallly are included.
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Communicator behaviour 
Visual stimulus directional behaviours Chimpanzees produced stimulus directional 
behaviours (touch, lean torso, extend extremity or move head in the direction of the stimulus) in 
48.65% (N = 37) of trials when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a conspecific compared 
to 17.65% (N = 17) when alone. Moreover, 60% (N = 10) of communicators produced 
stimulus directional behaviours during a larger proportion of social than non-social trials, and 
none during a larger proportion of non-social trials (Figure 3.2). Nonetheless, the likelihood of 
producing a stimulus directional behaviour when in presence of a conspecific only approached 
significance. (GLMM, the conditions entered as factors and participant as a random factor: 
Social: Est. = 1.17, SE = 0.68, z = 1.73, p = 0.084; Non-social: Ext.: -1.21, SE = 0.62, z = 0.13, 
p = 0.120). Stimulus directional behaviours were, however, non-randomly distributed across the 
three main conditions, and communicators were more likely than chance to produce a stimulus 
directional behaviour when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attending conspecific, 
though not when in the presence of an attending conspecific, or when alone (GLMM: 
Experimental-Towards’: Est. = 0.74, SE = 0.77, z = 0.96, p = 0.336; ‘Experimental-Away’: Est. = 
1.58, SE = 0.76, z = 2.09, p = 0.037; ‘Communicator Alone’: Est. = -1.21, SE = 0.64, z = 0.982, p 
= 0.155, Table 3.2). 
Figure 3.2: Production of stimulus directional behaviours by communicators in non-social 
(‘Communicator Alone’) and social (experimental) conditions.    
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‘Hunching’ stimulus directional behaviour: Chimpanzee communicators adopted a 
‘hunching’ posture in 33.33% (12 of 37) of social (experimental) trials and in 5.88% (1 of 17) non-
social trials (‘Communicator Alone’). Nonetheless, the probability of ‘hunching’ occurring in social 
trials only approached significance, while it was non-significant for non-social trials (GLMM: 
Social: Est. = 2.92, SE = 1.53, z = 1.91, p = 0.056; Non-social: Est. = -2.56, SE = 1.69, z = 
1.20, p = 0.700; Figures 3.3 and 3.4). When the three conditions were analysed individually, a 
similar picture emerged, with the production of ‘hunching’ approaching significance for the 
experimental conditions but not the ‘Communicator Alone’ condition (GLMM with the three 
conditions entered as factors and participant as a random factor, ‘Experimental-Towards’: Est. = 
3.05, SE = 1.60, z = 1.90, p = 0.057; ‘Experimental-Away’: Est. = 2.82, SE = 1.59, z = 1.78, p = 
0.075; ‘Communicator Alone’: Est. = -3.57, SE = 1.69, z = 0.70, p = 0.690). In all ‘Experimental-
Away’ trials where communicators adopted a ‘hunching’ posture (N = 6), ‘hunching’ was 
preceded by an auditory behaviour, while this was the case in only 33.33% (N = 6) of 
‘Experimental-Towards’ trials. Communicators did not adopt the ‘hunching’ posture in any of the 
‘No Stimulus’, ‘Target Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ control trials (N = 95). 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 3.3: ‘Hunching’ posture. Posture performed by the chimpanzees on the top left (still a), 
left (still b) and right (still c).  
 Figure 3.4: Adoption of ‘hunching’ posture in non-social (‘Communicator Alone’) and social 
(experimental) conditions (the chimpanzee Jolly received only one ‘Communicator Alone’ trial). 
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Locomotory and visual non-stimulus directional behaviours: The distribution of 
locomotory (approach stimulus) and visual non-stimulus directional behaviours (arrest 
behaviour, bipedal swagger, shake arm or leg silently, bob head, move head back rapidly) across 
the three conditions did not deviate significantly from chance (see table 3.2). 
 Auditory behaviours: Chimpanzees produced an auditory behaviour (vocalisation, 
stamp, knock, clap, audibly move object) in 5.88% (N = 17), 16.67% (N = 18) and 36.84% (N 
= 19) of trials where they viewed the stimulus alone (‘Communicator Alone’), or in the presence of 
an attentive ('Experimental-Towards') or non-attentive conspecific ('Experimental-Away’), 
respectively. The likelihood of communicators producing auditory behaviours in any of the 
conditions did, however, not deviate from chance, although it approached significance for the 
‘Experimental-Away’ condition (GLMM: ‘Experimental-Towards’: Est. = 0.24, SE = 1.39, z = 0.17, p 
= 0.860, ‘Experimental-Away’: Est. = 2.29, SE = 1.29, z = 1.75, p = 0.079; ‘Communicator Alone’: 
Est. = -1.21 SE = 0.63, z = 1.20, p = 0.099). Moreover, while comparison of the social 
(experimental) and non-social (‘Communicator Alone’) conditions, also failed to yield significant 
effects (Social: Est. = 1.36, SE = 1.11, z = 1.22, p = 0.222; Non-social: Est. = -3.38, SE = 1.34, 
z = 1.52, p = 0.116), 33% of chimpanzees produced auditory behaviours during a larger 
proportion of social than non-social trials, and none produced auditory behaviours during a 
larger proportion of non-social trials (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1: Production of auditory behaviours by communicators in non-social (‘Communicator 
Alone’) and social (Experimental, facing towards/away) conditions. One individual did not receive 
a ‘Communicator Alone’ trial (as the individual was co-housed with another individual), and data 
are therefore presented for only 9 participants. 
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Multimodal behaviours: There was no significant difference in the production of 
multimodal behaviours, where an auditory behaviour preceded a visual stimulus directional 
behaviour, across the three conditions (GLMM: ‘Experimental-Towards’: Est. = -0.47, SE = 1.39, z 
= 0.34, p = 0.735, ‘Experimental-Away’: Est. = 1.74, SE =1.25, z =1.39, p = 0.165; ‘Communicator 
Alone’: Est. = -3.42, SE = 1.48, z = 0.28, p = 0.846, Figure 3.5). There were, however, noticeable 
individual differences. Two individuals (Carl and Jolly) preceded a directional behaviour by an 
auditory behaviour in all (n = 5) experimental trials where the target faced away from the 
communicator. Moreover, during ‘Experimental-Away’ trials (and never during ‘Experimental-
Towards’ and ‘Communicator Alone’ trials), the dominant male of one group (Carl) consistently (in 
3 of 3 trials) produced an auditory behaviour (knocked on the ground) and subsequently hand-
gestured and/or leaned in the direction of the stimulus, while repeatedly alternating gaze 
between the stimulus and conspecific. No auditory behaviours followed by directional visual 
behaviours were observed in control conditions where communicators did not view the 
stimulus (‘No stimulus’, ‘Target Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’, N = 95). 
 
 Figure 3.5: Communicator production of behaviours across conditions. Percentage of 
‘Experimental-Towards’ (N = 18), ‘Experimental-Away’ (N = 19) and ‘Communicator Alone’ (N = 17) 
trials, where communicators produced auditory, visual non-stimulus directional, visual stimulus 
directional and multimodal behaviours. Asterisk indicates significant differences across 
conditions. 
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Conspecific directional behaviours: Sixty-two percent (23 of 37) of experimental trials 
could be reliably scored for gaze changes. Of these, communicators were no more likely than 
chance to look to the target within 2s of looking away from the stimulus (60.68% (14 of 23) of 
trials, Binomial test: n = 23, p = 0.188). Communicators produced an auditory behaviour in 10 
of 37 experimental trials, of which gaze behaviour could be reliably scored in eight trials. In 75% 
(6 of 8) of these trials communicators looked to the target conspecific within 2s of looking away 
from the stimulus, followed by a look to the stimulus within 2s of looking away from the 
conspecific (i.e., auditory behaviour followed by stimulus-target-stimulus gaze behaviour, while 
being within the conspecific’s ‘open’/‘peripheral’ field of vision). Communicators were no more 
likely than chance to perform this behaviour (Binomial test: n = 8, p = 0.289). 
  
Table 3.2: Results summary for GLMM analyses of the distribution of communicator 
behaviours across the ‘Communicator Alone’, ‘Experimental-Away’ and ‘Experimental-Towards’, and, 
separately, for social (Experimental) and non-social (‘Communicator Alone’) conditions. Significant 
and near-significant factors are highlighted in grey. 
 
 
Behaviour Model Fixed effects Estimate Std. Error z-value P
Stimulus directional 1 Communciator Alone -1.21 0.64 0.98 0.155
Experimental-Away 1.58 0.76 2.09 0.037
Experimental-Towards 0.74 0.77 0.96 0.336
2 Non-social -1.21 0.62 0.13 0.120
Social 1.17 0.68 1.73 0.084
Locomotory directional 3 Communciator Alone -2.18 1.27 1.51 0.121
Experimental-Away 1.78 1.29 1.34 0.166
Experimental-Towards 1.51 1.32 1.15 0.251
Non-stimulus directional 4 Communciator Alone 0.15 0.56 0.26 0.799
Experimental-Away 0.45 0.69 0.65 0.517
Experimental-Towards 0.15 0.70 0.22 0.830
Hunch 5 Communciator Alone -3.57 1.69 0.70 0.690
Experimental-Away 2.82 0.59 1.78 0.075
Experimental-Towards 3.05 1.60 1.90 0.057
6 Non-social -2.56 1.69 1.20 0.700
Social 2.92 1.53 1.91 0.056
Auditory 7 Communciator Alone -1.21 0.63 1.20 0.099
Experimental-Away 2.29 1.29 1.75 0.079
Experimental-Towards 0.24 1.39 0.17 0.860
8 Non-social -3.38 1.34 1.52 0.116
Social 1.36 1.11 1.22 0.222
Multimodal 9 Communciator Alone -1.85 1.48 1.60 0.146
Experimental-Away 1.74 1.25 1.39 0.165
Experimental-Towards -0.47 1.39 0.34 0.735
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3.3.2 Communicator behaviours leading targets to look to the stimulus area  
Conspecifics were significantly more likely to look to the stimulus area in experimental 
conditions when communicators produced (than did not produce) a stimulus directional 
behaviour (touch, lean torso, extend extremity or move head in direction of the stimulus), a 
multimodal behaviour, and adopted a ‘hunching’ posture, respectively (Table 3.3). There were 
only two experimental trials, in which ‘hunching’ occurred and did not lead targets to co-orient 
to the communicators’ focus at the stimulus. In one of these, the stimulus was shown on one 
side of an artificial termite mount, and the target observed the communicator attentively (looked 
while arresting its behaviour), as the communicator slapped its hand on (another part of) the 
termite mount, and subsequently approached and began to groom the target. Communicators’ 
production of locomotory stimulus directional, visual non-stimulus directional and auditory 
behaviours did not significantly affect conspecifics’ looks to the stimulus area. The 
communicators production of gaze cues (Gaze 1: looked to the conspecific within 2s of looking 
away from the stimulus; NGazec ue  = 14, NNo Gazec ue  = 11; Gaze 2: followed an auditory behaviour 
with gaze shifts from the stimulus to the target and back to the stimulus, while being within the 
conspecific’s ‘open’/‘peripheral’ field of vision) also failed to yield a significant effect on 
whether or not targets looked to the stimulus area (Gaze 1: Est. = 1.74, SE =1.25, z = 0.89, p = 
0.465; Gaze 2: Est. = 1.31, SE = 1.02, z = 0.97, p = 0.167). Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show targets 
looks to the stimulus area when communicators produced various behaviours. 
Table 3.3: Significance table. GLMM tests (model 1-5) for a difference in the probability that 
targets looked to the stimulus area when communicators produced particular behaviours while 
viewing the stimulus during experimental trials. Significant and near-significant factors are 
highlighted in grey. 
Model Fixed effects Estimate Std. Error z-value P
1) Intercept -2.58 0.93 2.80 0.005
Stimulus directional 3.11 1.14 2.73 0.006
Locomotory stimulus directional -1.26 1.41 0.89 0.373
Auditory 1.81 1.53 1.18 0.237
Non-stimulus directional 0.13 1.19 0.11 0.913
2) Intercept -1.66 0.55 3.04 0.002
Hunch 3.27 0.95 3.45 0.001
3) Intercept -0.53 1.65 0.92 0.335
Gaze 1 (gaze shifts) 0.15 1.21 0.10 0.938
4) Intercept -0.47 1.78 1.1 0.978
Gaze 2 (auditory & gaze shifts) 0.85 1.76 0.32 0.642
5) Intercept -1.15 0.43 2.64 0.008
Multimodal 3.09 1.15 2.68 0.007
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Figure 3.6: Attentive targets’ looks to stimulus area as a function of communicator behaviour. 
Percentage of conspecific looks to the stimulus area during ‘Experimental-Towards’ trials (N = 18) 
when communicators did/did not produce various behaviours (percentage based on all received 
trials). Labels above columns indicate the number of trials, in which communicators did/did not 
produce the behaviour. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Non-attentive targets’ looks to stimulus area as a function of communicator 
behaviours. Percentage of conspecific looks to the stimulus area during ‘Experimental-Away’ trials 
(N = 19) when communicators did/did not produce various behaviours. Labels above columns 
indicate the number of trials, in which communicators did/did not produce the behaviour. 
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3.4 Discussion 
This chapter aimed to identify behaviours that may act as cues triggering intra-specific 
attention following in chimpanzees, and test the hypothesis that chimpanzees have the ability 
and motivation to direct conspecifics to novel, distal objects, and engage in declarative-like 
signalling. Chimpanzees who viewed a novel laser stimulus were more likely to produce a 
directional behaviour (touch, lean torso, move extremity or head forward in the direction of the 
stimulus) when in the presence of an initially non-attending conspecific than when alone (or 
indeed in the presence of an attending conspecific). There was a non-significant, but nonetheless 
clear trend of the animals to preferentially produce a directional behaviour in conditions where 
they viewed the stimulus in the presence of a conspecific (attentive as non-attentive), rather than 
in a non-social context where they viewed the stimulus while alone. Moreover, conspecifics 
were more likely co-orient to the communicators’ attention when communicators produced a 
directional behaviour. Overall, this suggests that, as a compound gesture, directional behaviours 
may carry a communicative function. 
Chimpanzees adopted a ‘hunching’ posture (an action-based behaviour, in which the 
animal rounded its back, drew its head into its shoulders, leaned its body forward and pushed its 
chin towards the stimulus) in 33% (12 of 37) of trials where they viewed the stimulus in the 
presence of a conspecific and only once while alone. While the preferential adoption of the 
posture when viewing the stimulus in a social context failed to reach full significance (p = 
0.056), a clear trend was evident. Moreover, in all cases where chimpanzees adopted the posture 
while viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific (N = 6), it was 
preceded by an auditory behaviour, while this was the case in only a third (N = 6) of cases 
where they viewed it in the presence of an attentive conspecific. Furthermore, conspecifics were 
more likely to look to the stimulus when communicators adopted the ‘hunching’ posture.           
The ‘hunching’ behaviour is similar to the ‘quadrupedal hunch’ described by Estes where the 
chimpanzee’s “head is bent and drawn into the shoulders while the individual is in a 
quadrupedal stance, and the back is rounded” (Estes 1991, p. 554). Estes described the 
behaviour as a “high-intensity threat display to an opponent who is equal or near equal, and an 
attack may come after this” (Estes 1991, p 554). The ‘hunching’ component has, however, also 
been described for bipedal and sitting positions, and in the wild, chimpanzees assume the 
posture in multiple contexts, ranging from aggression to greeting and courtship (Goodall 1986; 
Nishida et al. 1999), where it signals intense attention. While the co-occurrence of ‘hunching’ 
and attention following does not alone allow for differentiation, as to whether this behavioural 
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component is a purely adventitious cue of intense attention deployed by conspecifics, or if it 
involves voluntary and intentional components, the consistent assuming of the posture in the 
presence of conspecifics (and when in the presence of non-attentive conspecific, prefacing it by 
an auditory behaviour), suggests that the behaviour may have been produced intentionally and 
carried a communicative function. Overall, the results suggest that, when preceded by an 
auditory cue and accompanied by gaze alternation between the stimulus and a conspecific, the 
posture carried a communicative function to direct conspecifics to the novel, distal stimulus. 
As predicted, there was no difference between the production of visual non-stimulus 
directional behaviours (arrest current behaviour, bipedal swagger, shake arm or leg silently, bob 
head, move head back rapidly) when the chimpanzees viewed the stimulus alone or in the 
presence of an attentive or non-attentive conspecific, nor did non-stimulus directional 
behaviours increase the probability of conspecifics co-orienting to the communicators’ 
attention. Contrary to prediction, however, there was also no difference in the probability of 
chimpanzees approaching the stimulus when viewed in the presence or absence of a conspecific.  
The chapter indirectly examined the suggestion that apes may use gaze as a communicative 
signal  (de Waal 2001) by examining the communicators’ gaze behaviour after looking to the 
stimulus, and the targets’ response thereto. There was, however, no evidence that the 
chimpanzees used gaze as a communicative signal. Chimpanzees were no more likely than 
chance to look referentially to the conspecific (gaze behaviour: stimulus-conspecific-stimulus), 
nor to produce an auditory cue and subsequently shift gaze from the stimulus to the target and 
back to the stimulus, while being within the conspecific’s ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ field of vision; 
Nor did these behaviours influence the probability that conspecifics looked to the stimulus area.  
Chimpanzee communicators were more than twice as likely to produce an auditory 
behaviour in experimental trials where a conspecific faced away rather than towards them, and 
more than six times as likely to do so than when they viewed the stimulus on their own. While 
these differences failed to reach statistical significance31, significance was approached for the 
condition, in which communicators viewed the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive 
conspecific (p = 0.079). While it is difficult to unequivocally determine if some of the 
chimpanzees intentionally produced auditory cues, so as to call conspecific attention, the overall 
trend of selectively producing auditory cues the presence of a non-attentive conspecific, 
                                               
31 Some individuals consistently, selectively produced auditory behaviours when viewing the 
stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific, while others never produced any 
auditory behaviours. The inferential statistics used controlled for individual contribution to the 
dataset, and thereby yielding results that only approached significance.  
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suggests that the auditory cues may have been produced intentionally and carried a 
communicative function, rather than being side effects of a response to the stimulus, driven 
mainly by arousal and emotional states.  
It is, nonetheless, possible that in situations of uncertainty, arousal levels are reduced 
when conspecifics are present, and indeed facing towards rather than away from the individual 
(i.e., the presence and attention of a conspecific may provide some form of comfort). If so, it is 
possible that communicators may have experienced comparatively higher stimulus-induced 
arousal levels in the experimental condition, where a conspecific faced away from rather than 
towards the subject. Hence, while the higher proportion of auditory cues followed by stimulus 
directional cues in the ‘facing away’ condition may reflect an intention to inform conspecifics 
about the stimulus (high level interpretation), or, (as seems more plausible in the light of the 
paucity of reported cases of informative and declarative pointing in intraspecific ape 
communication), to direct the conspecific to the stimulus for social referential purposes, it is 
conceivable that the cue combination may be attributable to increased arousal levels in this 
condition. The trend towards producing directional visual cues when viewing the stimulus in the 
presence of an initially away-facing rather than towards-facing individual indirectly supports this. 
Alternatively, it may simply be that individuals increased their communicative efforts when 
faced with a non-attentive conspecific. 
The trend towards selective production of auditory cues when in the context of a non-
attentive conspecific is consistent with the finding that (a much larger group of) chimpanzees 
used auditory cues to capture the attention of non-attentive humans in imperative food-begging 
contexts, and produce attention ‘getting sounds’ (‘raspberries’ and extended grunts) when a 
human was present in combination with food, and not when either the food or human was 
presented alone (Hopkins et al. 2007).  
There was no species-wide evidence of auditory signalling followed by directional visual 
signalling when the chimpanzees viewed the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive 
conspecific. There were, however, noticeable individual differences, as some chimpanzees 
consistently led conspecifics to the stimulus, while others ignored it. During experimental trials 
where the target faced away from the communicator, two individuals consistently (n = 5) 
preceded a directional behaviour by an auditory behaviour. Moreover, in these trials one of the 
subjects (the dominant male of one population) produced an auditory behaviour and 
subsequently hand-gestured and/or leaned in the direction of the stimulus, while alternating 
gaze between the stimulus and conspecific, and stopping only when the conspecific leaned over 
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to look to the stimulus area (located on a branch facing away from the conspecific). Overall, the 
results suggest that some chimpanzees may combine functionally different cues from different 
modalities to direct conspecifics to a yet unseen novel stimulus. Thus, the compound category 
‘stimulus directional behaviour’ may represent a case of a naturally occurring (albeit rarely 
deployed) intentional, declarative-like behaviour. 
Previous research has suggested that apes do not solicit the attention of non-attending 
human experimenters (in a food begging experiment) and conspecifics (based on a 75 hour 
observational study of chimpanzees) before producing a more specific visual behaviour, but tend 
to first locomote into the visual field of the recipient (Liebal et al. 2004a,b). In contrast, there are 
reports of three language-trained chimpanzees calling the attention of humans before using visual 
gestures (Krause & Fouts 1997; Menzel 1999), and of a repeated calling and pointing sequence 
observed in one wild bonobo (Veà & Sabater-Pi 1999). The language-trained apes and those in 
the present experiment differ from the subjects in Liebal and colleagues’ study in terms of rearing 
histories of close emotional bonding with the recipients. This suggests that some of the negative 
findings from laboratory experiments, where apes communicate with humans, may lie not in 
cognitive capacity, but in motivation (see Gómez 2004, for a similar argument regarding the 
performance of human-reared vs. group-reared chimpanzees during interactions with humans). 
The implication is that care should be exercised when attributing socio-cognitive performance 
to species differences, without careful consideration of ontogeny and motivational factors. 
The typically negative results for apes’ understanding of cooperative human referential 
gazing and pointing in the object-choice task have lent support to the notion of a cognitive 
difference between humans and other apes in terms of the ability to share intentions (e.g., 
Tomasello & Carpenter 2007). The present results, however, suggest that some chimpanzees may 
be able and motivated to solicit and direct conspecifics to novel, distal objects in non-competitive 
communicative contexts. While the experiment was designed to limit imperative motives, it did 
not eliminate the possibility of a selfish interrogative social referencing motive. Social referential 
pointing is neither about spurring the other into action to obtain a specific object or behaviour 
for the individual itself (imperative), nor to express or share interest or provide information 
(‘high-level’ cognitive interpretation of declarative pointing), but to provoke a response that can 
be used to discern ambiguity in situations of uncertainty and provide information about an 
object/situation and how to respond. When exposed to a novel object human-reared 
chimpanzees look referentially at their caregivers and adjust their behaviour according to the 
valence of the message they receive (Russell et al. 1997). Social referential pointing, however, 
includes first directing others to the referent, which, minimally, implies that individuals conceive 
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others as having emotional and/or behavioural responses towards the environment, that can be 
elicited by manipulating their attention. The present design did not address the question of 
whether the apes behaved to influence others’ mental states (an aspect frequently included in 
more recent definitions of the term ‘declarative’ [to share attention, attitudes, emotions and 
experiences with the addressee: Tomasello 1999; Liszkowski et al. 2004]), or to evoke an 
attentional and/or emotional reaction as reflected in overt manifestations. In the light of past 
research, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that apes, under some circumstances, may 
direct conspecifics to hidden or novel objects for ‘selfish’ reasons (i.e., not necessarily for 
cooperative purposes), to elicit an attentional response (as reflected in overt manifestations 
[facial expressions, postures etc.]) that may be used to disambiguate the situation (see also 
Gómez et al. 1993). That is to say, minimally, the present results suggest that some of the 
chimpanzees engaged in intraspecific ‘social referential pointing’.   
Along with experiments showing that apes perform better in object-choice tasks when a 
gaze direction cue is combined with e.g., a vocalisation (Itakura et al. 1999; Call et al. 2000), the 
present finding that the chimpanzees may have used subtle, compound, and in some cases 
multi-modal, behaviours to follow and direct others to distal locations, suggests that ‘pointing’ 
in apes involves elements other than the arm and index finger, and lends support to the notion 
that apes may point with their entire bodies (Menzel 1973). This accords with naturalistic 
observations of human infant pointing, which is typically combined with other gestures, gaze 
alternation and vocalisations (Zinober & Martlew 1985). Intra-specific functional manipulation 
of others’ attention may thus have been overlooked because it may be expressed through 
multiple, inconspicuous and composite behaviours that involve auditory gestures, the head and 
the whole body rather than a specialised species-specific referential signal. 
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CHAPTER 4: An exploratory observational study of chimpanzee 
attention management and manipulation 
 
 
Summary 
This exploratory study tested the hypothesis that chimpanzees accord and receive 
attention following as a function of rank. Approximately 15 hours of video-taped chimpanzee 
interactions were assessed for attention following instances, which were corrected for 
observation time per individual (seven adults and three infant chimpanzees), by dividing the 
number of times (i) the animals’ attention was followed, and (ii) the animals followed another’s 
attention, respectively, by the number of minutes of observation. Chimpanzees were more likely 
to follow the attention of the dominant individual, who in turn, was less likely to follow the 
attention of other chimpanzees (z-score for distance to the centroid = 1.98). These results 
provide the first evidence in support for the operation of the ‘Social Attention Hypothesis’ in 
chimpanzees, and suggest that the predictions made by the hypothesis (that individuals accord 
and receive attention as a function of rank: Chance 1967) also apply to the attention following. 
Moreover, eighty-four hours video taped chimpanzee interactions were analysed for the 
occurrence of ‘hunching’ behaviours (identified as potential ‘pointing behaviours’ in the 
previous chapter), which occurred four times and only in the context of attention following. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Attention following & the direction of attention 
While visual information can be communicative (designed to influence the behaviour of 
others), most is purely adventitious, and influences the observer’s behaviour unintentionally, 
without codified signals (Gómez 1994; Watts 1998). The visual attention of conspecifics may 
afford subtle signals, and indicate interest in the environment (humans: Argyle & Cook 1976; 
non-human primates: Miller 1971, cited by Kaplan & Rogers 2002), and the focus of attention 
within a group therefore (i) reveals the cues that individuals attend to and which may be used to 
Observational Study of Chimpanzee Attention Management & Manipulation 
 
96
predict their behaviour, and (ii) supplies attention following individuals with a cue for determining 
the main feature upon which inter-relationships are based (e.g., rank and relatedness). 
Animals are predicted to reduce outward anti-predator vigilance in the safety of large 
groups, due to shared vigilance (Bednekoff & Lima 1998), dilution of risk  (Hamilton 1971) and 
cooperative defence (e.g., Pulliam 1973). In contrast to most species of birds and mammals, 
who show a ‘group size effect on vigilance’, and decrease scanning rates with increasing group 
size (Elgar 1989; Quenette 1990), the majority of primates do, however, not support this notion 
(black howler monkeys, Alouatta pigra: Treves et al. 2001; red colobines, Procolobus badius, and 
redtail monkeys, Cercopithecus ascanius: Treves 1998; white-face capuchins, Cebus capucinus: Rose & 
Fedigan 1995; yellow baboons, Papio ursinus: Cowlishaw 1998)32, but spend a considerable 
amount of time monitoring associates within their own groups (baboons: Cowlishaw 1998; 
gorillas: Watts 1998; red colobus and redtail monkey: Treves 1999; squirrel monkeys, Saimiri 
sciureus, & tamarins, Saguinus labiatus: Caine & Marra 1988). Indeed, three, five and seven 
observations of three chimpanzees (Treves 1997) suggest that chimpanzees increase vigilance 
(defined as “any visual search directed beyond arm’s reach”: Treves 1999, p. 117) with 
increasing group size. Moreover, although a larger, controlled study found no relationship 
between vigilance and group size, male (though not female) chimpanzee vigilance increased as 
the number of individuals within 3m increased (Kutusake 2006). Such absence of a reduction in 
vigilance with increasing group size may owe to that (a) a reduction in outward anti-predator 
vigilance is compensated by an increase in an alternative component of vigilance, such as 
monitoring associates, and/or, relatedly, (b) that the selective pressure imposed by predation is 
eclipsed by intra-group competition in chimpanzees. Thus, in primates total vigilance may not 
reflect group size, but variables indicating or affecting social interaction, such as the presence 
and proximity of conspecifics in general, and of higher-ranking individuals in particular. 
Moreover, for captive animals anti-predator vigilance in likely to be reduced, thereby increasing 
the proportion of time available for monitoring conspecifics. 
Many organisms process eye information without reference to mental states, and rapidly 
follow the direction of others’ gaze in a way suggesting a social reflex. Such reflexive gaze 
following, however, involves voluntary components related to e.g., relative status; Although, for 
example, low-status rhesus macaques reflexively follow the gaze of all familiar conspecifics, 
high-status macaques tend follow the gaze of only other high-status individuals (Shepherd et al. 
2006). This accords with the ‘Social Attention Hypothesis’, which proposes that individuals 
                                               
32 Group sizes examined range between 2-76+ individuals. 
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accord and receive attention as a function of rank (Chance 1967; Chance & Jolly 1970). While, 
however, this hypothesis has received wide theoretical support, and the attention structures of 
captive gorillas (Yamagiwa 1992), wild patas monkeys, Erythrocebus patas (McNelis & Boatright-
Horowitz 1998) and baboons, Papio hamadryas (Kummer & Kurt 1963) are based on social 
dominance, empirical evidence for its operation in chimpanzees, is nonexistent.33 
Stimulus directed cues 
Experimental manipulations (see Chapters 2 and 3) suggest that chimpanzees may use a 
‘hunching’ posture (an action-based behaviour, in which the animal rounds its back, draws its 
head into its shoulders, leans its body forward and pushes its chin forward) to direct 
conspecifics to distal stimuli. In 12 trials (11 experimental trials where chimpanzees viewed a 
stimulus in the presence of a conspecific, and one control trial where a chimpanzee viewed the 
stimulus alone) six individuals adopted a ‘hunching’ posture, and in 75% of cases, preceded it by 
an auditory behaviour. Moreover, conspecifics were more likely to look to the stimulus when 
communicators adopted a ‘hunching’ posture. The ‘hunching’ behaviour is similar to the 
‘quadrupedal hunch’, described as a “high-intensity threat display to an opponent who is equal 
or near equal, and an attack may come after this” (Estes 1991, p. 554). As the laser stimuli used 
the experiment detailed in Chapters 2 and 3 may have evoked alarm in the subjects, the 
frequency and contexts, in which ‘hunching’ and other stimulus directional behaviours occur 
during natural chimpanzee interactions, should be ascertained. 
Aim 
The aim of the study was three-fold; (i) to apply Chance’s (1967) ‘Social Attention 
Hypothesis’ that individuals accord and receive attention as a function of dominance rank to 
attention following, and test the hypothesis that the chimpanzees followed the attention more 
frequently of the dominant individual (the alpha male) than of other individuals, (ii) to examine 
the cues that individuals produce prior to and during attention following, and (iii) to examine the 
prevalence of ‘hunching’ behaviours during natural chimpanzee interactions, and whether such 
co-occur with particular stimuli or events, and provoke noticeable changes in conspecifics’ 
behaviour. The present study was based on data extracted from 84 hours video-taped 
chimpanzee interactions, wherefrom attention following episodes were recorded ad libitum. i.e., 
analyses were conducted post-hoc. The study is therefore exploratory. 
                                               
33 Unreferenced claims (by researchers studying orangutans: Kaplan and Rogers 2002) have, 
however, been made that lower ranking chimpanzees look more towards higher ranking 
individuals than vice versa. 
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4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
Video was coded for seven adult and three infant chimpanzees housed at Copenhagen 
Zoo (see Chapter 2 for subject and housing details). For statistical purposes adult animals were 
considered individually, while the data for the infants were collapsed due to the comparatively 
shorter observation time of the infants. 
 
4.2.2 Procedure and Statistics 
Eighty-four hours of video recorded chimpanzee interactions were examined for the 
occurrence of ‘hunching’ behaviours, and of these approx. 15 hours (14.58 hours) were assessed 
for attention following episodes. Sequences analysed for attention following ranged from 30s to 
8 minutes and were selected for analysis if the faces and relative foci of attention of two 
individuals could be unambiguously scored for a minimum of 30s. The duration of time 
analysed differed across individuals, ranging from 47 to 175 minutes for a low and high-ranking 
female, respectively. Instances of attention following were corrected for observation time per 
individual or class of individuals (infants), by dividing the number of times (i) the animal(s)’ 
attention was followed, and (ii) the animal(s) followed another’s attention, respectively, by the 
number of minutes of observation. Z-scores were computed to assess differences across animals 
in terms of being the producer and recipient of attention following. To test the hypothesis that 
the attention of the highest ranking individual (the alpha male) was followed more frequently 
than the attention of others’, and that the individual was less likely to follow the attention of 
others, each animal’s distance to the geometrical centroid (the geometrical centre of a scattergram, 
in which production and according of attention following was plotted on the x-axis and y-axis, 
respectively, see Figure 4.2 for clarification) was calculated, using the following formula:  √ (x – 
x )2 - (y – y ) 2. To determine significance, the z-score for each individual’s/group’s distance to 
the centroid was computed, to explore if the attention followed/following of each 
individual/group (as measured by their z-score) was significantly further away from the centroid 
than would be predicted by chance. 
 
4.2.3 Inter-rater reliability  
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I coded the videotapes and recorded 46 cases of attention following. A second rater 
assessed all 46 cases for inter-observer reliability and agreed that in 98% (45 of 46), the video 
clips contained an instance of attention following34. The case, on which coders disagreed, was 
excluded from analysis.  
4.2.4 Behavioural coding 
Where relevant, the definitions were as in the experimental procedure detailed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. For example, the animal, whose focus of attention was followed, was termed 
the ‘communicator’, the animal that followed another’s focus of attention was termed the 
‘target’, and the object/event that the communicator looked to, was termed the ‘stimulus’. Only 
cases of attention following were included, i.e., co-focus arising from a series of independent 
stimulus-driven events (such as noise) were excluded. A behaviour was scored as attention 
following if chimpanzee ‘A’ looked in the direction of chimpanzee ‘B’s attention within 2s of 
looking to chimpanzee ‘B’, with both head and eyes simultaneously. For clarity, only attention 
following to locations distal to the communicator was recorded; I.e., looks to the 
communicator’s face, immediately followed by a look anywhere else on the communicator’s 
body (even if this is where communicator and target clearly looked), were excluded. 
The communicator’s and target’s behaviour was coded from 10s before the start of 
observed attention following instances, and are detailed in table 3.1 (Cue definitions and Classes, 
Chapter 2). The behaviours consisted of (1) auditory behaviours (vocalise, clap, stamp or knock 
on the ground, audibly move object), (2) visual non-stimulus directional behaviours (arrest 
current behaviour, bipedal swagger, shake arm or leg silently, bob head, move head back 
rapidly), (3) visual stimulus directional behaviours (touch, lean torso towards, move extremity or 
head in the direction of the stimulus, (4) locomotory stimulus directional behaviour (approach 
stimulus area), (5) conspecific directed behaviour (instances where the communicator shifted 
gaze from the stimulus to the conspecific and back to the stimulus [gaze sequence: stimulus – 
target – stimulus]), and (6) ‘hunching’. In addition (7) cases of target gaze alternation (gaze 
sequence: communicator – stimulus – communicator) were recorded. Only trials in which the 
animal’s attentional behaviour could be reliably coded were included. Cues were analysed as part 
of a cue category, apart from conspecific directed cues, which were analysed individually. In 
addition, the number of individuals in the enclosure, the distance between the communicator 
                                               
34 The percentage of agreement is presented rather than the conventional Cohen’s Kappa value, 
which requires a dichotomous variable (i.e., it would require that the raters recorded instances of 
absence as well as presence of attention following). 
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and target (< 1m, < 2m, < 3m, < 4m), and the general behaviour were recorded (Forage: 
search, handle, consume; Groom: being groomed, grooming conspecific, self-grooming, Play: 
playful interaction with conspecific; Aggression: aggressive interaction with conspecific; Idle: 
animal does not exhibit active behaviour, including sitting, laying and staring into space). 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 The direction of attention following 
Forty-five instances of attention following were recorded during 14.58 hours of analysed 
chimpanzee interactions. The communicators’ behaviour during the time of attention following 
was classified as idle (64.44%), forage (15.56%), groom (13.33%), locomote (4.44%) and play 
(2.22%), and inter-animal distance ranged form 1 to 4 meters, with 2-4 animals in the enclosures 
(in most cases the observations with more than 2 animals in the enclosure owed to the presence 
of infants that nearly always accompanied their mothers).  
Instances of attention following were corrected for observation-time per individual or 
class of individuals (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). The geometrical centroid (i.e., the geometrical 
centre of a scattergram, in which the production and according of attention following was 
plotted on the x-axis and y-axis, respectively) was 0.05 x 0.05, signifying the geometrical point at 
which individuals were equally likely to accord and receive attention following. The z-score for 
each animal’s distance to the centroid was computed. The alpha male (Carl) was significantly 
more likely to have his attention followed and less likely to follow the attention of a conspecific 
than other group members were (Carl, z = 1.99, p = 0.05, Figure 4.2).  
 Table 4.1: Observation time and attention following accorded and received per individual. For 
each individual instances of attention following were corrected for observation time, and the z-
score for the distance to the centroid is shown. 
Minutes 
observed
Instances of 
attention 
followed
Instances of 
following 
anothers' 
attention
Frequency of 
attention being 
followed per 
minute
Frequency of 
following another's 
attention per 
minute
Z-score for 
individual 
distance to the 
centroid
Carl (alpha male) 115 13 2 0.11 0.02 1.99
Cindy 175 5 12 0.03 0.07 -0.04
Gigi 91 4 4 0.04 0.04 -0.90
Infants (3) 141 8 6 0.06 0.04 -0.72
Mati 47 0 2 0.00 0.04 0.95
Olga 114 7 6 0.06 0.05 -0.65
Trunte 97 3 7 0.03 0.07 0.01
Yoran 95 5 6 0.05 0.06 -0.64
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Figure 4.1: Attention followed and following. Proportion of attention followed and attention 
following, corrected for observation time. 
             
 Figure 4.2: Attention followed and following per individual/class of individuals, corrected for 
observation time. 
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4.3.2 Cues associated with attention following 
 No auditory or tactile behaviours were observed during 45 instances of attention 
following. The cues most frequently performed by communicators were visual non-stimulus-
directional cues (arrest behaviour [N = 9], move head back rapidly [N = 4], bob head [N = 3]), 
followed by stimulus directional cues (lean towards [N = 8], and move head forwards in 
direction of stimulus [N = 7], Figure 4.3). Targets shifted gaze between the communicator and 
stimulus in 25% (11 of 45) of attention following episodes, and in 13% (6 of 45) the 
communicator shifted gaze between the stimulus and target (for an example, see Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.3: Behaviours associated with attention following. Percent attention following episodes 
(N = 45) where communicators and targets (last column only) performed various behaviours. 
  
  
 
Figure 4.4: Stills of attention following episode involving repeated gaze alternation. From top left: 
alpha male (bottom left in stills) entered the enclosure and (within the following 10s) looked out 
of the window; then looked to conspecifics; looked out of the window; looked back to 
conspecifics (2nd time) and out of the window (3rd time). Conspecific (top right in stills) looked to 
the alpha male, leaned towards the window, and looked in the direction of the alpha’s attention. 
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4.3.3 The occurrence of hunching behaviours 
Four instances of ‘hunching’ were observed during 84 hours of observation. In all cases 
a conspecific looked to the ‘hunching’ animal and subsequently towards the object of the 
‘hunching’ animal’s attention. The dominant male adopted a ‘hunching’ posture three times and 
an infant once (Figures 4.5 – 4.8). No sounds were audible from the direction that 
communicators looked and no conspecifics were visible. In no case was identification of the 
object of the communicator’s focus possible. 
  
Figure 4.5: Sitting ‘hunch’. The alpha male (bottom left) sits looking through the door to 
another enclosure, which has a window to the outside public areas (approx. 30m from the alpha 
male). The beta male (top right) turns its head and looks to the alpha, who then looks to beta, 
then lowers its head into its shoulders to sinks slightly forward into a ‘hunching’ posture and 
looks back through the door. The beta male turns around (repositions its body), looks through 
the door for 14s and then back to the alpha male.  
 
Figure 4.6-4.8: Quadrupedal and bipedal ‘hunching’ behaviour. From left: (i) alpha male enters 
enclosure, looks around and towards the ceiling, adopts a quadrupedal hunching posture and 
looks towards a window approx. 20m away. Conspecifics look to the alpha male and then 
towards the window (no sound were audible from the direction of the window, nor were any 
people visible). (ii) The alpha male (left) looks to a female conspecific (right) who faces him, 
moves into a bipedal ‘hunching’ posture, looks towards a door to an adjoining enclosure. Target 
turns around and looks in the same direction. (iii) Infant sits, then stands up, moves into a 
bipedal hunch while looking towards a wall, the infant then to looks to its mother, and then 
towards the wall. The mother co-orients to the wall.  
Observational Study of Chimpanzee Attention Management & Manipulation 
 
104 
4.4 Discussion 
The study aimed to apply Chance’s (1967) hypothesis that individuals accord and receive 
attention as a function of dominance rank, to attention following. Chimpanzees were more 
likely to follow the attention of the alpha male, who in turn was less likely to follow the 
attention of others. The ‘Social Attention Hypothesis’ is widely supported by evidence for its 
operation in a number of primate species, however, empirical data have thus far lacked for 
chimpanzees. While the hypothesis is traditionally tested by measuring the number of glances 
and duration of looks to conspecifics, attention following is a plausible extension of the 
predictions made by the hypothesis. Indeed, the present results are consistent with the finding 
that reflexive gaze following of macaques is gated by social dominance (Shepherd et al. 2006). 
While the opportunistic nature of the data collection (ad libitum data collection from videos, and 
consequent unequal observation time across individuals) means that the study remains 
exploratory and the results conditional upon further confirmation, they provide the first 
evidence for the operation of the ‘Social Attention Hypothesis’ in chimpanzees and suggest that 
the predictions made by the hypothesis also apply to the attention following.  
The present results are consistent with the suggestion that low social status may be 
associated with increased arousal and scanning behaviour (e.g., Caine & Marra 1988), and 
consequently increased levels of attention following. Several researchers (e.g., Keverne et al. 
1978; Shepherd et al. 2006) have, however, suggested that high social status requires selective 
monitoring of only other high status individuals; a suggestion to which the present results do 
not lend support, as the only two cases of recorded attention following by the alpha male were 
to two low-ranking females. 
The study also examined the cues that chimpanzee communicators produce prior to and 
during attention following episodes, and the contextual occurrence of ‘hunching’ behaviours. 
None of 45 attention following episodes involved auditory behaviours, yet many were preceded 
by non-stimulus- and stimulus directional behaviours (e.g., leaning and moving the head 
forwards towards the stimulus). The approx. 84 hours of analysed chimpanzee interactions, 
contained four instances of the ‘hunching’ posture, which all led conspecifics to co-orient to the 
communicators’ direction of attention. The co-occurrence of ‘hunching’ and attention following 
does not alone allow for differentiation, as to whether the behavioural component is a purely 
adventitious signal of intense attention (as suggested by Estes 1991) that is deployed by 
conspecifics as a sign of something of potential interest, or if it involves voluntary and 
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intentional components on behalf of the communicator. Nonetheless, in conjunction with the 
trend for chimpanzees to adopt a ‘hunching’ posture when viewing a novel stimulus in the 
presence of a conspecific, and not when alone (see Chapter 3 Chimpanzee Attention 
Manipulation35), and that conspecifics were more likely to co-orient to the communicator’s 
attention when the ‘hunching’ posture was adopted, the present finding goes some way to 
suggest that this (albeit very rare) behaviour may be involved in attention coordination contexts. 
Several things suggest that the chimpanzees were aware that others’ attention was 
directed at specific events in the environment. For example, targets alternated gaze between the 
communicator and the direction of the communicators’ attention in 25% of attention following 
episodes, and in 13% (6 of 45) the communicator repeatedly (up to 3 times) shifted gaze 
between a conspecific and the object of its own attention. There was thus some suggestion that 
communicators either ‘checked’ conspecifics’ attention, attempted social referencing, or may (in 
a small number of cases) have used head/gaze shifts between the conspecific and ‘stimulus’, as a 
communicative cue. While such repeated head/gaze shifts’, is consistent with the suggestion by 
de Waal (2001) that apes may use gaze to communicate referentially about external events, any 
conclusions are constrained by the nature of the data collection (examination of attention 
following episodes), which naturally meant that all triadic gaze exchanges between 
communicators, targets and external stimuli led to visual coorientation. The experimental 
manipulation reported in Chapter 3 also showed that communicators frequently (in 61% of 
trials that could be reliably scored for gaze changes, n = 23), shifted gaze between the stimulus 
and target conspecific and back to the stimulus, and in 75% (n = 8) of trials where 
communicators produced an auditory cue, shifted gaze between the stimulus-target-stimulus 
within a few seconds, while being within the conspecific’s ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ field of vision. 
The lack of evidence that such repeated head/gaze shifts (in the experimental manipulation) 
increased the probability that target conspecifics co-oriented to the laser stimulus, however, 
suggests that even if the chimpanzees used gaze shifts as intentionally communicative 
behaviours to direct others’ attention to distal locations, they not be particularly effective cues.  
While research has often relied on gaze alternation as a criterion for intentional 
communication, and pointing has been classified as non-communicative when not accompanied 
                                               
35 While chimpanzees were not significantly more likely to adopt the hunching posture when 
viewing the stimulus in the presence of a conspecific than alone, there was a clear trend, with 
the difference between the production of the behaviour in social and non-social conditions very 
closely approaching significance (p = 0.056). 
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by gaze alternation to a recipient (Bates et al. 1975), it may be misleading to use coordinated 
looks as the primary criterion for communicative intent (Liszkowski 2005). Not only is there 
evidence of cross-cultural differences in the degree of e.g., mutual gaze in human mother-infant 
dyads (with twice as much face-to-face engagement in North American, compared to Japanese, 
mother-infant dyads: Bornstein et al. 1990, cited by Blake et al. 2003), but studies have also 
reported low levels (17%) of eye contact/checking co-occurring with communicative gestures in 
9-14 months old Japanese infants (Blake et al. 2003). Absence of gaze alternation does not 
necessarily imply absence of communicative intent, as individuals (be they apes or human 
infants) may simply assume that the context presupposes an assumption of communicative 
intent, and that the viewer understands that the subject’s behaviour is intended as 
communicative (e.g., Bard 1992; Liszkowski 2005). More research, including cross-cultural 
studies of adult and infant humans, is needed to clarify whether the use gaze alternation as a 
central criterion to indicate communicative intent is warranted. 
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CHAPTER 5: Attention following in bonobos 
 
 
Summary 
 While the genetic proximity of the Pan species may suggest similar attention following and 
directing skills, differences in social behaviours, such as cooperation, raise the question, as to 
whether the species may exhibit different motivations to follow others’ attention. The present 
study tested the hypothesis that experimentally naïve bonobos follow the attention of 
conspecifics to locations behind themselves and around barriers, and lead non-attentive 
conspecifics to detect a novel object. Eleven bonobos were presented with a novel visual 
stimulus to test if they would lead a non-attending conspecific to detect it under two 
experimental conditions. In one the conspecific faced the communicator, while another required 
the communicator to first attract the attention of a non-attending conspecific. Some trials 
required targets to only turn to detect the stimulus, while others that they locomote around an 
obstacle to follow the communicator’s attention (geometric attention following). Bonobos 
followed conspecific attention, and showed some indication of geometric attention following (as 
subjects passed tests conducted on only the first received trial, but failed tests including all trials 
that they received). 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Bonobos and chimpanzees diverged from the common evolutionary ancestor shared with 
humans 5 million year ago (Kumar et al. 2005) and are genetically equidistant to humans. 
Chimpanzees have long been considered the referential model for human cognition and 
behaviour, and have been studied extensively with respect to understanding of (primarily 
human) attention and referential gestures. By comparison bonobos are understudied, despite, by 
homology, equal value as a referential model. The Pan species diverged from each other as little as 
0.9-2.7 m.y.a. (Bradley & Vigilant 2002; Kassmann & Pääbo 2002; Won & Hey 2005), however, 
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differ in aspects of social structure, temperaments, cooperation and possibly consequently, 
cognition  (Stanford 1998; Boesch et al. 2002; Hare et al. 2007; Hare & Kwetuenda 2010).  
 Chimpanzees exhibit male dominance, with males forming long-term alliances to 
coordinate and dominate females and rivals. They cooperate during hunts, aggressive territory 
border patrols, infanticide and occasional lethal attacks on neighbouring group members  
(Goodall 1979; Boesch & Boesch 1989; Mitani & Watts 1999; Wrangham 1999; Boesch & 
Boesch-Achermann 2000; Watts & Mitani 2001; Watts et al. 2002). By comparison, male 
sociality is almost non-existent among bonobos, who exhibit female social dominance, with 
unrelated females forming strong social bonds against males, which via intra-sexual contact is 
thought to minimise aggression and dilute conflicts (Susman 1984; Kano 1992). The rate of 
intra-specific physical conflict and lethal violence is considerably lower among bonobos, with 
infanticide being rare (Hohmann & Fruth 2008), inter-group encounters predominantly 
amicable, and border-patrolling and inter-community raiding purportedly non-existent (Doran 
2002). Overall, bonobos appear more egalitarian, tolerant and cooperative in their social 
interactions (Hare et al. 2007; Vigilant 2007), something, which may be related to the presence 
of a microsatellite DNA section controlling responses to vasopressin (a hormone affecting 
attachment and bonding) in bonobos (and humans), while being absent in chimpanzees  
(Hammock & Young 2005).  
 Chimpanzees perform better in competitive than collaborative tests of social cognition. 
To account for this difference, Hare and Tomasello’s (2005) ‘Emotional Reactivity Hypothesis’ 
has proposed that apes’ social problem solving may be constrained by temperament and 
disposition for cooperation and sharing. According to this hypothesis, selection for social 
emotions, that counteract competitiveness, favoured the emergence of stronger cooperative 
tendencies in bonobos than chimpanzees, as exemplified by the more relaxed social 
relationships of bonobos, including fewer and less intense conflicts over food (Hare 2007). The 
hypothesis has received some support from findings suggesting that bonobos outperform 
chimpanzees in cooperative tests. While pairs of either bonobos or chimpanzees will cooperate 
to achieve a goal that provides food for both partners, only bonobos cooperate when the food 
is indivisible and will end up monopolised by one partner (Hare et al. 2007). Moreover, when 
given an opportunity, unrelated bonobos prefer to release a conspecific form an adjacent room 
and feed together rather than eating alone (Hare & Kwetuenda 2010). The question arises 
whether the species exhibit different motivations in following and manipulating conspecific 
attention, and whether bonobos are more likely to lead conspecifics to view a novel stimulus. 
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 Previous research, involving four bonobos with much human experience, suggests that 
bonobos are sensitive to the attentional states of humans and follow human attention to 
locations above and behind themselves and geometrically, around opaque barriers and through 
windowed obstructions  (Kaminski et al. 2004; Liebal et al. 2004a; Bräuer et al. 2005; Okamoto-
Barth et al. 2007a). Johnson and Oswald (2001) reported that bonobos follow the gaze of 
conspecifics, although the authors referred to papers (Johnson 1997; Johnson et al. 1999) that 
make not reference to observed instances of attention following.36 A recent study modelled on 
Tomasello and colleagues’ study of intra-specific gaze following (Tomasello et al. 1998), 
however, suggested that three bonobos followed the attention of conspecifics induced to raise 
their heads to locations 2m above and immediately behind the subject (Pitman & Shumaker 
2009). The study, nonetheless, found that bonobos followed human attention more readily than 
conspecific attention (Pitman & Shumaker 2009). 
 While previous studies have found little evidence that bonobo coordinate looks between 
conspecifics and objects (Bard & Vauclair 1984), ape ‘communicators’ in this experiment were 
more likely to alternate gaze between the stimulus-conspecific-stimulus within a 10s period 
when the human experimenter held up an object than simply a empty hand (Pitman & 
Shumaker 2009).37 Overall, this body of research suggests some understanding of the referential 
nature of gaze direction. 
 Bonobos are claimed to show social referencing (Savage-Rumbaugh 1986, cited by 
Johnson 2004), have some understanding that what others see influence their behaviour and 
behave differently when a human faces towards or away from them. For example, they 
preferentially use visual gestures to beg food from a human experimenter facing them, and 
locomote to places where the experimenter can see their gestures, when the experimenter faces 
away from them  (Kaminski et al. 2004; Liebal et al. 2004a). These experiments have, however, 
used the same four bonobos, of whom three were human-reared and all had considerable 
experience with humans and the experimental setups (see Appendix 3). Observations 
nonetheless, suggest that bonobos are more likely to use visual than tactile gestures during 
interactions with attending conspecifics (Pika 2007). 
                                               
36 “Captive bonobos (…), when mature, show gaze aversion, gaze following, and can use the 
eyes as a cue at close range (personal observation – see also Johnson 1997; Johnson et al. 1999)” 
(Johnson & Oswald 2001, p. 176). 
37 Pitman & Shumaker (2009) claimed that all the ape species (bonobos, chimpanzees, 
orangutans and gorillas) engaged in coordinated (triadic) communication with conspecifics, 
however, peculiarly, only reported data pooled for the four species, thereby preventing any 
assessment as to whether the coordinated looks were performed by e.g., bonobos.  
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 The aims, predictions and general methodology of the present study correspond to those 
detailed in the chimpanzee attention following study (Chapter 2). The aims were to assess the 
conspecific gaze-following skills of bonobos, and to test the hypotheses that experimentally 
naïve bonobos are able and inclined to follow the attention of conspecifics (rather than humans) 
in a non-food related and non-competitive context, including under conditions that require 
geometrical attention following. 
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
Participants consisted of 11 bonobos, ranging from 6 months to 28 years of age at the 
beginning of the experiment. There were four adult female bonobos and three males ranging 
from 10-29 years of age (mean age at the start of the experiment = 19.36 yr., s.d. = 11.07), one 
adolescent, and three infants (6-45 months). Three individuals were hand-reared and eight were 
parent-reared (Table 5.1). None of the bonobos had participated in behavioural experiments 
before, thus all were experimentally naïve. One individual (Cheka) was observed to over-groom 
herself and her infant (Gemena), but no other stereotypic behaviours were observed. 
 
Table 5.1: Bonobo participants. The age classes follow those established by Thompson-Handler 
and colleagues (Thompson-Handler et al. 1984).  
Individual Sex Age Class Date of birth
Age at time of 
experiment
Rearing 
history
Mother
Banya F Adult 01-02-90 16-17 yr. Parent Bonnie
Cheka F Adult 18-03-96 10-11 yr. Parent Salanga
Diatou F Adult 21-10-77 28-29 yr. Hand Wilhelma
Jasongo M Adult 02-08-90 16-17 yr. Hand Lisala
Kakowet II M Adult 07-06-80 26-27 yr. Hand Linda
Keke M Adult 02-01-94 12-13 yr. Parent Diatou
Kichele F Adult 19-04-89 17-18 yr. Parent Diatou
Maringa F Adolescent 05-05-98 8-9 yr. Parent Yala
Luo M Infant 01-12-02 39-45 mts. Parent Diatou
Bokela F Infant 14-10-03 35-45 mts. Parent Banja
Gemena F Infant 07-11-05 6-21 mts. Parent Cheka
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Husbandry  
The bonobos were housed in two social groups at Twycross Zoo (England). During the 
day each group had permanent access (except during cleaning hours) to a core indoor enclosure 
(approx. 35 m2) and between the hours of 7.30 and 16.30 the groups alternated access a semi-
natural outdoor compound of approx. 600 m2 (Figure 5.1). The outdoor enclosure contained a 
wooden climbing structure, two large tree trunks, rubber mesh and robes, and an artificial 
waterfall, yet provided few opportunities for natural foraging, as it contained no natural foliage, 
and the only growing plant was grass. All bonobos were observed to pick and eat grass. The 
keepers provided the apes with a variety of enrichment in the form of plastic bottles, cloth and 
boxes made from cardboard and plastic. The bonobos had auditory access to the public areas, 
as the outdoor enclosures were separated from these by a 4m deep moat and approx. 2m high 
glass windows. Neither indoor nor outdoor enclosures provided a place for the bonobos to be 
out of view of the public. The exhibit received the majority of its visitors between the hours of 
11.30-14.00. Due to the exhibit’s location (far from the zoo entrance), it received fewer visitors 
and was exposed to less noise than the exhibits of the orangutans or the chimpanzees tested at 
the same zoo. The animals were fed according to their daily routine on a variety of fruits and 
vegetables, supplemented by primate pellets, vitamins and diluted fruit drinks.  
 
   
   
Figure 5.1: Experimental enclosure 
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5.2.2 Data collection 
The bonobos were tested between the hours of 10.00-16.30 between April and October 
2006, and between 07.30-16.30 between April and August 2007 during a total of approx. 900 
observation hours38. Trials were mainly conducted outside opening hours and at times when 
fewest members of the public were present, between the hours of 7.30-11.30 and 14.30-16.30. 
The bonobos were tested exclusively in their outdoor enclosure and the experiment recorded by 
two camcorders (Panasonic NV-GS120 and Sony DCR-HC40/DCR-PC55E). The miniDV 
videotapes were digitised into IMovie and converted into QuickTime files, from which the trials 
were scored.  
 
5.2.3 Design, materials and procedure 
The general methods were as detailed in chapter 2, and consisted of the same two 
experimental conditions (‘Target faces communicator’ and ‘Target faces away from communicator’) and five 
control conditions (‘No Stimulus-Towards’, ‘No Stimulus-Away’, ‘Target Alone’, ‘Target and Ignorant 
Communicator’, ‘Communicator Alone’, Figures 5.2-2.8). The experimenter projected a visual 
stimulus into the participants’ enclosure; a moving light pattern within an area of approx. 0.5m2, 
produced by a commercial green laser pointer (OnPoint Extreme Fusion: 532nm, classification: 
3b, power output: 125 mW, point diameter at 4m distance in ambient outside light: approx. 
2cm). The stimulus was adapted to the brighter light conditions of the outside bonobo 
enclosures compared to the inside chimpanzee enclosures. The laser was more powerful than 
the laser used with chimpanzees participants onto which no optical diffractive element was 
attached (OnPoint GR532: 532 nm, classification: 2b, power output: 5 mW, point diameter at 
4m distance: approx. 2cm), and identical to that onto which an optical diffractive element was 
attached, so it produced an image of an insect. The brighter outside light conditions meant that 
the stimulus size of the more powerful laser (OnPoint Extreme Fusion) was equivalent to the 
stimulus size of the less powerful laser (OnPoint GR532) used with chimpanzees. 
                                               
38 Bonobos and orangutans (Chapter 7) were tested during a total of 1,523 observation hours, of 
which approx. 60% of the time (914 hours) was spent with the bonobos and 40% (609 hours) 
with the orangutans. 
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Figure 5.2: Experimental condition: ‘Target faces 
communicator’. (Still of stimulus is encircled). 
Figure 5.3: Experimental condition: ‘Target faces 
away from communicator’. 
  
Figure 5.4: Control condition: ‘No Stimulus -Target 
faces communicator’. The stimulus is aimed on the 
tree in front of the communicator.  
Figure 5.5: Control condition: ‘No Stimulus – 
Target faces away from communicator’. The stimulus 
is aimed on the ground behind the target. 
  
Figure 5.6: Control condition: ‘Target Alone’. Figure 5.7: Control condition: ‘Target and 
Ignorant Communicator’. 
 
Figure 5.8: Control condition: ‘Communicator 
Alone'. 
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The stimulus was projected from the public areas onto 32 different locations in the 
experimental enclosure (Figure 5.9). 
 
Figure 5.9: The use of the experimental enclosure. Dotted lines indicate windows and stimulus 
projection points at 32 locations, projected from the public areas. Broken lines show two doors 
to the inside enclosures (see also Figure 5.1). Illustrations (clockwise from left) depict a log, a 
climbing structure (see also Figure 5.1) a waterfall, and a tree. 
 
Trials requiring targets to turn versus locomote to detect the stimulus 
Twenty-two percent (31 of 139) of trials required targets to only turn around to look to 
the stimulus area, while 78% (108 of 139) that they first locomote around an obstacle (Table 5.2). 
The two trial types were not designed conditions, but due to the nature of the experimental set-up. 
Table 5.2: Trials requiring targets to ‘turn’ and ‘locomote’ to look to the stimulus. The 
‘Experimental’ and ‘No Stimulus’ conditions each consisted of two trial types. 
Turn Locomote Turn Locomote
Experimental 18 82 7 32
No Stimulus 45 55 18 22
Target Alone 19 81 4 17
Target and Ignorant Communicator 5 95 2 37
Total 22 78 31 108
Condition
NPercent
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Trial sequences 
The conditions were presented sequentially in an order similar to that detailed in 
Chapter 2 (section 2.2.2.4 Trial sequences). Six participants received two trial sequences; one 
received two trial sequences bar one experimental trial, and two individuals received only one 
trial sequence (Table 5.3) Individuals who received one or incomplete trial sequences were 
young restive mothers (Banya and Cheka) and the offspring of one (Bokela).39 
 
Table 5.3: Trial sequences and order of presentation of trials; EXP = ‘Experimental’, NOS = ‘No 
Stimulus’, TAR = ‘Target Alone’, TAR+ = ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’, COM = ‘Communicator 
Alone’, T = Target faces towards communicator, A = Target faces away from communicator. 
Coloured text indicates trials involving a stimulus, and trials highlighted were not conducted. 
                                               
39 Bokela received two trial sequences, yet the second sequence was excluded from the analysis 
due to experimenter error in experimental trials (both in which the target looked to the 
stimulus). In the ‘facing towards’ trial it could not be conclusively determined that the target did 
not look to the stimulus before the communicator, and in the ‘facing away‘ trial, stimulus 
projection enabled the target to detect the stimulus origin and perhaps therefore locomote and 
look to the stimulus. 
Individual
Trial 
Sequence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Banya 1 TAR+ TAR COM EXP T TAR EXP A NOS T NOS A
2 TAR TAR NOS T COM TAR+ EXP A NOS A EXP T
Bokela 1 TAR+ EXP A TAR+ NOS A COM EXP T TAR NOS T
Cheka 1 COM NOS T NOS A EXP A EXP T TAR TAR+ TAR
Diatou 1 COM NOS A TAR+ NOS T EXP T TAR EXP A TAR
2 TAR EXP T EXP A TAR+ TAR NOS A COM NOS T
Gemena 1 TAR TAR+ COM EXP A NOS T EXP T NOS A TAR
2 EXP A EXP T TAR NOS A TAR NOS T TAR+ COM
Jasongo 1 TAR+ COM EXP T NOS A EXP A NOS T TAR+ TAR
2 NOS A TAR+ TAR COM EXP A TAR+ EXP T NOS T
Kakowet 1 EXP A NOS T TAR+ TAR TAR COM EXP T NOS A
2 NOS T EXP T NOS A TAR+ EXP A TAR COM TAR
Keke 1 COM NOS A EXP T TAR NOS T TAR TAR+ EXP A
2 TAR NOS T COM EXP T NOS A EXP A TAR TAR+
Kichele 1 NOS A TAR EXP T TAR COM TAR+ NOS T EXP A
2 TAR EXP A TAR NOS T TAR+ COM EXP T NOS A
Lou 1 TAR+ COM EXP A NOS T EXP T NOS A TAR TAR
2 NOS T TAR NOS A EXP A TAR+ TAR EXP T COM
Maringa 1 COM TAR NOS T TAR+ NOS A EXP T EXP A TAR
2 EXP T NOS A EXP A TAR TAR NOS T COM TAR+
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5.2.4 Scoring & reliability 
All trials were scored from videotapes. I coded whether the stimulus area fell within 
targets’ ‘open’ field of vision (for definitions, see Figures 2.12 and 2.14) during the pre-stimulus 
and stimulus phases, and a second coder coded 28% (39 of 139) of trials randomly selected 
from the dataset to assess inter-observer reliability. There was 97% agreement between the two 
coders in terms of target looks to the stimulus area in both the pre-stimulus (Cohen’s kappa = 
0.95 = good agreement; Altman 1991) and stimulus phases (Cohen’s kappa = 0.95, excellent 
agreement). In cases of disagreement (N = 1 in the pre-stimulus and stimulus phase, 
respectively), the most conservative estimate was chosen; i.e., targets were recorded to look to 
the stimulus area in the pre-stimulus phase and not in the stimulus phase. 
 
5.2.5 Statistics 
The rationale for the choice of statistical analyses is detailed in Chapter 2, section 
2.2.2.6. Repeated measures binomial logistic regressions (GLMM) were used for analyses of 
targets’ looks to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of experimental 
and control conditions, respectively, and to compare looks to the stimulus area during the 
stimulus phases of experimental and control conditions. Moreover, individuals’ performance on 
the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of the first trial received in individual conditions was 
analysed by means of non-parametric McNemar tests for repeated measures and nominal data. 
Null-hypotheses were rejected at an alpha level of 5%, and all tests were two-tailed. 
 
5.3 Results 
Bonobos followed the attention of conspecifics to the stimulus in 55.55% (12 of 22) of 
the time, 45.45% (5 of 11) and 63.64% (7 of 11), respectively, in experimental trials where they 
faced towards and away from the communicator at the start of stimulus projection (percentage is 
based on only the first trial that communicators received in the two experimental conditions). 
Communicators produced a visible behaviour while being in targets’ ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ field 
of vision (approached or touched the stimulus, shifted gaze between the stimulus and target, 
repositioned body while looking at stimulus, or arrested current behaviour) in 68.18% (15 of 22) 
of the first received experimental trials (facing towards and facing away from the communicator). 
Conspecifics followed the communicator’s attention in 75% (3 of 4) of experimental trials where 
conditions were comparable to those, under which the intra-specific attention following of five 
other primate species have been tested (Tomasello et al. 1998); That is when (i) communicators 
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produced a visible cue while being in the target’s ‘open’/’peripheral’ field of vision, (ii) targets 
faced towards the communicator at the start of stimulus projection, and (iii) targets were required 
to only ‘turn’ around (rather than ‘locomote’ around an obstacle) to look to the stimulus. 
Comparisons within conditions (of pre-stimulus and stimulus phases - ‘Pre versus post’ control):  
Bonobo targets were more likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase 
than pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials, including when the conditions where the target 
faced towards and away from the communicator at the start of the stimulus phase, respectively, 
were analysed separately (‘Experimental’ conditions collapsed: All trials received, GLMM: Est. = 
3.65, SE = 1.09, z = 3.35, p = 0.001; ‘Experimental-Towards’: All trials received: Est. = 3.93, SE = 
1.41, z = 2.78, p = 0.005; Analysis of first trial, McNemar test: 2 = 4.05, N = 11, p = 0.044; 
‘Experimental-Away’: All trial received: Est. = 3.82, SE = 1.01, z = 3.38, p = 0.001; Analysis of 
first trial, McNemar test: 2  = 10.23, N = 11, p = 0.001).  
In contrast, there was no significant difference in the likelihood of targets looking to the 
stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of the control trials (‘No Stimulus-
Towards: All trials received, GLMM: Est. = 0.00, SE = 185700.00, z = 0, p = 1, Analysis of first 
trial, McNemar test: 2  = 0.03, N = 11, p = 0.871; ‘No Stimulus-–Away’’: All trials received: Est. 
= 0.00, SE = 185700.00, z = 0, p = 1, Analysis of first trial: 2 = 0.03, N = 11, p = 0.871; ‘Target 
Alone/Target and Ignorant Communicator’: All trials received: Est. = 0.00, SE = 107200.00, z = 0, p 
= 1, Analysis of first trial: 2  = 0.02, N = 11 p = 0.88040, Figure 5.10, Table 5.4a). 
Considering the duration of looks, targets overall oriented significantly longer towards 
the stimulus area (i.e., the stimulus fell within the targets’ ‘open’ field of vision) during the 
stimulus phase (mean = 4.50s, s.d. = 2.68) than pre-stimulus phase (mean = 0.06, s.d. = 0.24) of 
all experimental trials (despite the stimulus being removed before targets could view it: repeated 
measures t-test conducted on trials, where targets looked to the stimulus area during either the 
pre-stimulus or stimulus phase: (t(19) = -5.78, p < 0.000).  
                                               
40 There was no significant difference between targets looking to the stimulus when displayed 
outside the view of a ‘Target Alone’ and a ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ (comparison of 
stimulus phases of the two conditions: N = 60, p = 1). Therefore, and since ‘Target Alone’ trials 
for some subjects were substituted by the more conservative ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ 
trials, the two conditions were collapsed. 
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Comparisons across conditions (of looks to the stimulus area during stimulus phases) 
Targets were more likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase of 
experimental than control conditions (All trials received: GLMM with ‘look/no-look’ and 
‘Experimental’, ‘No Stimulus’ and ‘Target Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ conditions 
entered as factors and participant as a random factor: ‘Experimental’ vs. ‘No Stimulus’: Est. = -
3.18, SE = 1.01, z = 3.01, p = 0.001; ‘Experimental’ vs. ‘Target Alone’/’Target and Ignorant 
Communicator’: Est. = -3.12, SE = 1.17, z = 3.18, p = 0.001; Analysis of first trial: McNemar test: 
‘Experimental-Towards’ vs. ‘No Stimulus-Towards’: 2 = 7.68, N =11, p = 0.006; “Experimental-Away’ 
vs. ‘No Stimulus-Away’: 2 = 10.23, N =11, p = 0.001, Figure 5.10, Table 5.4a). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Target looks to the stimulus area. Percent target looks to the stimulus area during 
the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of experimental and control conditions (based on the 
average response to all trials that individual subjects received). Asterisks indicate significant 
differences between target looks to the stimulus location during stimulus and stimulus phase of 
experimental trials, and during the stimulus phases of experimental and control trials. 
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Trials requiring targets to only turn around to look to the stimulus 
Considering the subset of trials that required targets to only turn around so as to look to 
the stimulus (22% of all trials, 31of 139), bonobos looked to the stimulus in 80% (4 of 5) and 
100% (2 of 2) of experimental trials where the target faced towards and away from the 
communicator at the start of stimulus projection, respectively. Targets were more likely to look 
to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase than pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials 
(GLMM: Estimate = 4.89, SE = 1.95, z = 2.51, p = 0.012), though this was not the case when 
trials where they faced towards and away from the communicator at the start of the stimulus 
projection were analysed separately, nor when any of the control trials were considered 
(GLMM, ‘Experimental-Towards’: Est. = 22.47, SE = 61.13, z = 0.37, p = 0.71; Analysis of first 
trial: McNemar test: χ2 = 2.5, n = 5, p = 0.114; ‘Experimental-Away’: GLMM, Est. = 47.13, SE = 
131010.68, z = 0, p = 1; Analysis of first trial: χ2 = 2.25, n = 2, p = 0.134; ‘No Stimulus–Towards’: 
GLMM, Est. = 0.00, SE = 190400.00, z = 0, p = 1; Analysis of first trial: χ2 = 0.10, n = 5, p = 
0.751; ‘No Stimulus–Away’: Est. = 0.00, SE = 151900.00, z = 0, p = 1; Analysis of first trial: χ2 = 
0.06, n = 9, p = 0.814; ‘Target Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’: Est. = 0.00, SE = 
124700.00, z = 0, p = 1; Analysis of first trial: χ2 = 0.13, n = 5, p = 0.752). 
There were no significant differences between targets’ looks to the stimulus location 
across experimental and control trials (‘No Stimulus’: GLMM: Est. = -23.36, SE = 1135.94, z = 0, 
p = 0.998; ‘Target Alone’/’Target and Ignorant Communicator’: Est. = -23.36, SE = 1967.49, z = 0, p 
= 0.999, Table 5.4b). 
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Trials requiring targets to locomote around a barrier to look to the stimulus 
Considering the subset of trials that required targets to first locomote around a visual 
barrier to look to the stimulus (78% of all trials, 108 of 139), there were no significant 
differences between targets’ looks to the stimulus location during the pre-stimulus and stimulus 
phases of any of the conditions, nor across the stimulus phases of the various conditions when 
all trials that participants received were considered (see Table 5.4c and Figure 5.11). 
Considering, however, only the first trial that participants received, targets were more 
likely to look to the stimulus location during the stimulus than pre-stimulus phase of 
experimental trials (McNemar test: ‘Experimental-Towards’: 2 = 4.10, n = 10, p = 0.044; 
‘Experimental-Away’: 2  = 6.05, n = 10, p = 0.014). In contrast, there were no significant 
differences between target looks to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and stimulus 
phases any of the control trials ('No Stimulus-Towards': 2  = 0.03, n = 10, p = 0.871; 'No Stimulus-
Away': 2 = 0.03, n = 7, p = 0.871; 'Target Alone'/'Target and Ignorant Communicator': 2  = 0.05, n = 
10, p = 0.823, Figure 5.11). Moreover, analysing the performance for the 6 subjects that received 
at least one ‘Experimental-Towards’, ‘Experimental-Away, ‘No Stimulus-Towards’ and ‘No Stimulus-
Away’ ‘locomote’ trial, targets were significantly more likely to look to the stimulus area during 
the stimulus location of experimental than ‘No Stimulus’ trials (McNemar test of first trial received: 
2 = 5.04, n = 6, p = 0.025). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Locomote trials. Percent target looks to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus 
and stimulus phases of experimental and control trials that required targets to first locomote 
around an obstacle (measure is based on the average response to all ‘locomote trials that 
individuals subjects received). Asterisks indicate significant differences across the pre-stimulus 
and stimulus phases of experimental conditions based on analysis of the first received trial.
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Table 5.4: Results summary. Statistics for all trials (Table a), and for the data-subsets where 
targets were required to either only ‘turn’ (Table b), or to ‘locomote’ around a barrier to look to 
the stimulus (Table c). The hypotheses predicted a difference between target looks to the 
stimulus locations in comparisons 1-3 and 7-8, and none in comparisons 4-6. Significant 
differences are highlighted in grey. Analysis of comparison c7 for first trial received was based 
on the performance of 6 subjects. 
 
 
 
Trial type(s) compared Intervals
compared
Estimate SE z P  P
1 Experimental (all trials) Pre- & Stimulus 3.65 1.09 3.35 0.001
2 Exp. - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 3.93 1.41 2.78 0.005 4.05 0.044
3 Exp. - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 3.82 1.01 3.38 0.001 10.23 0.001
4 No Stimulus - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 185700.00 0.00 1.000 0.03 0.871
5 No Stimulus - Target faces away from com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 185700.00 0.00 1.000 0.03 0.871
6 Target Alone / Target & Ignorant com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 107200.00 0.00 1.000 0.02 0.880
7 Exp. & No Stimulus Stimulus -3.18 1.01 3.01 0.001 9.82 0.002
8 Exp. & Target Alone/Target & Ign. com.Stimulus -3.12 1.17 3.18 0.001 19.11 0.000
(first trial received)
a) All trials All trials
McNemar Test GLMM
Trial type(s) compared Intervals
compared
Estimate SE z P  P
1 Experimental (all trials) Pre- & Stimulus 4.89 1.95 2.51 0.012
2 Exp. - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 22.47 61.13 0.37 0.710 2.50 0.114
3 Exp. - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 47.13 131010.68 0.00 1.000 2.25 0.134
4 No Stimulus - Target faces towards com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 190400.00 0.00 1.000 0.10 0.751
5 No Stimulus - Target faces away from com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 151900.00 0.00 1.000 0.06 0.814
6 Target Alone / Target & Ignorant com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 124700.00 0.00 1.000 0.13 0.752
7 Exp. & No Stimulus Stimulus -23.36 1135.94 0.00 0.998
8 Exp. & Target Alone/Target & Ign. com.Stimulus -23.36 1967.49 0.00 0.999
Turn
GLMM McNemar Test 
b) 'Turn' trials
(first trial received)
Trial type(s) compared Intervals
compared
Estimate SE z P  P
1 Experimental (all trials) Pre- & Stimulus 19.18 3132.86 0.00 0.995
2 Exp. - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 19.24 4262.83 0.00 0.996 4.10 0.044
3 Exp. - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 19.11 4179.00 0.00 0.996 6.05 0.014
4 No Stimulus - Target faces towards com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 139700.00 0.00 1.000 0.03 0.871
5 No Stimulus - Target faces away from com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 167900.00 0.00 1.000 0.03 0.871
6 Target Alone / Target & Ignorant com.Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 130000.00 0.00 1.000 0.05 0.823
7 Exp. & No Stimulus Stimulus -20.19 6278.00 0.00 0.997 5.04 0.025
8 Exp. & Target Alone/Target & Ign. com.Stimulus -20.19 3974.00 0.00 0.996
McNemar Test 
(first trial received)
Locmote
GLMM
c) 'Locomote' trials
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 5.4 Discussion 
The study aimed to assess the conspecific gaze-following skills of bonobos, who reliably 
followed the attention of conspecifics in a non-competitive context, to locations behind 
themselves. More specifically, bonobos were more likely to look to the area of a novel stimulus 
when in the presence of a conspecific who viewed the stimulus, than in the absence of a 
conspecific, or in the presence of a conspecific ignorant as to the stimulus, and when no 
stimulus was projected. Bonobos followed the attention of conspecifics in 46% of trials when 
facing a conspecific viewing the stimulus (compared to 60% for the chimpanzees tested, 
percentages based on the first trial received). Where conditions were comparable to those, 
where the intra-specific gaze following of chimpanzees, mangabeys and macaques has been 
tested (Tomasello et al. 1998), and only trials where the communicator produced a visible cue 
while in the target’s ‘open’/’peripheral’ visual field were included (and targets were required to 
only ‘turn’ around to co-orient with communicator attention), bonobos and chimpanzees 
followed conspecific attention at comparative levels (bonobos: 75% of trials; chimpanzees: 64%, 
see Chapter 2, Chimpanzee Attention Following). 
Like chimpanzees, bonobo targets oriented longer towards the stimulus area during the 
stimulus than pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials (although the stimulus was removed 
before it came within targets’ view), suggesting an expectation of a point of interest. While it 
cannot be ruled out that targets might have peripherally detected a flicker of the stimulus, the 
analysis of looking duration supports the attention following interpretation. 
When trials that required targets to only turn (rather than first ‘locomote’ around a visual 
barrier) so as to co-orient to the communicator’s attention, were analysed separately, targets 
were more likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus than pre-stimulus phase of 
experimental trials, although the difference between experimental and control trials was non-
significant. As these analyses were performed post-hoc, the number of subjects who received 
experimental trials requiring targets to either ‘turn’ or first ‘locomote’ around a barrier to look to 
the stimulus varied, and the ‘turn’ trial sample size was too small to draw any meaningful 
conclusions from this analysis. 
Bonobo targets followed conspecific attention under unfavourable geometric conditions 
that required them to first locomote around a visual barrier (when the first trial that subjects 
received were considered, however, these comparisons did not yield significant results when all 
of the trials that individuals received were considered, jointly). While previous research has 
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demonstrated that four bonobos with substantial experimental experience follow human gaze to 
distal locations, around opaque barriers and through windowed obstructions (Bräuer et al. 2005; 
Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007a), the present results represent the first evidence to show that, 
overall, geometric co-orientation to others’ attention also occurs during interactions between 
conspecifics (and among experimentally naive bonobos). The results support the argument that 
bonobos do not simply respond automatically to the attention of others, but may have some 
understanding that attention signifies that another is somehow connected to an external target, 
and that the animals follow the attention of others around barriers in an apparent attempt to 
take their visual perspective. Thus, bonobos seem to be either naturally interested in the 
attention of conspecifics as reflected by adventitious cues (and motivated to locomote in order 
to co-orient thereto, possibly underscored by the species’, seemingly overall, highly ‘active’ way 
of life), or the bonobo communicators produced highly salient and/or intentional cues, as to the 
focus of their attention. 
While previous research suggests that bonobos have some understanding that what 
others see influence their behaviour and behave differently when recipients face towards and away 
from them (Kaminski et al. 2004; Liebal et al. 2004a), the present results suggest that bonobos 
consistently led non-attentive conspecifics to look to a novel stimulus suggesting that bonobos 
may possibly (like chimpanzees: Menzel 1973) direct conspecifics to hidden objects in a manner 
that elicits an attentional response. Ascertaining whether the bonobos led non-attending 
conspecifics to look to stimulus by means of adventitious or intentional behaviours, however, 
requires analysis of the communicators’ behaviours. The next chapter explores whether 
particular behaviours produced by individuals viewing the stimulus consistently led to conspecific 
attention re-orientation, and if individuals intentionally redirected conspecifics’ attention. 
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CHAPTER 6: Bonobo manipulation of conspecific attention 
 
 
Summary 
 There have been no systematic tests on conspecific attention directing in bonobos, and 
virtually no data regarding this exists, except for anecdotal observations of one wild individual 
and two language-trained bonobos. This chapter aimed to identify behaviours that may act as 
cues triggering attention following in bonobos, and test the hypothesis that bonobos have the 
ability and motivation to direct conspecifics to a novel stimulus. The behaviour of the 11 
bonobos who were presented with a novel stimulus while alone or in the presence of an 
attentive or non-attentive conspecific (see Chapter 5) was examined. Bonobos were significantly 
more likely to produce a stimulus directional cue when they viewed the stimulus in the presence 
of an initially non-attentive conspecific, though the behaviour did not significantly predict 
conspecifics’ looks to the stimulus area. There was no significant difference in the distribution 
of auditory and multi-modal behaviours (sequential auditory and stimulus directional 
behaviours) across the three conditions, though individual differences were evident, and all 
auditory behaviours were followed by stimulus directional behaviours, and all in contexts, in 
which the animals viewed the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific. There 
were no significant differences in the distribution of locomotory, visual non-stimulus directional 
across the three conditions, and no indication that the bonobos intentionally used gaze as a 
communicative referential signal. Overall the results do not lend support to the predictions of 
the ‘Emotional Reactivity Hypothesis’ (Hare & Tomasello 2005), which suggests that the 
bonobos might outperform the chimpanzees. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Bonobo auditory gestures 
Two of the most debated topics with respect to nonhuman primate use of gestures, 
facial expressions, and vocalisations are whether they are used intentionally and referentially, or are 
simply side effects of responses to external events, driven mainly by arousal and emotional states 
(see Chapter 1 and Tomasello & Call 1997). As many other primates, bonobos respond to 
external events with vocal signals that frequently attract other group members and provide 
referential information about the events (bonobos: Clay & Zuberbühler 2009; chimpanzees: 
Slocombe & Zuberbühler 2005, 2006; rhesus macaques: Hauser & Marler 1993a,b; toque 
macaques: Dittus 1984). Indeed, bonobos call more frequently when they discover food in the 
presence of conspecifics (Van Krunkelsven et al. 1996), and produce acoustically distinct call 
types in response to differentially preferred food items, which listeners may use to draw 
inferences about the items (Clay & Zuberbühler 2009). Bonobos thus use vocalisations in 
seemingly complex ways, and field researchers have noted a near incessant cacophony of sound 
in bonobo parties (Bermejo & Omedes 1999), and emphasized the importance of the ‘peep’ and 
other close contact calls in within-party communication. Following a study of the 
communicative repertoire of 10 captive bonobos, de Waal suggested that their most common 
vocalisation, the soft ‘food peep’, functions “to draw attention to and ‘comment’ on objects, 
food, and events in the environment” (de Waal 1988, p. 211), a key characteristic of early human 
language development and language in general (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007). The 
observational nature of de Waal’s study, however, raises questions as to the validity of 
concluding that ‘food peeps’ actually carry the referential function suggested. Nonetheless, despite 
flexibility within their vocal communication system, bonobo vocalisations display less flexibility 
than their gestures (Pollick & de Waal 2007), most likely because vocalisations are closely tied to 
specific emotions, such as fear, aggression and affiliation (Tomasello & Call 1997; Corballis 
2002; Call & Tomasello 2007). The question thus remains, whether such vocalisations are 
intentionally communicative acts emitted to inform others, or relatively inflexible responses to 
external events, that reflect merely arousal changes in the signaller (or indeed some combination 
of the two). A promising candidate for intentionally acoustic communicative signals are so-
called ‘auditory gestures’ (see e.g., Tomasello & Call 1997), such as clapping or banging on 
objects, which may allow bonobos to produce auditory signals with higher flexibility than is 
feasible given their vocal system. 
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Bonobo visual gestures 
 Compared to vocalisations, gestures are an evolutionarily more recent arrival, as suggested 
by their complexity in the Hominoids and comparatively limited presence in monkeys  
(Tomasello & Call 1997; Corballis 2002; Call & Tomasello 2007). Moreover, gestures are less 
closely linked to specific emotions and therefore subject to greater cortical control than 
vocalisations (e.g., Wiesendanger 1999), and both Pan species use communicative gestures more 
flexibly than vocalisations and facial expressions (Pollick & de Waal 2008). Relatively little is 
known about the gestural communication of wild bonobos, although some studies have devoted 
attention to gestures (e.g., Kano 1992; Ingmanson 1996; Veà & Sabater-Pi 1998). The most 
systematically collected data stem from observational studies of captive bonobos, and their 
interactions with human experimenters, which suggest that bonobos have similar sized 
repertoires to chimpanzees, consisting of 20-30 gestures (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1977; de Waal 
1988; Pika et al. 2005). In addition, bonobos frequently use the species-typical behaviour, peering 
(prolonged gazing within 30 cm of a conspecific’s face), which although used in many contexts, 
has been suggested to function to solicit interactions (Idani 1995, cited by Johnson et al. 1999).41  
 
Bonobo attention solicitation and directing 
 Systematic observations suggest that, while bonobos beg food from one another and 
infants may include objects in social play, they engage in very few triadic interactions with 
conspecifics around objects (Bard & Vauclair 1984; Tomonaga et al. 2004). In contrast, adult 
bonobos have been shown to engage in some degree of coordinated attention with both 
humans and conspecifics, by repeatedly alternating gaze between a novel object and a human or 
conspecific (Pitman & Shumaker 2009). Bonobos who are reared with human contact and have 
been explicitly or implicitly exposed to the functional aspects of human pointing may, 
furthermore, direct humans to things that they want and directions they wish to travel (by 
means of e.g., an out-stretched arm and hand: Savage-Rumbaugh 1986, 1998). As most intra-
specific gestures (de Waal 1988), such gestures are, however, of an imperative nature and about 
spurring others into action to do something for the subject.  
                                               
41 ‘Peering’ is described as a highly stereotyped social interaction, where the ‘peerer’ approaches 
and positions its face often within centimetres of a conspecific’s. The behaviour is primarily 
performed by younger animals to more dominant females, and given its production in inter-
group encounters, where it eases tensions (Idani 1995, cited by Johnson et al. 1999), its function 
is suggested to be one of initiating amicable interactions. 
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 While bonobos have some understanding that what others see influences their behaviour, 
and adjust their food begging behaviour to the attentional state of cooperative human 
experimenters by locomoting to places where their gestures can be seen (Kaminski et al. 2004), 
there is little evidence that they follow auditory attention calling signals with more specific, visual 
gestures. For example, when faced with desirable, out-of-reach food and a human experimenter 
facing away from the subject, bonobos tend to locomote, so as to gesture towards the food in 
front of the non-attentive experimenter, rather than first call the experimenter’s attention 
(Liebal et al. 2004a). Interestingly, however, the picture becomes more complex when contexts 
more dynamic than the rather formalised food-begging situation are considered. In contrast to 
chimpanzees (Warneken & Tomasello 2006), young bonobos actively encourage reluctant 
human partners to re-engage in social games by means of intentional gestures, accompanied by 
eye contact and/or response waiting (Pika & Zuberbühler 2008). This behaviour has been 
interpreted as evidence of some form of shared intentionality (Pika & Zuberbühler 2008), in 
which interlocutors engage in collaborative interactions and share psychological states with one 
another (Bratman 1992; Gilbert 1992, cited by Tomasello & Carpenter 2007). The absence of 
this form of collective intentionality has previously been suggested to underlie the lack of 
declarative signalling in non-human species (Tomasello 2007; Tomasello & Carpenter 2007). 
While de Waal (2001) has suggested that bonobos may use gaze as an intentional referential 
signal, in lieu of imperative manual pointing (by engaging in ostensive behaviour and alternating 
gaze between the interlocutor and a desired object) there is little evidence that (non-language 
trained) bonobos point for and show things to one another (e.g., Bard & Vauclair 1984). Long-
term field studies of bonobos, spanning over 40 years, have not identified referential pointing as 
a frequent element in their communicative repertoires. The only documented instance of 
pointing by wild bonobos stems from one individual observed to extend an outstretched arm 
towards some poorly hidden nearby scientists, while vocalising and alternating gaze between the 
humans and its conspecifics, repeating the pointing sequence twice (Veà & Sabater-Pi 1999).  
 Reports of inter-specific declarative-like signalling stem from human-raised and language-
trained bonobos who have been observed to direct the attention of human caretakers to unusual 
sounds by means directional looking and gesturing (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986, 1998)42. 
Importantly, all these reports are anecdotal and without exception lack proper controls; in all 
cases interpretation is at issue. Indeed, an interesting observation that bonobos may use iconic 
                                               
42 “When she [Matata] heard unusual sounds in the forest, she would direct my attention 
towards them by looking and gesturing in that direction” (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998, p. 11).   
Bonobo Attention Manipulation 
 
128 
gestures (i.e., gestures that depict motion in space, such as a male bonobo moving a hand across 
a female’s body to indicate the action or position he wanted her to take: Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 
1977), has not been replicated in a systematic follow-up study of 20 other bonobos from three 
different populations (Roth 1995). Zimmermann and colleagues (Zimmermann et al. 2009) 
found that five bonobos used fingers protruded through metal mesh or Plexiglas holes to guide 
a human experimenter to the location of a hidden tool needed to retrieve food for the bonobo, 
suggesting an ability to adjust communication in accordance to the human’s knowledge of the 
tool location, and point to the location when needed. While it remains unresolved if the 
pointing in the experiment was motivated by an intention to inform the human about the tool’s 
location (informative pointing) or represented a complex imperative request that the human 
recover and use to tool to retrieve food (Gómez 2004; Zimmermann et al. 2009), the principle 
of parsimony and general paucity of reported instances of informative pointing in bonobos tilts 
the interpretation towards a complex imperative request. 
 An experimental study involving non-language trained bonobos interacting with 
conspecifics, suggest that, in contrast to chimpanzees, bonobos are motivated to cooperate to 
procure and share food, even when there is no immediate benefit to themselves (Hare et al. 
2007; Hare & Kwetuenda 2010). Thus, if the paucity of ape pointing is due to motivational 
rather than cognitive factors, and the rarity with which relevant situations present themselves 
(Leavens et al. 1996), the question arises whether bonobos may be more likely than chimpanzees 
to actively lead conspecifics to view a novel stimulus. 
While the ‘Emotional Reactivity Hypothesis’ (Hare & Tomasello 2005) suggests that 
chimpanzees are unable to overcome their social intolerance and competition in foraging 
contexts, this does not necessarily imply a Pan species difference in motivation to share 
attention to novel, non-food objects. Indeed, a recent finding that bonobos (Hare, unpublished 
data), as chimpanzees (Hare & Tomasello 2004), are also not able and/or inclined to use the 
human pointing gesture to locate hidden food in a cooperative object-choice task, raises doubt 
as to whether chimpanzees’ poor performance on the task stem solely from its collaborative 
nature. The explanation for these contrasting data may lie in a combination of food incentives 
and the inter-specific communicative setting of the object-choice task; i.e., that chimpanzees’ 
social intolerance prevents intra- as inter-specific cooperation in foraging contexts, and that 
both species fail in cooperative inter-specific interactions. Alternatively, a recent finding that 
bonobos, chimpanzees and orangutans, with extensive experience with the object-choice task 
perform better when experimenters perform highly distal rather than more proximal points 
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(100cm vs. 40cm distance to an indicated container) has led to the suggestion that apes’ typically 
poor performance on the object-choice task rests on methodological rather than cognitive / 
motivational factors (Mulcahy & Call 2009; Lyn 2010). The question, however, remains whether 
the Pan species exhibit different motivations in the manipulation of conspecific attention, and if 
bonobos may be more likely to lead conspecifics to view a novel stimulus. 
 
Aims of the study 
 This study aimed to explore if bonobos who view a novel stimulus, consistently behave in 
ways that may act as cues triggering intra-specific attention following, and test the hypothesis 
that the species has the ability and motivation to direct conspecifics to a novel stimulus and 
engage in referential signalling other than necessarily hand-pointing. This study is particularly 
significant, as there have been no systematic tests on conspecific attention directing in bonobos, 
and virtually no data regarding this exists, except for the anecdotal observations of one wild 
individual and of language-trained bonobos. 
To test if communicators actively called the attention of non-attentive conspecifics, and 
led them to look to the stimulus that only they observed, it was (as in Chapter 3: Chimpanzee 
Manipulation of Conspecific Attention) recorded whether communicators produced different 
behaviours or combinations thereof when: (1) in the presence of the stimulus but absence of a 
conspecific (‘Communicator Alone’), and in the presence of the stimulus and an (2) attentive or (3) 
non-attentive conspecific (social and non-social Experimental conditions). As in Chapter 3, it was 
predicted that communicators would behave differently as a function of conspecific’s presence 
and visual attention. Specifically, it was predicted that there would be: 
(i) A difference in the frequency of auditory behaviours produced across the conditions, and 
a difference in the likelihood that non-attentive conspecifics looked to the stimulus area 
when communicators produced an auditory behaviour. 
(ii) A difference in the frequency of visual stimulus directional behaviours when in the 
presence of the stimulus, and either in the presence or absence of a conspecific, and a 
difference in the likelihood conspecifics looking to the stimulus area when communicators 
produced stimulus directional behaviours. 
(iii) No difference in the frequency of visual non-stimulus directional behaviours in experimental 
and ‘Communicator Alone’ conditions; nor in the likelihood of conspecifics looking to the 
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stimulus area when communicators produced non-stimulus directional behaviours in 
experimental conditions. 
The chapter examines de Waal’s (2001) suggestion that bonobos may use gaze as an 
intentional referential signal by examining communicators’ gaze behaviour after looking to the 
stimulus, and target conspecifics’ responses thereto. It was predicted that: 
(iv) When within a conspecific’s ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ field of vision (see Figure 2.15), 
communicators would be more likely than chance to look to the conspecific within 2s of 
looking away from the stimulus, followed by a look to the stimulus within 2s of looking 
away from the conspecific (gaze behaviour: stimulus-target-stimulus). Due to the difficulty 
of distinguishing such behaviour from referential looking, specific attention was paid to 
trials, where communicators preceded the gaze behaviour with an auditory signal. Thus, 
the hypothesis that bonobos might use gaze as a communicative behaviour would be 
supported if targets were more likely to look to the stimulus location when communicators 
produced an auditory behaviour, followed by stimulus-target-stimulus gaze behaviours 
while being within the targets ‘open’/’peripheral’ field of vision. 
(v) There would be a difference in the likelihood of conspecifics looking to the stimulus area 
when communicators produced the above behaviour. 
 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Design  
The analyses were based on the experiment described in Chapter 5, involving 11 bonobos. 
The comparisons involved the experimental and  ‘Communicator Alone’ conditions, designed to test 
if behaviours produced by bonobos who viewed a novel stimulus while alone, or in the presence 
of an attentive, or non-attentive conspecific, reflected a heightened state of arousal or possessed 
a communicative function, i.e., if communicators took conspecific presence and attentional state 
into account. Seventy-three percent of participants (N = 11) received a ‘Communicator Alone’ trial 
before the first experimental trial (see Figure 5.3). 
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6.2.2 Coding of Communicator Behaviour 
The coding of communicators’ behaviour followed the scheme devised for chimpanzees 
(see section 3.2.2 and Table 3.1) and were: (1) auditory behaviours (vocalise, clap, audibly move 
object), (2) visual non-stimulus directional behaviours (arrest current behaviour, move head 
back rapidly), (3) visual stimulus directional behaviours (touch, lean torso towards, move 
extremity or head in the direction of the stimulus), (4) locomotory stimulus directional 
behaviour (approach), (5) conspecific directed behaviours (looks to the conspecific that were 
preceded within 2s of a look to the stimulus, and instances where communicators produced an 
auditory behaviour and subsequently shifted gaze from the stimulus to the conspecific and back 
to the stimulus), (6) ‘hunching’ behaviour. Auditory cues were recorded by two camcorders (i.e., 
not by a separate microphone), and where necessary due to e.g., windy conditions and the 
animals’ distance to the cameras, verbal comments were made (to the camcorders) and later 
transcribed. 
 
6.2.3 Scoring and reliability  
Two additional coders coded 34.48% (20 of 58) of experimental and ‘Communicator Alone’ 
trials to assess inter-observer reliability in terms of communicator production of (1) auditory 
and (2) visual and (3) locomotory stimulus directional cues.43 Inter-observer reliability with 
respect to visual and locomotory stimulus directional cues was perfect (Cohen’s kappa = 1, n = 
20), while it was good with respect to auditory cues (Cohen's kappa = 0.77, n = 20).  
 
6.2.4 Statistics 
 As in Chapter 3, gaze behaviours were analysed by means of binomial tests, and the 
distribution of cues across conditions, and of communicators’ cue production (and targets’ look 
to the stimulus area when communicators produced particular cues), were analysed by means of 
binomial logistic regressions (GLMM, fitted by the Laplace approximation) with a binomial 
error structure. 
 
                                               
43 Trials were randomly selected for inter-observer reliability coding, except for trials that I had 
recorded as containing auditory cues, which were all included. 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Communicator behaviour 
Communicators were more likely to produce a visual stimulus directional behaviour 
when they viewed the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive than an attentive conspecific, 
or alone (see Table 6.1 for results of GLMM analyses). Forty-six percent (5 of 11) of bonobos 
produced stimulus directional behaviours during a larger proportion of experimental than 
'Communicator Alone' trials, while only one individual produced stimulus directional cues during a 
larger proportion of ‘Communicator Alone' trials (Figure 6.1). There were, however, no significant 
different in the production of stimulus directional behaviour across social and non-social 
conditions. Likewise, forty-six percent (5 of 11) of bonobo communicators produced stimulus 
directed behaviours during a larger proportion of ‘Experimental-Away’ than ‘Experimental-Towards’ 
trials, while only one individual produced stimulus directed behaviours during a larger 
proportion of ‘Experimental-Towards' trials (Figure 6.2). No ‘hunching’ postures were observed in 
any trials. There was no statistically significant difference in the production of and visual non-
stimulus directional behaviours across the three conditions, although significance was 
approached for when communicators viewed the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive 
conspecific, and in social rather than non-social conditions. 
 
Figure 6.1: Visual stimulus directional behaviours. Percentage of trials where bonobo 
communicators produced visual stimulus directional behaviours in non-social (‘Communicator 
Alone’) and social (experimental, facing towards/away) conditions. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
            Non-social                 
(Communicator Alone)
            Social             
(Experimental)
Condition
Banya
Bokela (infant)
Cheka
Diatou
Gemana (infant)
Jasongo
Kakowet
Keke
Kichele
Luo (infant)
Maringa
Bonobo Attention Manipulation 
 
133 
 
Figure 6.2: Production of visual stimulus directional behaviours in experimental conditions. 
Percentage of ‘Experimental-Towards’ and ‘Experimental-Away’ trials where bonobo communicators 
produced visual stimulus directional behaviours. 
There were no significant differences in the communicators’ production of locomotory 
stimulus directional, auditory and multimodal behaviours (sequential auditory and stimulus 
directional behaviours) across the three conditions, nor across social and non-social conditions. 
Bonobos, nonetheless, only produced auditory and multimodal behaviours when they viewed 
the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific (‘Experimental-Away’: 20% of trials, N 
= 20; ‘Experimental-Towards’: 0% of trials, N = 19; ‘Communicator Alone’: 0% of trials, N = 19, 
Figure 6.3). All recorded auditory behaviours (N = 3) were followed by a stimulus directional 
behaviour. 
Figure 6.3: Auditory behaviours. Percentage of trials where individual bonobos produced auditory 
behaviours in ‘Communicator Alone’, ‘Experimental-Towards’ and ‘Experimental-Away’ conditions. 
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Figure 6.4: Behaviours produced across conditions. Percentage of ‘Experimental-Towards’ (N = 
19), ‘Experimental-Away’ (N = 20), and ‘Communicator Alone’ (N = 19) trials, where 
communicators produced various behaviours. Asterisks indicate significant differences across 
conditions. 
Table 6.1: Results for GLMM analyses of the distribution of communicator behaviours across 
the ‘Communicator Alone’, ‘Experimental-Away’ and ‘Experimental-Towards’ conditions. Significant 
and near-significant factors are highlighted in grey. 
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 Descriptions of trials containing auditory cues  
Auditory and multimodal behaviours only occurred in four trials. While all recorded 
auditory behaviours met the requirement for inclusion in the auditory behaviour category, the 
underlying intentionality of auditory cue production was questionable in (at least) one trial (see 
Figure 6.8). Trials containing auditory behaviours are therefore described below: 
1) Communicator viewed the stimulus and grunted. Target (female with infant) approached the 
stimulus area (on the right side of a tree, Figure 6.5). When the target was 2m from the 
communicator, the communicator looked to the target, approached and touched the 
stimulus, and then looked back to the target. Target approached and touched stimulus area. 
   Figure 6.5: ‘Experimental-Away’ trial. Auditory (vocal) and stimulus directional behaviours. 
2) Target left the outside area (entered an inside enclosure, and sat in the door immediately 
behind the plastic cover, Figure 6.6) and 30s pre-stimulus phase began. Communicator 
viewed the stimulus and clapped. Target returned, sat down and looked to communicator 
and stimulus area. Five seconds later communicator looked in the direction of the stimulus 
area and looked back to the target conspecific. 
 Figure 6.6: ‘Experimental–Away’ trial. Auditory (clapping) and stimulus directional behaviours. 
3) Infant communicator viewed, approached and touched the stimulus; vocalised quietly 
(grunted) and touched stimulus again (Figure 6.7). Target turned around and walked past 
communicator, and the communicator looked to the target and back to the stimulus. 
   Figure 6.7: ‘Experimental–Away’ trial. Auditory (vocal) and stimulus directional behaviours. 
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4) Communicator viewed the stimulus displayed on the right hand side of a plastic bucket 
(Figure 6.8), approached and manipulated the bucket (lifted it and looked inside) and looked 
to conspecific. The target looked to the communicator and bucket, but did not approach and 
locomote around the bucket to look the stimulus.  
Figure 6.8: ‘Experimental–Away’ trial. Auditory (object manipulation) and stimulus directional 
behaviour. 
 
Conspecific directed cues: Seventy-two percent (28 of 39) of experimental trials could 
be reliably scored for gaze changes. Of these, communicators were no more likely than chance 
to shift gaze from the stimulus to the conspecific and back to the stimulus while being within 
the conspecific’s ‘open’/‘peripheral’ field of vision (50 % [14 of 28] of trials, Binomial test: n = 
28, p = 0.572). Communicators produced an auditory cue in 4 of 39 experimental trials, of which 
gaze behaviour could be reliably scored in three trials. In all three trials, communicators looked 
to the target conspecific within 2s of looking away from the stimulus, and in one case a 
communicator followed an auditory cue with ‘stimulus-target-stimulus’ gaze behaviour, while 
being within the conspecific’s ‘open’/‘peripheral’ field of vision. 
During one ‘Communicator Alone’ trial, a juvenile female communicator (who had 
previously viewed the stimulus in one ‘Communicator Alone’ and four experimental trials (see 
Figures 6.6 and 6.8), approached and touched the stimulus, then approached and looked (for 2s) 
through a trapdoor to an inside enclosure containing conspecifics, after which she returned and 
re-engaged with the stimulus (Figure 6.9). No sound was heard from the inside enclosure. 
   
Figure 6.9: ‘Communicator Alone’ trial.  
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6.3.2 Communicator behaviours leading targets to look to the stimulus area 
None of the individually recorded behaviours that communicators produced 
significantly affected whether or not targets looked to the stimulus area during experimental trials 
(Table 6.2). Nor did the production of the compound category, ‘multimodal behaviours’, affect 
the probability of conspecifics looking to the stimulus area (GLMM, Est. = 1.27, SE = 1.20, z = 
1.06 p = 0.291).  
Table 6.2: Significance table. GLMM test for a difference in the probability that targets looked 
to the stimulus area when communicators produced various behaviours while viewing the 
stimulus in the presence of a conspecific (experimental conditions). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Target looks to stimulus area as a function of communicator behaviour. Percentage 
of targets’ looks to the stimulus area during experimental trials (N = 39) when communicators 
did/did not produce various behaviours. Labels above columns indicate the number of trials in 
which communicators did and did not produce the behaviour. 
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6.4 Discussion 
Did the bonobos preferentially produce stimulus directional behaviours when 
viewing the stimulus in the presence of conspecifics? 
Contrary to prediction, the bonobos were no more likely to produce a visual stimulus 
directional behaviour when they viewed the novel stimulus in the presence of a conspecific than 
alone. Intriguingly (and like the chimpanzees tested under the same paradigm), the bonobos 
were, however, more likely to produce a stimulus directional behaviour they viewed the stimulus 
in the presence of a non-attending conspecific. While analyses of chimpanzee behaviour under the 
same paradigm suggest the some individuals may engage in intra-specific pointing by means of 
multi-faceted cues, such as the ‘hunching’ behaviour, no ‘hunching’ postures were observed in 
the bonobos. 
Do bonobos preferentially produce auditory and multimodal behaviours when 
viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific? 
The bonobos produced an auditory behaviour in only four trials, which were, however, 
all were followed by a stimulus directional behaviour, and all in contexts, in which the animals 
viewed the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific. Coupled with the complete 
lack of auditory cues, and sequential auditory and stimulus directional cues in conditions where 
individuals viewed the stimulus alone or in the presence of an attentive conspecific it suggests 
some awareness and monitoring of conspecific attention, and sensitivity to their ability to 
receive the cues that the bonobos themselves produced. Nonetheless, as a group the bonobos 
were no more likely than chance to produce auditory or multimodal behaviours in the context 
of non-attentive conspecifics, and neither of these behavioural classes significantly affected 
conspecifics looks to the stimulus area. Indeed, contrary to prediction, none of the recorded 
behaviours that communicators produced increased the probability that conspecifics might look 
to the stimulus area. Any general conclusions regarding the behaviour of the animals that 
produced sequential auditory-stimulus-directional behaviours must therefore be prefaced with 
the caution that the selective production of the behaviours in the presence of a non-attentive 
conspecific failed to yield statistical significance at a group-wide level. 
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Do bonobos use gaze as an intentional referential signal? 
Bonobos looked to conspecifics within two seconds of looking away from the stimulus 
in fifty percent (N=28) of experimental trials that could be reliably scored for gaze changes, 
which did, however, not deviate from chance. The trend is, nonetheless, consistent with a 
finding that three bonobos looked referentially to a conspecific upon viewing a human hold up 
an object (Pitman & Shumaker 2009), and with the first of the two defining criteria of social 
referencing, of (i) looking referentially between an object and another individual in order to 
subsequently (ii) regulate behaviour based on the emotional information received. 
As with most ape studies (and the chimpanzee study reported in Chapters 2 and 3) there 
were noticeable individual differences, with for example, one adolescent female producing 
auditory and directional cues in all trials when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-
attentive conspecific, and no auditory cues when alone or in the presence of a toward-facing 
individual. While viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific, the 
individual clapped and, upon attentional contact with a conspecific, looked to the stimulus 
location and back to the conspecific. In another trial the individual audibly manipulated a box, 
upon which the stimulus was shown, and seemingly alternated gaze between the box and the 
conspecific, once the conspecific turned around.44 In one ‘Communicator Alone’ trial the individual 
engaged with the stimulus, then approached and partly entered a trapdoor to an inside enclosure 
containing conspecifics, after which she returned and re-engaged with the stimulus. While it is 
possible that the animal responded to sounds from the inside enclosure, none were audible, and 
the behaviour is consistent with some form of referential looking that may have had the effect 
of either reducing stimulus induced arousal, or functioned to establish attentional contact with 
conspecifics for potential subsequent, adventitious stimulus detection. 
To examine de Waal’s (2001) suggestion that bonobos may intentionally use gaze as an 
intentionally communicative referential signal, and to separate such instances from mere 
referential looking I examined the bonobos gaze behaviour in the few trials, in which they 
produced an auditory cue, and which could be reliably scored for gaze behaviour. While the 
bonobos followed all auditory behaviours (N=4) with a look to a conspecific, they were no 
more likely than chance to precede gaze alternation (while being within the conspecific’s ‘open’ 
or ‘peripheral’ field of vision) by an auditory behaviour, nor did this behaviour influence the 
                                               
44 Gaze behaviour could, however, not be unambiguously ascertained in this trial, and the trial 
was thus excluded from the gaze analysis. 
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probability that conspecifics looked to the stimulus. Thus, while there is some suggestion and 
evidence that apes may use gaze as an ostensive signal (Menzel 1973, 1974; O'Connell 1994; 
Gómez 1996; Veà & Sabater-Pi 1998; de Waal 2001) to direct other’s attention to e.g., desired, 
objects or goals, the current results (partially due to the very small sample size) cannot lend 
support to the suggestion that bonobos use gaze and gaze alternation as referential signals to 
communicative about a distal object or event.  
Conclusion 
The cognitive sophistication underlying the bonobo behaviours remain obscure, as the 
design does not allow for a distinction between intentional attention calling and re-direction, and 
the possibility that individual arousal levels may be influenced by the mere presence of a toward-
facing conspecific. The design does also not address the question of whether the apes behaved to 
influence others’ mental states or to evoke an attentional and/or emotional reaction as reflected 
in overt manifestations. In the light of past research, however, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that (like chimpanzees) some bonobos, under some circumstances, may direct conspecifics to 
hidden objects to elicit an attentional response as reflected in overt manifestations (see Gómez et 
al. 1993). Some of the apes may have performed a form of simple showing, not unlike the 
earlier types of proto-declarative communication that human infants engage in, before they 
begin to point declaratively (Bates et al. 1975) and possibly some form of interrogative social 
referential pointing, to provoke a response that can be used to discern ambiguity in situations of 
uncertainty and provide information about an situation and how to respond. 
Overall, the results do not support predictions of the ‘Emotional Reactivity’ Hypothesis 
(Hare & Tomasello 2005), that the socially more tolerant bonobos (Hare et al. 2007) should 
outperform the chimpanzees (Chapter 3). The ‘Emotional Reactivity Hypothesis’ is, however, 
predicated upon cooperation involving food, which may be predicted to evoke a higher degree 
of self-interest than an ambiguous, novel object. The behaviour of the individuals of the two 
species may be more comparable when presented with a stimulus predicted to evoke interest 
rather than want (or indeed, fear), than a monopolisable food object. For both the bonobos and 
chimpanzees, some individuals preceded directional gestures by an auditory signal in trials only 
where they viewed the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific, and consistently 
led conspecifics to the stimulus. Thus, for both species there were noticeable individual 
differences, urging caution in deriving species-wide conclusions on the basis of tests involving 
limited sample sizes. 
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CHAPTER 7: Attention following in orangutans 
 
 
Summary 
 Research suggests that orangutans are sensitive to the attentional states of others and 
follow the gaze of humans. This study investigated whether orangutans follow the attention of 
conspecifics, and presented seven Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus pygmaeus) with a novel 
visual stimulus to test if conspecifics would detect it under two experimental conditions. In one 
the conspecific faced the communicator, while another required the communicator to first 
attract the attention of a non-attending conspecific. Control conditions tested the probability of 
orangutans detecting the stimulus on their own and the influence of conspecific presence. 
Orangutans followed conspecific attention, yet showed no evidence of geometrical conspecific 
attention following. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 Orangutans belong to the great ape clade along with bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas and 
humans. While the non-human great apes are often considered as a single group, due to the 
anatomical and cognitive similarities that distinguish them from monkeys and lesser apes, 
orangutans are phylogenetically more distantly related to humans, bonobos and chimpanzees 
than either of those species are to one another (Ruvolo 1997; Wimmer et al. 2002). The 
orangutan clade diverged from the lineage leading to Pan and Homo 10-12 m.y.a. (Stauffer et al. 
2001) and represents the best extant model of the last common ancestor of the great apes 
(Byrne 1995). Orangutans are therefore an ideal species to examine if pleisomorphic (ancestral) 
or synapomorphic (derived) differences in the following (and directing) of conspecific attention 
exist within the great ape lineage. Abilities shared by orangutans and the Pan species can be 
assumed to be homologous and represent ancestral states, abilities, or motivations present in the 
last common ancestor. Conversely, where orangutans can be shown to differ, it may be assumed 
that these traits are derived and have evolved after the lineage that led to humans and African 
apes split from the last common ancestor shared with the Pongids.  
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 The majority of research on nonhuman ape communication has involved the African 
apes, compared to which the gestural communication and socio-cognitive abilities of orangutans 
are relatively understudied. Compared to the Pan species, orangutans live a mainly semi-solitary 
lifestyle with loose social bonds. Encounters between males are typically agonistic, while those 
of females range from affable to mutual avoidance and aggression (Delgado & Van Schaik 
2000). In contrast to chimpanzees, both wild and captive orangutans tend to tolerate each other 
(except for adult males) and engage in few aggressive encounters. While orangutan mothers and 
offspring typically spend at least 7 years together (until the end of the offspring’s juvenile 
period), where visual and other social communication skills seem essential, adults rarely seek 
social contact, and adult males spend less than 2% of their time engaging in social activities, 
such as mating and vocalising (Jantschke 1972, cited by Liebal 2007; Knott 1999).  
 As sophisticated socio-cognitive skills tend to correlate with the social complexity of 
primate groups (Whiten & Byrne 1997), some have suggested that the semi-solitary lifestyle of 
orangutans in densely vegetated forests (Delgado & Van Schaik 2000) may have favoured the 
importance of tactile and vocal signals over visual signals, and engendered lesser communicative 
and cognitive skills in Pongo than the Pan species (Bennett 1998, cited by Liebal et al. 2006). 
While others have argued that small orangutan party sizes owe to feeding competition, and that 
favourable habitats afford parties similar to those seen in the fission-fusion structure of the Pan 
species (Delgado & van Schaik 2000), the suggestion that visual communication may play a 
lesser role for orangutans than other great ape species has received implicit empirical support 
from studies suggesting that orangutans may be less skilful than bonobos and chimpanzees in 
solving a variety of visual perspective-taking problems, such as the understanding of human 
experimenters’ seeing in the presence of barriers (e.g., Bräuer et al. 2005; Okamoto-Barth et al. 
2007a). 
 Orangutans, nonetheless, use a number of sophisticated skills in the physical and socio-
cognitive domains. Both captive (Lethmate 1982) and wild orangutans (Fox & Bin’Muhammad 
2002; van Schaik et al. 2003) manufacture and use tools, and possibly, as chimpanzees (Pruetz & 
Bertolani 2007), deploy javelin tools during hunts (for fish, see Schuster et al. 2008). Orangutans 
pass the ‘mark test’ for mirror-self recognition (Suarez & Gallup 1981) and show some 
understanding of what they have (and have not) seen (Call & Carpenter 2001)45, although, in 
contrast to chimpanzees and bonobos, seemingly not what they have (and have not) heard (Call 
                                               
45 As chimpanzees and 2 year old children, orangutans preferentially look inside the one of two 
containers that they had not seen baited (Call & Carpenter 2001). 
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2004). Furthermore, they show some understanding of the intentions underlying others’ 
behaviour, and discriminate between the intentions of experimenters who accidentally or 
intentionally mark one of two boxes in an object-choice situation  (Call & Tomasello 1998).  
 Orangutans readily follow the gaze and pointing signals of human experimenters to the 
ceiling (Bräuer et al. 2005; Herrmann et al. 2007), locations behind themselves (Itakura 1996), 
and to one of several containers in front of them (Itakura & Tanaka 1998; Byrnit 2004). 
Moreover, they are sensitive to the attentional state of human experimenters, and alter their 
signalling modality in accordance with changes in experimenters’ attentional focus; They 
preferentially produce visual gestures when a human faces them (Call & Tomasello 1994; Liebal 
et al. 2004b; Poss et al. 2006), and one of two orangutans (the human-reared orangutan, 
Chantek), in one test showed sensitivity to human eyes, and was more likely to gesture towards 
food in the presence of an experimenter with open than closed eyes (Call & Tomasello 1994). 
While orangutans show some understanding of the effect of visual occlusions on humans’ visual 
states (Shillito et al. 2005), and have been shown to follow human attention geometrically, 
around visual barriers (Bräuer et al. 2005), one study has failed to find any evidence of this 
(Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007a), leading to the suggestion that orangutans ability within this 
domain may be less robust as that of the Pan species. 
 The semi-solitary fission-fusion social structure of wild orangutans does not lend itself 
easily to studies of intra-specific visual signalling, and few studies have been conducted on 
orangutan conspecific attention following. Observational studies of orangutan sensitivity to the 
attention of conspecifics concur with experimental findings involving human experimenters. 
Captive orangutans perform visual-based signals (such as facial expressions and visual gestures) 
near-exclusively towards attending conspecifics, and use visual gestures more frequently than 
tactile gestures towards attending recipients (Liebal et al. 2006). With respect to gaze patterns, a 
study of more than 200 gaze episodes during 112 hours of observation recorded only two cases 
of gaze-following (Kaplan & Rogers 2002), and have (along with observations during sign 
language teaching: Shapiro & Galdikas 1995), led to the suggestion that orangutans rarely 
engage in prolonged gazing directly at conspecifics.46 The typical animal-observer distance in the 
study was, however, 10m, and given that approximatelyy 65% of the observation time was 
carried out on free-ranging orangutans in Sabah, Malaysia (which may have made accurate 
identification of gaze behaviours difficult), the results and conclusions should be treated with 
some caution. The only available experimental study suggest that orangutans follow the 
                                               
46 The same, however, might be said for chimpanzees (personal observation). 
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attention of conspecifics induced to raise their heads to locations 2m above and immediately 
behind the subject (Pitman & Shumaker 2009). 
 The present study aimed to assess the conspecific gaze-following skills of orangutans, for 
whom little systematic information exists. Secondly, the experiment tested the hypothesis that 
experimentally naïve orangutans are able and inclined to geometrically follow the gaze of 
conspecifics (rather than humans), about which no data exists. The experimental and control 
conditions, and predictions were as detailed in chapters 2 and 5 for chimpanzees and bonobos. 
It was predicted that there would be a difference between targets animals’ looks to the stimulus 
area during a 30s pre-stimulus phase and a 30s stimulus phase of experimental, but not control 
trials, and a difference between targets’ looks to the stimulus area during the 30s stimulus phases 
of experimental and control trials. As previous studies have suggested that bonobos and 
chimpanzees may be more skilled than orangutans at solving a number of visual perspective-
taking problems (e.g., Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007), it was predicted that orangutans would follow 
conspecific attention at a lower frequency than chimpanzees and bonobos. 
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7.2 Methods  
7.2.1 Participants 
Participants consisted of 7 Bornean orangutans from a group of 8 individuals housed at 
Twycross Zoo (England). One individual (Tami, 18 months of age) was excluded from the 
experiment, given near-continual physical contact with its mother. There were three adult 
females and one adult male ranging from 17-29 years of age (mean age at the start of the 
experiment = 19 yr., s.d. = 7.16), two juveniles (5 and 7 years) and one infant female (29 
months). Six participants were parent-reared and one was hand-reared (Table 7.1). Three adult 
females had participated in a food receiving experiment (in which their gestures to a human 
experimenter were recorded) six months prior to testing (Cartmill & Byrne 2007), yet all 
participants were otherwise experimentally naïve. All of the orangutans, apart from the adult 
male, were part of a single matriline (led by Kibriah).   
Table 7.1: Orangutan participants. The classification of age classes was adopted from Rijksen 
(1978). 
 
Husbandry 
The orangutans were housed in two indoor enclosures. During the day they had 
permanent access (except during cleaning hours) to their core indoor enclosure (approx. 30 m2) 
and between the hours of 9 and 16.30 they alternated access to a semi-natural outdoor enclosure 
of 361 m2 (Figure 7.1). The outdoor enclosure contained three 12 m tall tree trunks connected 
by rubber mesh, of which one contained a wooden climbing platform. The enclosure afforded 
few opportunities for natural foraging, as it contained no natural foliage, and the only growing 
plant was grass. The animals were fed according to their daily routine with fruits and vegetables, 
supplemented by primate pellets, vitamins and sweet drinks. In addition, adult the females spent 
most of the time outdoors picking and eating grass. The keepers provided the apes with 
Individual Sex Age Class Age Date of birth Rearing history Mother Group
Batu M Adult 17 25-05-89 Parent Unknown Alternate
Kibriah F Adult 29 23-01-77 Hand Jess 1
Maliku F Adult 12 10-06-94 Parent Kibriah 1
Miri F Infant 2.5 00-04-04 Parent Maliku 1
Satu F Juvenile 7 31-08-99 Parent Theodora 2
Theodora F Adult 18 05-05-88 Parent Kibriah 2
Tiga M Juvenile 5 22-07-01 Parent Kibriah 1
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enrichment in the form of plastic bottles, cloth, bags, freshly cut tree branches and cardboard 
and plastic boxes. The orangutans had auditory access to the public areas, as the outdoor 
enclosures were separated from these by a 4 m deep moot and approx. 6 m high glass windows. 
The exhibit received the majority of its visitors between the hours of 10.30-14.30, when several 
family or school groups observed the animals at any one time. Visitors frequently engaged in 
calm interactions with the apes. Neither the indoor, nor outdoor enclosures provided a place for 
the orangutans to be out of view of the public, and all orangutans frequently covered their heads 
and bodies with the provided cloth. 
 
   
 
Figure 7.1: Outdoor orangutan experimental enclosure. 
 
7.2.2 Data collection 
The orangutans were tested between the hours of 8.30-16.00 between June and 
September 2006, and July and August 2007 during a total of approx. 600 hours47. While trial 
durations were brief (60s), the frequent presence of members of the public and the number of 
conditions that had to be met meant that opportunities to conduct trials were rare. Trials were 
conducted outside opening hours and at times when few members of the public present, 
between the hours of 8.30-10.30 and 14.30-16.00. 
                                               
47 Orangutans and bonobos were tested during a total of 1,523 observation hours, of which 
approx. 40% (609 hours) of the time was spent with the orangutans and 60% (914 hours) with 
the bonobos. 
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7.2.3 Design, Materials and Procedure 
The general methods were as detailed in chapter 2 (Attention following in chimpanzees), 
and consisted of the same two experimental conditions (‘Target faces communicator’ and ‘Target faces 
away from communicator’) and five control conditions (‘No Stimulus-Target faces towards communicator’, 
‘No Stimulus-Target faces away from communicator’, ‘Target Alone’, ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’, 
‘Communicator Alone’, Figures 7.3-7.9). The experimenter projected a visual stimulus into the 
participants’ enclosure; a moving light pattern within an area of approx. 0.5m2, produced by a 
commercial green 3b laser pointer (OnPoint Extreme Fusion: 532 nm; power output: 125 mW, 
point diameter at 4 m distance in ambient outside light: approx. 2 cm). The stimulus was 
identical to the one used in the experiment involving bonobos (Chapters 5 and 6). Ninety-five 
percent of trials were conducted outside. Five percent of trials (5 of 98) were conducted inside 
and the stimulus displayed in three of the trials and viewed by subjects in two trials (3% and 2% 
of the total number of trials, respectively, see Appendix 2 for pictures of inside enclosures). The 
stimulus was projected from the public areas onto 28 different locations in the experimental 
enclosure (Figure 7.9). 
 
 
Figure 7.2: The use of the outside experimental enclosure. Dotted lines indicate windows, where 
the ground slants into a moat (see also Figure 7.1), and stimulus projection points at 28 different 
locations, projected from the public areas. Illustrations depict three horizontal wooden logs 
connected by rubber mesh 
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Figure 7.3: Experimental condition: ‘Target faces 
communicator’. (Still of stimulus [i.e., only a dot, 
not a pattern is visible in the still] is encircled). 
Figure 7.4: Experimental condition: ‘Target faces 
away from communicator’. 
  
Figure 7.5: Control condition: ‘No Stimulus – 
Target faces communicator’. The stimulus is aimed 
on the grass behind the target.  
Figure 7.6: Control condition: ‘No Stimulus – Target 
faces away from communicator’. The stimulus is aimed 
on the grass in front of the communicator. 
  
Figure 7.7: Control condition: ‘Target Alone’. Figure 7.8: Control condition: ‘Target and Ignorant 
Communicator’. 
Figure 7.9: Control condition: ‘Communicator Alone'. 
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Trials requiring targets to turn versus locomote to detect the stimulus 
Sixty-one percent (60 of 98) of trials required targets to only turn around to see the 
stimulus, while 39% (38 of 98) that they first locomote around a visual barrier (Table 7.2). The 
two trial types were not designed conditions, but due to the nature of the experimental set-up.  
Table 7.2: Trials requiring targets to ‘locomote’ and ‘turn’ to look to the stimulus. 
 
Trial sequences 
The conditions were presented sequentially in an order determined as detailed in section 
2.2.2.4). Some targets with dependent offspring were never alone and could not be tested 
individually; for these individuals, ‘Target Alone’ trials were substituted by ‘Target and Ignorant 
Communicator’ trials. All individuals received two trial sequences (Table 7.3) 
Table 7.3: Trial sequences and order of presentation of trials; EXP = ‘Experimental’, NOS = ‘No 
Stimulus’, TAR = ‘Target Alone’, TAR+ = ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’, COM = ‘Communicator 
Alone’, T = Target faces towards communicator, A = Target faces away from communicator. 
Coloured text indicates trials involving a stimulus. 
Participant
Trial 
Sequence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Batu 1  TAR+  COM  EXP T  NOS A  EXP A  NOS T  TAR  TAR
2  NOS A  TAR+  TAR  COM  EXP A  TAR  EXP T  NOS T
Kibriah 1  COM  NOS A  TAR+  NOS T  EXP T  TAR+  EXP A  TAR+
2  TAR  EXP T  EXP A  TAR+  TAR  NOS A  COM  NOS T
Maliku 1  TAR+  COM  EXP A  NOS T  EXP T  NOS A  TAR+  TAR
2  NOS T  TAR  NOS A  EXP A  TAR+  TAR+  EXP T  COM
Miri 1  TAR+  TAR+  NOS T  COM  TAR+  EXP A  NOS A  EXP T
2  TAR+  EXP A  TAR+  NOS A  COM  EXP T  TAR+  NOS T
Satu 1  NOS A  TAR  EXP T  TAR  COM  TAR+  NOS T  EXP A
2  TAR  EXP A  TAR  NOS T  TAR+  COM  EXP T  NOS A
Theodora 1  COM  TAR+  NOS T  TAR+  NOS A  EXP T  EXP A  TAR
2  COM  NOS A  EXP T  TAR  NOS T  TAR  TAR+  EXP A
Tiga 1  TAR+  NOS T  COM  EXP T  NOS A  EXP A  TAR+  TAR+
2  TAR+  TAR+  COM  EXP T  TAR+  EXP A  NOS T  NOS A
Turn Locomote Turn Locomote
Experimental 57 43 16 12
No Stimulus 64 36 18 10
Target Alone 80 20 12 3
Target & Ignorant Communicator 52 48 14 13
Total 61 39 60 38
Condition
NPercent
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7.2.4 Scoring and reliability  
I coded whether the stimulus area fell within targets’ ‘open’ field of vision during the 
pre-stimulus and stimulus phases, and a second coder coded 40% of the trials for reliability 
purposes (100 % [N = 28] of experimental trials and 17% [N = 70] of a random selection of 
control trials). Inter-observer reliability was very good (pre-stimulus phase: Cohen’s kappa = 
94.56, n = 39; Stimulus phase: Cohen's kappa = 0.88, n = 39). 
 
7.2.5 Statistics 
The general rationale for the choice of statistical analyses is detailed in Chapter 2, 
section 2.2.2.6. Repeated measures binomial logistic regressions (GLMM) were used for analyses 
of targets’ looks to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of 
experimental and control conditions, respectively, and to compare looks to the stimulus area 
during the stimulus phases of experimental and control conditions. Moreover, individuals’ 
performance of the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of the first trial received in individual 
conditions was analysed by means of non-parametric McNemar tests for repeated measures and 
nominal data. Null-hypotheses were rejected at an alpha level of 5%, and all tests were two-tailed. 
 
7.3 Results 
Orangutans followed the attention of conspecifics to the stimulus in 42.86% (6 of 14) of 
trials when the conspecific viewed the stimulus, 71.42% (5 of 7) and 14.29% (1 of 7), 
respectively, in trials where they faced towards and away from the communicator at the start of 
stimulus projection (percentage is based on the first trial that communicators received in the 
two experimental conditions). Communicators produced a visible behaviour while within targets’ 
‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ field of vision (approached, extended hand towards or touched the 
stimulus, alternated gaze between the stimulus and target, repositioned body while looking at 
stimulus, or arrested current behaviour) in 28.57% (4 of 14) of experimental trials (percentage 
based on the first trial received in the two experimental conditions). Although based on very 
few observations, orangutans followed communicator attention in 100% (3 of 3) experimental 
trials where conditions were comparable to those, under which the intra-specific attention 
following of five other primate species have been tested (Tomasello et al. 1998), and only trials 
(i) where the communicator produced a visible behaviour while being within the targets’ ‘open’ 
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or ‘peripheral’ field of vision, (ii) targets faced towards the communicator at the start of trials, and 
(iii) were required to only ‘turn’ around to look to the stimulus. 
Comparisons within conditions (of pre-stimulus and stimulus phases - ‘Pre versus post’ control):  
Orangutan targets were more likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus than 
pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials (GLMM: Estimate = 2.28, SE = 0.87, z = 2.62, p = 
0.01). When the experimental conditions where the target faced towards and away from the 
communicator at the start of the stimulus phase were analysed separately, targets were more 
likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase of trials where they faced towards 
(All trials received, GLMM: Est. = 2.57, SE = 1.17, z = 2.20, p = 0.028; Analysis of first trial 
received, McNemar test: 2 = 5.79, N = 7, p = 0.016), but not away from the communicator at 
the start of trials (All trial received, GLMM: Est. = 2.63, SE = 1.67, z = 1.57, p = 0.116; 
Analysis of first trial, McNemar test: 2  = 0.07, N = 7, p = 0.789). There were no significant 
differences in the likelihood of targets looking to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and 
stimulus phases of the control trials (see Table 7.4a and Figure 7.10). 
Considering the duration of looks, targets overall oriented significantly longer (i.e., the 
stimulus fell within the targets’ ‘open’ field of vision) towards that stimulus area during the 
stimulus phase (mean = 9.33s, s.d. = 9.12) than pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials (mean 
= 1.42s, s.d. = 3.48, t(12) = -2.58, p < 0.05, repeated measures t-test conducted on trials where 
targets looked to the stimulus area during either the pre-stimulus or stimulus phase). 
Comparisons across conditions (of looks to the stimulus area during stimulus phases): 
There was no significant difference between targets looking to the stimulus when 
displayed outside the view of a ‘Target Alone’ and a ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ (comparison 
of stimulus phases of all trials in the two conditions: N = 42, p = 1). The ‘Target Alone’ and 
‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ conditions were therefore collapsed. Targets were more likely 
to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase of experimental than control conditions 
(All trials received: GLMM with ‘look/no-look/, ‘Experimental’, ‘No Stimulus’ and ‘Target 
Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ conditions entered as factors and participant as a 
random factor: ‘Experimental’ vs. ‘No Stimulus’ (GLMM: Est. = -2.86, SE = 1.09, z = 2.62, p = 
0.000; ‘Experimental’ vs. ‘Target Alone’/’Target and Ignorant Communicator’: Est. = -1.82, SE = 0.65, z 
= 2.78, p = 0.005, Figure 7.10, Table 7.4b).  
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Figure 7.10: Target looks to the stimulus location. Percent target looks to the stimulus area 
during the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of experimental and control conditions 
(percentages are based on the average response to the trials that individual subjects received). 
Asterisks indicate significant differences between target looks to the stimulus location during 
stimulus and stimulus phase of ‘experimental-towards’ trials, and during the stimulus phases of 
experimental and control trials. 
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Trials requiring targets to turn around to look to the stimulus 
Comparisons within conditions (of pre-stimulus and stimulus phases - ‘Pre versus post’ control):  
 Considering the subset of trials that required targets to only turn around, so as to look 
to the stimulus (61% of all trials, 60 of 98), orangutan targets were significantly more likely to 
look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase than pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials 
(GLMM: Estimate = 2.77, SE = 0.94, z = 2.97, p = 0.003). This result remained when trials, in 
which target animals faced towards (GLMM: Est. = 3.33, SE = 1.33, z = 2.51, p = 0.012; Analysis 
of first trial, McNemar test: 2 = 10.08, n = 6, p = 0.002), but not away from the communicator 
at the start of the stimulus projection were considered separately, although the latter approached 
significance when all received trials were analysed (GLMM: Est. = 2.69, SE = 1.52, z = 1.77, p 
= 0.077; Analysis of first trial, McNemar test: 2  = 0.90, n = 5, p = 0.343). There were no 
significant differences between targets looking to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and 
stimulus phases of controls trials (see Table 7.4b). 
Comparisons across conditions (of looks to the stimulus area during stimulus phases): 
 Targets were more likely to look to the stimulus area during the stimulus phase of the 
experimental than control conditions (All trials received: Experimental’ vs. ‘No Stimulus’: GLMM: 
Est. = -3.63, SE = 1.16, z = 3.12, p = 0.002; ‘Experimental’ vs. ‘Target Alone’/’Target and Ignorant 
Communicator’: Est. = -2.83, SE = 0.82, z = 3.46, p = 0.001, Figure 7.11). 
 
Figure 7.11: Turn trials. Percent target looks to the stimulus area during the pre-stimulus and 
stimulus phases (based on the average response to all ‘turn’ trials that individuals received; As 
some subjects did not receive ‘turn’ trials in all conditions, N vary). Asterisks indicate significant 
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differences across conditions. 
Trials requiring targets to locomote around a barrier to look to the stimulus 
Considering only the subset of trials that required targets to first locomote around a 
visual barrier to look to the stimulus (39% of all trials, 38 of 98), targets looked to the stimulus 
in 0% (0 of 12) of experimental trials (and in one control trial, ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’). 
There were, thus, no significant differences between targets looking to the stimulus area during 
the pre-stimulus and stimulus phases of neither experimental nor control conditions, nor during 
the stimulus phases of the different conditions (Table 7.4c).  
Table 7.4: Results summary. Statistics for all trials (Table a), and for the data-subsets where 
targets were required to either only ‘turn’ (Table b), or to ‘locomote’ around a barrier to look to 
the stimulus (Table c). The hypotheses predicted a difference between target looks to the 
stimulus locations in comparisons 1-3 and 7-8, and none in comparisons 4-6. Significant (and 
one near-significant) differences are highlighted in grey. 
 
Trial type(s) compared Intervals
compared
Estimate SE Z P  P
1 Experimental (all trials) Pre- & Stimulus 2.28 0.87 2.62 0.001
2 Exp. - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 2.57 1.17 2.20 0.028 5.79 0.016
3 Exp. - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 2.63 1.67 1.57 0.116 0.07 0.789
4 No Stimulus - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 134600 0.00 1.000 0.03 0.789
5 No Stimulus - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 18.00 7812 0.00 0.998 0.07 0.789
6 Target Alone / Target & Ignorant com. Pre- & Stimulus 1.46 1.14 1.28 0.200 2.77 0.092
7 Exp. & No Stimulus Stimulus -2.86 1.09 2.62 0.009
8 Exp. & Target Alone/Target & Ign. com. Stimulus -1.82 0.65 2.78 0.005
a) All
GLMM McNemar Test 
(first trial received)
Trial type(s) compared Intervals
compared
Estimate SE Z P  P
1 Experimental (all trials) Pre- & Stimulus 2.77 0.94 2.97 0.003
2 Exp. - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 3.33 1.33 2.51 0.012 10.08 0.002
3 Exp. - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 2.69 1.52 1.77 0.077 0.90 0.343
4 No Stimulus - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 190400 0.00 1.000 0.10 0.752
5 No Stimulus - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 18.26 8813 0.00 0.998 0.07 0.789
6 Target Alone / Target & Ignorant com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.18 1.19 0.99 0.321 2.29 0.131
7 Exp. & No Stimulus Stimulus -3.63 1.16 3.12 0.002
8 Exp. & Target Alone/Target & Ign. com. Stimulus 2.83 0.82 3.46 0.001
b) 'Turn' trials
GLMM McNemar Test 
(first trial received)
Trial type(s) compared Intervals
compared
Estimate SE Z P  P
1 Experimental (all trials) Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 145400 0.00 1.000
2 Exp. - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 136600 0.00 1.000 0.13 0.724
3 Exp. - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 190400 0.00 1.000 0.10 0.752
4 No Stimulus - Target faces towards com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 190400 0.00 1.000 0.10 0.752
5 No Stimulus - Target faces away from com. Pre- & Stimulus 0.00 176400 0.00 1.000 0.17 0.683
6 Target Alone / Target & Ignorant com. Pre- & Stimulus 17.86 7308 0.00 0.998 0.45 0.230
7 Exp. & No Stimulus Stimulus 0.00 20640 0.00 1.000
8 Exp. & Target Alone/Target & Ign. com. Stimulus 18.86 13910 0.00 0.999
c) 'Locomote' trials
McNemar Test 
(first trial received)
GLMM
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7.4 Discussion 
As predicted, orangutans readily followed conspecific attention in face-to-face 
situations. Although the stimulus shown to the communicator was removed immediately before 
it fell within the peripheral view of the attention following individual, individuals oriented longer 
towards the stimulus area during the stimulus than pre-stimulus phase of experimental trials, 
suggesting an expectation of a point of interest. In contrast, orangutans were no more likely 
than chance to look to the stimulus when they faced away from the individual, who viewed the 
stimulus, and was therefore required to, somehow, first attract the other’s attention. 
 Orangutans followed the gaze of conspecifics in 71% of trials when they faced the 
conspecific (compared to 60% and 45% for chimpanzees and bonobos, respectively) 
disconfirming the hypothesis that the orangutans would follow conspecific attention at a lower 
frequency than the populations of chimpanzees and bonobos tested (see Chapter 9 for a direct 
test of potential species differences). This is consistent with a previous finding that conspecific 
orangutan gaze following does not differ from that of other great apes induced to raise their 
heads to locations 2m above and immediately behind the subject (Pitman & Shumaker 2009). 
 Where conditions where comparable to those, under which the intra-specific gaze 
following of e.g., mangabeys and macaques have been tested (Tomasello et al. 1998), orangutans 
followed conspecific attention in 100% trials (compared to 78% and 73% for chimpanzees and 
bonobos, detailed in Chapters 2 and 5), yet the number of trials that matched this criterion was 
too small, to allow any species comparisons to be drawn. The rate of following the attention of 
conspecifics in face-to-face contexts in the present experiment (71% for the first received trial 
and 50% when all [two] received trials were considered) considerably exceeds the 33% (Bräuer et 
al. 2005) and 50% (Pitman & Shumaker 2009) found when orangutans have faced a human 
experimenter looking to the ceiling. It also exceeds the gaze following rate of 35% found when 
conspecifics were induced to raise their heads to locations 2m above and immediately behind 
the subject (Pitman & Shumaker 2009). 
One cause of the seeming difference of results across these and the current study may 
lie in the number of trials that the apes received. The present results relied on fewer trials 
(percentages were based on one and two trials, respectively), than previous experiments (Bräuer 
et al. 2005; Pitman & Shumaker 2009), which involved six trials presented to each subject in 
relative quick succession. The subjects in Bräuer and colleagues’ and Pitman & Shumaker’s 
experiments may to some extent have habituated to the experimenter’s looks to the ceiling 
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(given the absence of an interesting target) and to a conspecific’s repeated looks to an 
experimenter holding up a wooden block, thereby producing an overall lower rate of gaze 
following than in the present experiment. The rate of attention following in the present 
experiment may thus be more representative for the species, as it was not part of an on-going 
(food-delivery-related) interaction (Bräuer et al. 2005), and not influenced by potential 
habituation effects (Bräuer et al. 2005; Pitman & Shumaker 2009). It should, nonetheless, be 
emphasized that the orangutan communicators in the present experiment produced behaviours 
indicative of their focus of attention, other than only head and gaze orientation. 
While previous research has demonstrated that orangutans with considerable 
experimental experience follow the gaze or pointing signals of human experimenters (Itakura 
1996; Itakura & Tanaka 1998; Byrnit 2004; Bräuer et al. 2005; Herrmann et al. 2007), the present 
experiment presents consistent and systematic observations of conspecific gaze following by 
orangutans. The results support the results of an observational study recording two instances of 
gaze following during 112 hours of observation (Kaplan & Rogers 2002), and the recent finding 
that orangutans follow the attention of conspecifics induced to raise their heads towards an item 
held by a human 2m above and immediately behind the subject (Pitman & Shumaker 2009). 
Moreover, the results show that co-orientation of attention consistently occurs in the 
interactions between experimentally naive animals, to points that require a only small 
reorientation on the part of the communicator and where no interesting events (such as human 
presence) typically occur.  
Orangutans showed no evidence of being able/inclined to follow the attention of 
conspecifics geometrically. While this result concurs with research suggesting that orangutans 
show limited understanding of the referential nature of human gaze in the presence of 
transparent and opaque barriers (Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007a), it is contradicted by another 
finding that orangutans do follow human gaze around opaque barriers (Bräuer et al. 2005). The 
findings by Bräuer and colleagues are, however, not fully comparable to the present results, as 
the gaze following in that experiment occurred as part of an ongoing communicative interaction 
between the human and orangutan, involving the cessation of provision of a significant 
reinforcer, food. In the experiment, the human repeatedly fed the subject pieces of food, until, 
while holding a piece of food in hand, she arrested behaviour, and for 1 minute looked to a 
location behind a barrier, outside the subject’s view, while alternating head and gaze between 
the subject and target. The withholding of food is likely to have strengthened the subjects’ 
response, and the experimenter’s gaze alternation added a communicative signal that prevents 
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conclusions being drawn, as to whether the subject responded to the experimenter’s attention 
alone, or the intentionally communicative signal. While the results suggest that orangutans with 
considerable experimental experience follow human attention geometrically in food 
provisioning contexts (Bräuer et al. 2005), their failure to do so outside ongoing communicative 
interactions involving immediate food rewards (i.e., in the present experiment and the study by 
Okamoto-Barth and colleagues), suggests that motivational factors may be at play. It raises the 
question, as to whether orangutans’ seemingly poorer performance on geometrical attention 
following trials, compared to bonobos and chimpanzees (in the study by Okamoto-Barth and 
colleagues, and as suggested by the performance of the orangutans and bonobos tested in the 
current experiment), owes to motivational rather than cognitive factors, and lie in the 
comparatively less motile behaviour of the species.  
 
 The results suggest that although the orangutans re-oriented in response to conspecific 
attention to the stimulus, this may have occurred purely on the basis of adventitious cues, 
without active attraction of conspecific attention, and production of intentionally 
communicative cues on the part of the communicator. The next chapter will further explore 
whether, and if so, which, particular behaviours produced by communicators consistently led to 
conspecific attention re-orientation, and potential intentionality underlying such behaviours.
Orangutan Attention Directing 
 
158 
 
 
CHAPTER 8: An experimental study of orangutan manipulation 
of conspecific attention 
 
 
Summary 
The behaviour of 7 Bornean orangutans who were presented with a novel visual 
stimulus while either alone or in the presence of an attentive or non-attentive conspecific (see 
Chapter 7) was recorded. Contrary to prediction, there was no difference in the production of 
gaze behaviours, auditory, locomotory and visual stimulus directional behaviours across the 
three conditions, and none of the behaviours predicted whether conspecifics looked to the 
stimulus. There was no species-wide evidence for active attention calling followed by directional 
signalling, although two orangutans followed sequential auditory-stimulus-directional behaviour 
by gaze shifts between the stimulus and an initially non-attentive conspecific, who then co-
oriented to animal’s attention to the stimulus area. Moreover, in a few cases orangutans may 
have used gaze communicatively.  
 
8.1 Introduction  
 The largely solitary and individually based fission-fusion structure of wild orangutans does 
not lend itself readily to examinations of intra-specific visual signalling, and many studies have 
thus focused on vocal communication (e.g., McKinnon 1974; Galdikas & Insley 1988; Mitani 
1985). While studies of wild and reintroduced orangutans suggest that they use a range of vocal 
signals and often incorporate auditory displays (such as throwing, slapping and shaking 
branches), an extensive observational study of captive orangutans found a complete absence of 
auditory signals (Liebal et al. 2006). In contrast, orangutans frequently produce auditory signals 
(object or cage bang, clap or ‘kiss squeak’, ‘raspberry’) in experimental studies, to solicit human 
attention (Poss et al. 2006; Cartmill & Byrne 2007). Observational studies of the gestural 
communication of wild (MacKinnon 1974; Kaplan & Rogers 2002), reintroduced (Rijksen 1978; 
Bard 1992) and captive orangutans (Liebal et al. 2006; Liebal 2007 Genty et al. 2009) indicates a 
variable and flexibly used gestural repertoire, with a higher proportion of tactile signals than 
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those of chimpanzees and bonobos (Liebal et al. 2006; Genty & Byrne 2009). While orangutans 
frequently repeat their gestures, combining them into sequences, such sequences comprise 
mainly of repetitions of the same signal rather than elaborations or functionally different signals 
(Liebal et al. 2006; Genty & Byrne 2009). 
Attention and communicative gestures 
 Both observational (Liebal et al. 2006; Genty et al. 2009) and experimental studies (Call & 
Tomasello 1994; Poss et al. 2006) show that orangutans (as chimpanzees: Hostetter et al. 2001; 
Leavens et al. 2004) deploy appropriate communicative signals to gain others’ attention, and 
preferentially use visual signals (facial expressions and visual gestures) when the receiver attends 
to them, and auditory and tactile signals when not. Overall, research suggests that orangutans 
discriminate between the different states of visual attention in others and have some 
understanding of the effectiveness of their signals.  
 While orangutans may use signals to intentionally attract the attention of human 
experimenters, neither intra-specific observational studies (Liebal et al. 2007; Genty & Byrne 
2009), nor inter-specific experimental study (Liebal et al. 2004b) have found evidence that 
orangutans use attention-getting behaviours to capture the attention of non-attending 
individuals (i.e., make the recipient move to face them) before producing a more specific visual 
signal, such as begging. Interestingly, when presented with un-reachable food and an 
experimenter oriented either towards or away from the subject, chimpanzees and bonobos tend 
to change their own relative orientation and move to gesture in front of the experimenter, while 
orangutans continue to gesture predominantly towards the location of the food (Liebal et al. 
2004a). While this suggests that apes find it less difficult to change their own relative orientation 
than manipulate human attentional orientation (Gómez 2005), it indicates that the sensitivity to 
human orientation, when deploying visual gestures, either may be higher in the Pan species than 
Pongo (as suggested by e.g., Liebal et al. 2004b), or as seems more likely in the light of the Pongids 
overall less ‘active’ way of life, that orangutans may simply be overall less motivated to 
locomote. That is, rather than the different performance of the Pongo and Pan species on these 
tasks reflecting species differences in cognition, it seems reasonable (and parsimonious) to 
conclude that the observed differences rely on motivational factors. 
 Orangutans (like chimpanzees: Leavens et al. 2005) also modify their communicative 
strategies according to the responses and apparent comprehension by their human audience 
(Cartmill & Byrne 2007). When in the context of food begging, presented with experimenters 
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who appear to understand the orangutans’ request for food (i.e., deliver food), partially-
understand (deliver half of the food), or misunderstand their requests (deliver alternative, less 
desirable food), orangutans select different tactics for repairing the apparently failed 
communication. When partially understood, they repeat the same or similar signals more 
energetically, while when misunderstood, they switch to a tactic of using a wider range of 
different gestures, and avoid those initially used. Such accommodation of communicative tactics 
suggests that orangutans, not only view others as agents capable of having intentions and 
perceptions, but also that they communicate intentionally about distal objects. 
 
Inter-specific pointing 
More than 30 years of field studies have provided no evidence that orangutans produce 
and use pointing gestures in a referential way during interactions with conspecifics. Many 
captive orangutans with experience of physical barriers and being placed in a position unable to 
acquire food or objects, however, (like other apes) develop tactics to request unreachable food 
from humans (e.g., Gómez & Teixidor 1992, cited by Gomez 1996; Call & Tomasello 1994). 
Moreover, anecdotal descriptions suggest that human-raised orangutans may point distally to 
things other than food, including other humans (Furness 1916)48, objects they desire, and places 
they wish to travel (Miles 1990). Orangutans who have received training in pointing also appear 
capable of more complex forms of referential signalling, as both mother- as human-reared 
orangutans will guide a human experimenter to the location of a hidden tool needed to access 
food for the animal (Gómez & Teixidor 1992; Call & Tomasello 1994; Zimmermann et al. 
2009). While this behaviour suggests that the animals may be motivated by an either informative 
motive or a complex imperative request that the human recover and use to tool to retrieve food 
(Gómez 2004; Zimmermann et al. 2009), the finding that the animals frequently pointed to the 
tool when the human experimenter knew the location of the tool (i.e., when informational 
pointing was not necessary), suggests that their behaviour did not reflect the mind-reading skills 
required for informative pointing  (Zimmermann et al. 2009).  
Declarative pointing has only been anecdotally reported for the human-raised, language-
trained orangutan, Chantek, for whom the acquisition of pointing seemed to follow a typical 
human sequence (Miles 1990). The superior performance of Chantek over mother-raised 
                                               
48 “When asked “where is papa ” she [an orangutan] would at once point to me or pat me on 
the shoulder” (Furness 1916, p. 284). 
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orangutans in a number of experiments (e.g., representing the mental state of another by 
distinguishing intentional from accidental actions: Call & Tomasello 1998; production and 
comprehension of pointing: Call & Tomasello 1994; preferentially requesting food from 
experimenters with open versus closed eyes: Call & Tomasello 1994) and of other ‘enculturated’ 
orangutans (Itakura & Tanaka 1998) has, however, lent support to the suggestion that 
individuals, raised with extensive human contact in early ontogeny, display more complex forms 
of cognition (Call & Tomasello 1996). Although the underlying mechanisms, by which human 
rearing influences developing apes remain obscure, it is plausible that the triadic interactions 
characteristic of human communication (involving the ape, human and an object of joint 
attention) facilitate the development of perspective taking, understanding of intentionality and 
learning about communicative intentions (Tomasello 1995). 
 
Intra-specific pointing 
While there is no evidence of orangutans pointing for one another in their natural 
habitats, individuals who have been previously trained to point by keepers and experimenters 
can generalize the behaviour to point imperatively amongst themselves. In a study, where 
orangutans were placed in neighbouring cages and had to request out-of-reach tokens from 
conspecifics, to subsequently exchange them with experimenters for food, individuals used hand 
begging and imperative manual pointing (fingers extended through the mesh separating the 
cages) in direction of the tokens, which appeared to be understood and rewarded as requests by 
conspecifics (Pele et al. 2009). It does, however, remain equivocal whether the behaviour 
involved understanding of the socio-cognitive causality underlying the gestures’ efficacy upon 
the behaviour of others, or were simply conditioned responses with little understanding of the 
reason for their effectiveness (i.e., that the gesture functioned to indicate a want: Gómez 2004). 
While the finding is intriguing and represents the only reported instance of pointing amongst 
orangutans, the token transfer experiment involved the same orangutans as tested by 
Zimmermann and colleagues (Zimmermann et al. 2009), that all had extensive experience with 
physical barriers and being placed in a position unable to acquire food or objects by themselves. 
Thus, all individuals were used to point to objects to indicate a choice, or request unreachable, 
food from human experimenters, and the behaviour may therefore have required only a 
generalisation to a different (species of) recipient. Moreover, the indication (in another 
experiment) that additional experience with the particular experimental setup enabled a mother-
raised orangutan to eventually respond appropriately to cues also used by an ‘enculturated’ 
orangutan (e.g., open vs. closed eyes: Call & Tomasello 1994), suggests that rather than 
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engendering more complex cognition, ‘enculturation’ and extensive human contact, including 
training and experience with the experimental setups, may simply increase the opportunity for 
learning about the peculiarities of human interaction and communication channels. If so, it 
would lend support to the notion that intra-specific pointing in experimentally experienced 
orangutans does not represent a qualitative departure from other forms of imperative 
communication amongst orangutans. 
 
Aim 
Surprisingly few experiments have involved orangutans without extensive human and 
laboratory experience, and only two previous experimental studies of orangutan communication 
(Pele et al. 2009; Pitman & Shumaker 2009) have involved conspecifics rather than only humans. 
The results of the previous chapter suggest that, although orangutans re-orient in response to 
conspecific attention to a novel stimulus, this may have occurred purely on the basis of 
adventitious cues emitted by individuals viewing the stimulus, without active attraction and 
redirection of non-attending conspecifics. This chapter aims to explore whether behaviours 
produced by orangutans viewing the novel stimulus consistently led to conspecific attention re-
orientation, and whether individuals intentionally redirected conspecifics’ attention. To test if 
communicators actively called the attention of non-attentive conspecifics, and led them to look 
to a stimulus that only they observed, the method and rationale presented in Chapter 3 
(Attention Following in Chimpanzees) was used to record, whether communicators produced 
different behaviours or combinations thereof when in the presence of the stimulus but absence 
of a conspecific, and in the presence of the stimulus and an either attentive or non-attentive 
conspecific. As in Chapter 3, it was predicted that communicators would behave differently as a 
function of conspecific’s presence and visual attention. 
 By virtue of orangutans’ willingness to cooperate with conspecifics (Pele et al. 2009) and 
to obtain rewards for conspecifics as themselves (Chalmeau et al. 1997), one might predict 
cooperative abilities similar to those of bonobos. Given differences in social structure and 
performance in social cognition experiments, orangutans were, however, predicted be less likely 
than chimpanzees and bonobos to intentionally direct conspecifics to the novel stimulus and 
engage in referential signalling. 
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8.2 Methods 
8.2.1 Design and procedure 
The analyses were based on the experiment described in Chapter 7, involving 7 
orangutans, and followed the rationale described in Chapter 3. The key comparisons involved 
the experimental and ‘Communicator Alone’ conditions, designed to test if communicators took 
conspecific presence and attentional state into account when responding to the stimulus. The 
conditions were presented in an order determined by the Latin Square technique (see to Figure 
7.3), in which 86% (N = 7) of participants received a ‘Communicator Alone’ control trial before 
the first experimental trial.  
 
8.2.2 Coding of communicator behaviour  
The communicator behaviours coded were as detailed in Chapter 3 and 6 (in studies of 
chimpanzees and bonobos), and comprised of (1) auditory, (2) visual non-stimulus directional, 
(3) visual stimulus directional, (4) locomotory stimulus directional (approach), and (5) 
conspecific directional gaze behaviours (Table 8.1, see also section 3.2.2 for further definitions 
of individual behavioural categories).  
Table 8.1: Behavioural categories coded. 
 
Behaviours Class Behaviour
(1) Auditory Voalise, stamp, knock, clap, move object
(2) Visual non-stimulus directionalArrest beahviour, swagger, shake extreity, shake object, bob head, head 
(3) Visual stimulus directional Touch, lean, exend extremity, move head forward, 'hunch'
(4) Locomotory stimulus directionalApproach
(5) Conspecific directional Gaze 1: Signaller looks to conspecific within 2s of looking to the stimulus
Gaze 2: Signaller looks to a conspecific within 2s of looking to the 
stimulus, followed by a look to the stimulus within 2s of looking away from 
the conspecific (gaze behaviour: stimulus-target-stimulus). Gaze change is 
scored by head movement and only trials scored unequivocallly are 
included.
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8.2.3 Scoring and reliability  
A second coder coded a random selection of 17% (7 of 42) of experimental and 
‘Communicator Alone’ trials to assess inter-observer reliability in terms of (1) auditory, (2) visual 
stimulus directional, and (3) locomotory stimulus directional behaviours. Inter-observer 
reliability with respect to auditory and visual stimulus directional cues was perfect (Cohen’s 
kappa = 1, n = 7), while it was ‘good’ with respect to auditory cues (Cohen's kappa = 0.70, n = 7).  
 
8.2.4 Statistics 
 In contrast to chimpanzees and bonobos tested, all orangutans received two full 
sequences of trials. To deal with the issue of potential pseudo-replication caused by each 
participant receiving two ‘Experimental-Towards’, ‘Experimental-Away’ and ‘Communicator Alone’ 
trials, the distribution of communicators’ behaviours across the thee conditions, and of targets’ 
look to the stimulus area when communicators produced particular behaviours, were analysed 
by means of repeated measures binomial logistic regressions (fitted by the Laplace 
approximation). Gaze behaviours were analysed by means of binomial tests. Null-hypotheses 
were rejected at an alpha level of 5%.  
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8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Communicator behaviour 
There was no statistical significance in the production of any of the recorded behaviours 
across the three conditions (Table 8.2, Figure 8.1). Locomotory stimulus directional behaviours, 
however, approached significance for the ‘Communicator Alone’ condition, and visual non-stimulus 
directional behaviours approached significance for when the communicator viewed the stimulus 
in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific (‘Experimental-Away’). Likewise, there was a trend 
for communicators to produce stimulus directional behaviours more frequently when viewing 
the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive (50% of trials) than attentive conspecific (21%), 
or when viewing the stimulus while alone (21%). No hunching behaviour was observed. 
Table 8.2: Results for GLMM analyses of the distribution of communicator behaviours across 
the ‘Communicator Alone’, ‘Experimental-Away’ and ‘Experimental-Towards’ conditions.  
 
Figure 8.1: Communicator behaviour. Percent ‘Experimental-Towards’ (N=14), ‘Experimental-Away’ 
(N=14) and ‘Communicator Alone’ (N=14) trials, where communicators produced auditory, visual 
non-stimulus directional, visual stimulus directional and multimodal behaviours. 
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Behaviour Fixed effects Estimate Std. Error Z-value P
Stimulus directional Communciator Alone -1.02 1.05 0.97 0.332
Experimental-Away 1.01 0.98 1.03 0.303
Experimental-Towards 1.18 1.08 1.09 0.278
Locomotory directional Communciator Alone -1.57 0.81 1.94 0.053
Experimental-Away 8.64 0.92 0.94 0.350
Experimental-Towards -7.81 1.00 0.00 0.999
Non-stimulus directional Communciator Alone -0.98 0.64 1.54 0.124
Experimental-Away 1.61 0.83 1.95 0.051
Experimental-Towards 0.98 0.81 1.21 0.225
Auditory Communciator Alone -2.52 1.04 -0.47 0.999
Experimental-Away -1.05 1.47 1.01 0.403
Experimental-Towards -1.70 0.47 0.00 0.999
Multimodal Communciator Alone -2.52 1.04 -0.47 0.999
Experimental-Away -1.05 1.47 1.01 0.403
Experimental-Towards -1.70 0.47 0.00 0.999
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Gaze behaviour: Fifty percent (14 of 28) of experimental trials could be reliably scored 
for gaze changes. The target conspecific’s back was turned to the communicator throughout 
three of these trials, which were therefore excluded from an analysis of potentially 
communicative gaze behaviour. Communicators were no more likely than chance to look 
referentially to the conspecific (look to the conspecific within 2s of looking away from the 
stimulus, while being within the conspecific’s ‘open’/‘peripheral’ field of vision; 72.73%, 8 of 11 
of trials, Binomial test: n = 11, p = 0.227), nor to shift gaze from the stimulus to the conspecific 
(within 2s of looking away from the stimulus) and back to the stimulus (within 2s of looking 
away from the conspecific), while being within the conspecific’s ‘open’/‘peripheral’ field of 
vision (45.45%, 5 of 11 trials, Binomial test: n = 11, p = 1). Communicators produced an 
auditory cue in two of 28 experimental trials, both while in the presence of a non-attentive 
conspecific, and in both cases auditory behaviour were followed by gaze alternation between the 
stimulus and conspecific, while being in conspecific’s ‘open’ visual field. In both cases, targets 
co-oriented looked to the stimulus location (Figures 8.2 and 8.3). 
   
Figure 8.2: ‘Experimental–Away’ condition; From left: (1) The communicator (left, who had 
viewed the stimulus in a previous trial) views the stimulus (encircled). (2) The communicator 
abruptly and noisily scrambles up wired rubber structure, vigorously shaking a hanging tyre in 
the process. (3) Target (right, the communicator’s mother) turns and looks towards the 
communicator, who looks to the stimulus area, then target, and back to the stimulus area. 
 
    
Figure 8.3: ‘Experimental–Away’ condition. From left: (1) The Communicator views stimulus, (2) 
bangs hand on door by stimulus, (3) turns to look to the experimenter, then target conspecific 
(4), who turns around. When the target has turned, the communicator looks back to the stimulus. 
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8.3.2 Communicator behaviours leading targets to look to the stimulus area 
None of the recorded behaviours that communicators produced during the stimulus 
phase of experimental trials where they viewed the stimulus while in the presence of an attentive 
(Table 8.2, Figure 8.4) or non-attentive conspecific (Table 8.3, Figure 8.5) significantly affected 
whether or not targets looked to the stimulus area. 
Table 8.2: Significance table. GLMM test for a difference in the probability that targets looked 
to the stimulus area when communicators produced various behaviours while viewing the 
stimulus in the presence of an attentive conspecific (‘Experimental-Towards’ condition).  
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Attentive targets’ looks to stimulus area as a function of communicator behaviours. 
Percentage of conspecific looks to the stimulus area during ‘Experimental-Towards’ trials (N=14) 
when communicators did/did not produce various cues. Labels above columns indicate the 
number of trials in which communicators did/did not produce the behaviours on which the 
percentage is based. 
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Intercept -2.31 1.33 0.10 0.999
Stimulus directional 2.30 2.32 0.90 0.788
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Auditory 4.01 3.41 0.00 1.000
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Table 8.3: Significance table. GLMM test for a difference in the probability that targets looked 
to the stimulus area when communicators produced various behaviours while viewing the 
stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific (‘Experimental-Away’ condition).  
 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Non-attentive targets’ looks to stimulus area as a function of communicator 
behaviours. Percentage of conspecific looks to the stimulus area during ‘Experimental-Away’ trials 
(N=14) when communicators did/did not produce various behaviours. Labels above columns 
indicate the number of trials in which communicators did/did not produce the behaviours on 
which the percentage is based. 
 
Fixed effects Estimate Std. Error Z-value P
Intercept -2.10 3.35 0.10 0.999
Stimulus directional 1.32 2.28 0.00 1.000
Locomotory stimulus directional -1.07 3.00 0.10 1.000
Auditory 4.14 3.33 0.00 1.000
Non-stimulus directional 3.22 2.35 0.00 1.000
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8.3.3 Qualitative analysis of communicator target interactions  
Some trials contained interesting gaze interactions between communicators and targets 
that did not lend themselves to quantitative analysis, given the rarity with which they occurred. 
While the observations remain anecdotal, they suggest that, although statistically non-significant 
when all individuals and dyad constellations were analysed, some individuals may have used gaze 
communicatively to convey something about the stimulus. This seems to have particularly been 
the case in mother-offspring dyads interactions, for which several trials included repeated 
communicator gaze alternation, while being within the conspecific’s ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ field 
of vision. Some of these trials are described in Figure 8.2, and Figures 8.6, 8.8 and 8.9, below. 
   
Pre-stimulus display phase. Stimulus displayed. Communicator looks to stimulus. 
   
Communicator looks to target. Communicator looks to stimulus. Communicator looks to target. 
   
Target turns and looks to 
stimulus location. 
Target looks back to 
communicator. 
Target looks to stimulus     
location. 
 
Figure 8.6: ‘Experimental-Towards’ trial involving gaze alternation. Repeated gaze alternation 
between the stimulus and target by the communicator (left), followed by visual co-orientation 
and ‘checking’ behaviour by the target upon finding nothing at the focus point of the 
communicator’s attention. 
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Figure 8.7: ‘Experimental-Away’ trial. From left: (1) Communicator looks to stimulus (encircled), 
(2) looks to the experimenter, (3) approaches stimulus, (4) which makes target (encircled) turn 
and look to communicator. The communicator then looks to stimulus, then to target, and then 
back to stimulus, while being within target’s ‘open’ field of vision. Target does not approach to 
look to the stimulus.  
  
Figure 8.8: ‘Experimental-Towards’ trial. From left: (1) Stimulus displayed. (2) Communicator (left) 
sees stimulus, and (3) looks to infant (right, who looks to mother and stimulus), and back to the 
stimulus, and then approaches the stimulus.  
 
   
Figure 8.9: ‘Experimental-Towards’ trial. From left: (1) Pre-stimulus phase. (2) Communicator 
(right) sees stimulus. (3) Communicator looks to experimenter, and alternates gaze between the 
experimenter, stimulus and possibly target 7 times within the following 10s (laser pointer is 
disguised, and only the stimulus point on the grass should be visible to the communicator). 
Target (left) is immediately in front of the communicator, precluding unequivocal 
determination, as to whether the communicator also looks to target while looking to the 
stimulus. Target appears to notice the communicator’s movements, and turns and scans over 
the stimulus area, and upon finding nothing, looks back to communicator and, within 2s 
thereafter, to stimulus area again. 
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8.4 Discussion 
 Contrary to prediction orangutans were no more likely to produce auditory, 
locomotory and visual stimulus directional cues when they viewed the stimulus in the presence 
of an attentive or non-attentive conspecific, than alone. Moreover, none of the recorded 
behaviours consistently triggered conspecific attention following to the stimulus location. There 
was also no individually consistent, nor species-wide, evidence of active attention manipulation, 
in the form of multimodal behaviours (i.e., sequential auditory and visual stimulus directional 
behaviours).  
Overall, this supports the results of Chapter 7 (Orangutan Attention Following), which 
suggested that the orangutans did not actively attract the attention of non-attending conspecifics 
to the stimulus location, and that conspecific re-orientation to the stimulus area occurred on the 
basis of adventitious cues emitted by individuals viewing the stimulus. More specifically, 
conspecifics were only significantly more likely to look to the stimulus area when they faced 
towards communicators during the stimulus projection and needed only read the communicators’ 
adventitious attentional cues, and turn around, so as to look to the stimulus (i.e., when visual co-
orientation required no communicative efforts on the part of the communicator).  
Nonetheless, in two cases, individuals (the adult male and a juvenile female viewing the 
stimulus in the presence of its mother) followed an auditory behaviour by a stimulus directional 
behaviour. In both cases, the animals viewed the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive 
conspecific and followed the sequential auditory-stimulus-directional behaviour by gaze shifts 
between the stimulus and conspecific, who co-oriented to the stimulus area. Moreover, while 
statistically non-significant, there was a clear tend for communicators to produce visual stimulus 
directional as well as visual non-stimulus directional behaviours more frequently when viewing 
the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive than an attentive conspecific or alone. Despite 
neither of these behavioural classes reaching statistical significance when analysed individually 
and on a group-wide basis, it seems that the orangutans’ behavioural responses to the stimulus 
were, overall, stronger when it was viewed in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific. While 
this might be explained with reference to potential differences in arousal levels when viewing 
ambiguous stimuli in the presence of a non-attentive rather than attentive conspecific, arousal 
levels should, theoretically, be even higher when the animals viewed the stimulus while alone. 
Interestingly, both the chimpanzee and the bonobo populations tested were also more likely to 
produce stimulus directional behaviours when they viewed the stimulus in the presence of a 
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non-attentive than attentive conspecific or alone. Overall, the orangutans seemingly stronger 
behavioural responses to the stimulus when in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific 
suggests that some of the orangutans may have increased their responses to the stimulus (and 
potentially, communicative efforts) when there was little chance conspecifics might detect the 
stimulus on their own.  
In accordance with a comprehensive observational study of orangutan intra-specific 
communication, which found a complete absence of auditory signals (Liebal et al. 2006), no 
vocal signals were observed, and only two trials included auditory cues. In contrast, orangutans 
frequently produce auditory signals in experimental studies, to solicit human attention (Poss et 
al. 2006; Cartmill & Byrne 2007), and use a number of gestures in experimental settings that are 
not used as intentional gestures during interactions with conspecifics (Poss et al. 006; 
Zimmermann et al. 2009; Cartmill, E. pers. com.). Orangutans may simply use a different collection 
of signals to attract and direct the attention of experimenters and keepers than conspecifics. 
While previous research has demonstrated that orangutans discriminate between the 
different states of visual attention in others, view others as agents capable of having intentions 
and perceptions, and have some understanding of the effectiveness of their own signals, which 
they use appropriately to gain others’ attention in imperative contexts (Call & Tomasello 1994, 
1998; Shillito et al. 2005; Poss et al. 2006; Liebal et al. 2006; Cartmill & Byrne 2007; Genty & 
Byrne 2009; Genty et al. 2009), the present results provide little evidence that the orangutans, as 
a group, behaved differently as a function of conspecifics’ visual attention, or communicated 
about the stimulus. This may be interpreted to suggest that (i) orangutans may communicate 
intentionally about distal objects to humans, but not conspecifics, and that orangutans trained to 
point (though not experimentally naïve orangutans) may extend this behaviour to point for 
conspecifics, (ii) that the visual stimulus had a lower motivational value than the food that has 
evoked intentional communication in other experimental paradigms, and/or (iii) that orangutans 
may communicate imperatively about distal objects they desire but not declaratively (or social 
referentially) about a non-food object predicted to evoke interest rather than want. 
Do orangutans use gaze as an intentional referential signal? 
To examine de Waal’s (2001) suggestion that apes may intentionally use gaze as a 
referential signal, I examined the orangutans gaze behaviour with specific emphasis on the few 
trials, in which they produced auditory cues, so as to separate referential looking (‘stimulus–
conspecific’ gaze behaviour), from intentionally communicative instances. Communicators were 
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no more likely than chance to look referentially to the target conspecific, nor to shift gaze from 
the stimulus to the conspecific (within 2s of looking away from the stimulus) and back to the 
stimulus (within 2s of looking away from the conspecific), while being within the conspecific’s 
‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ field of vision. While statistically non-significant when all individuals and 
dyad constellations were analysed, the results, however, suggest that some individuals may have 
used gaze communicatively to convey something about the stimulus. In particular, the only two 
trials, in which communicators preceded an auditory cue (both while in the presence of a non-
attentive conspecific), lend support to this notion. In both cases auditory cues were followed by 
gaze alternation between the stimulus and conspecific (‘stimulus-conspecific-stimulus’ gaze 
behaviour) while being in conspecific’s ‘open’ visual field, and in both cases the conspecific 
turned around to look to the stimulus location. Moreover, one trial involved a mother 
repeatedly alternating gaze between the stimulus and her attentive juvenile daughter, which was 
followed by visual co-orientation to the stimulus location and checking behaviour by the 
daughter (‘stimulus area – mother – stimulus area’ gaze behaviour). 
Conspecifics’ looks to the stimulus area were randomly distributed across trials, in which 
communicators did and did not look referentially to the conspecific or shifted gaze between the 
stimulus, target and back to the stimulus, while being within a conspecifics’ ‘open’ or 
’peripheral’ field of vision. While this gaze behaviour failed to trigger attention following, this 
may be partially explained by the low statistical power afforded by the limited number of trials, 
in which orangutan communicators produced these behaviours. Moreover, given that trials were 
performed opportunistically and dyad compositions not controlled, the finer gradations and 
influence of conspecific relationship on attention co-ordinating behaviours remain untested. 
Furthermore, in one experimental trial (detailed in Figure 8.3) the communicator banged 
on the door, on which the stimulus was displayed, and before turning to look to a conspecific 
behind itself, looked to me, the experimenter. In another trial, the same communicator (the 
adult male) also looked to me, before looking to its conspecific and then back to the stimulus 
(trial detailed in Figure 8.7). It is possible that, despite meticulous care exercised to prevent the 
animals detecting the origin of the stimulus (and grasping the nature of the experiment), that 
(some of) the animal(s) may have done just that. If so, the stimulus’ value as a novel, interesting 
object of uncertain origin, may have been reduced to simply ‘another odd thing that happens 
around people’, with little need to engage a conspecific. An alternative interpretation of the 
communicator’s behaviour in these two trials, is that the animal might not have grasped the 
origin of the stimulus, but simply that the physically closest other individual, with whom to 
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socially reference, was a human (i.e., the experimenter), and that looks to and engagement with a 
conspecific were unnecessary. 
Given orangutans semi-solitary existence, one might predict that visual, and particularly 
gaze-related, communication play a lesser role for orangutans than other great apes species 
(Delgado & Van Schaik 2000). While the overall results suggest that the orangutans did not use 
locomotion or gestures to actively bring about instances of joint attention, a few interactions 
suggest that the species may use more subtle, less dynamic behaviours (including gaze 
behaviours) that effectively coordinate others’ to the focus of their own attention. Thus, while, 
there was no overall evidence that orangutans directed others’ attention to the stimulus, the 
behaviour of some individuals was consistent with the suggestion that apes may use gaze and 
gaze alternation as ostensive (Menzel 1973, 1974; Gómez 1990, 1991) and referential signals (de 
Waal 2001). 
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CHAPTER 9: General discussion 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The thesis now turns to the discussion, further elaboration and contextualisation of the 
research presented in the previous chapters. The key findings are summarised, and the 
performance of the three species compared, and empirical and theoretical implications of the 
findings are discussed. A number of methodological strengths and limitations within this 
program of research are discussed and finally, suggestions for future studies, which will expand 
on the present research program, are proposed. 
 
9.2 Empirical findings 
9.2.1 Summary of key findings 
The principal aims of this thesis were to (i) investigate the conspecific attention 
following skills of three species of non-human apes, and (ii) devise a methodological approach 
to test if the apes would lead conspecifics to detect a novel stimulus, that would allow a 
distinction of adventitious and intentionally emitted cues. An extensive battery of controls was 
devised, to explore if the animals considered the presence and visual attention of conspecifics 
when viewing a novel stimulus, as well as the probability of conspecifics detecting the stimulus 
on their own and by chance. A further key aim was to (iii) identify potential behaviours that 
consistently function as cues triggering intra-specific attention following, and test if the apes 
took conspecific presence attention into consideration when engaging in such behaviours, 
including potentially, directional signalling that, while not necessarily corresponding to hand-
pointing, might be meaningful to the animals. 
In Chapter 2, I described the general methodology used with the three species and 
reported the attentional responses of chimpanzees to the behaviour of ten adult and three infant 
conspecifics shown a novel laser stimulus. Adult chimpanzees failed one control condition 
(which nonetheless showed the right tendency), involving comparison of initially non-attentive 
targets’ looks to the stimulus location during the 30s that the stimulus was shown, and the 
Discussion 
 
176 
preceding 30s when it was not. Nonetheless, they passed all other control conditions and were 
more likely to look the stimulus area when a communicator viewed the stimulus, than in the 
absence of a communicator or the presence of a communicator ignorant as to the presence of 
the stimulus, and in the absence of the stimulus, while orienting either towards or away from the 
communicator. Three infant communicators received a limited number of conditions, but 
consistently brought about conspecific co-orientation to the stimulus area. The study involved 
only three trials where infants served as both targets and communicators, yet, infants co-
oriented to communicator attention in all trials, suggesting that they readily followed conspecific 
attentional cues. This is consistent with a finding that one chimpanzee (with extensive 
experimental experience) reliably followed the head orientation of a human experimenter to a 
location behind itself by 20 months of age (Okamoto et al. 2004), and adds to this, by suggesting 
that experimentally naïve infant chimpanzees also co-orient to conspecific (versus human) 
attention to locations where no events may be expected to occur (wall vs. the infant’s mother: 
Okamoto et al. 2004). Conspecifics, however, emitted cues other than only head cues, and often 
approached and inspected the stimulus, thus providing far more conspicuous cues to the 
location of the stimulus, than the head cues provided in the experiment involving a human 
experimenter/communicator (Okamoto et al. 2004). Overall, the results suggest that the infant 
as adult chimpanzees consistently brought about conspecific co-orientation when presented 
with a novel/interesting visual stimulus, and indeed that both infant and adults followed the 
attention of conspecifics. 
A key finding in Chapter 3 was the identification of a behavioural component, 
‘hunching’, which when included, consistently led the chimpanzee to co-orient to the 
communicator’s attentional focus. The component consisted of the chimpanzee rounding its 
back, tilting its body forward, drawing the head into its shoulders and pushing its chin forward 
towards the focus of its attention. A similar ‘hunching’ component has been reported in 
quadrupedal, bipedal and sitting positions in multiple contexts among wild chimpanzees (see 
e.g., Nishida et al. 1999), but never identified as a potential component of a form of functional 
or intentional chimpanzee attention re-direction. It is plausible that through a statistical 
contingency and its occurrence in greeting, aggression and courtship contexts, the behaviour has 
acquired a function of adventitiously signalling intense attention towards a social entity, onto 
which some behaviour will follow. There was, however, a clear trend for the chimpanzees to 
selectively adopt the ‘hunching’ posture when they viewed the stimulus in the presence of a 
conspecific rather than alone (the comparison was statistically non-significant, but very closely 
approached significance [p = 0.056]), and they never assumed the posture in control conditions 
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where they did not view the stimulus. Moreover, in all cases where chimpanzees adopted the 
posture while viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific, it was 
preceded by an auditory behaviour. Overall, the results suggest that the behaviour may represent 
a case of a naturally occurring (albeit rarely deployed) intentional, declarative-like behaviour. In 
Chapter 4, I analysed naturally occurring attention following episodes, of which four included 
the ‘hunching’ posture, thus demonstrating that the behaviour occurs in contexts other than 
that of potentially laser-stimulus-induced increased arousal in the experimental manipulation. 
Overall, the results go some way to suggest that the behaviour may have been produced 
intentionally and referentially. 
In Chapter 4, I also applied Chance’s (1967) ‘Social Attention Hypothesis’ (that 
individuals accord and receive attention as a function of dominance rank) to attention following, 
and found that the chimpanzees were more likely to follow the attention of the alpha male, who 
was less likely to follow the attention of others. While the ‘Social Attention Hypothesis’ is 
traditionally tested using e.g., ‘point sampling’ to measure the frequency of looks to 
conspecifics, attention following is a plausible extension of the predictions made by the 
hypothesis. The results represent the first of their kind, and add to the body of evidence, 
suggesting that the attention structure of primates (e.g., wild baboons, patas monkeys and 
possibly orangutans) is based on social dominance (Kummer & Kurt 1963; McNelis & 
Boatright-Horowitz 1998; Kaplan & Rogers 2001). 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I described an adaptation of the general method to a bonobo 
population, who, like the chimpanzees, followed conspecific attention to the stimulus. Unlike 
the chimpanzees, the bonobos also consistently followed conspecific attention when the setup 
required that they first locomote around a visual obstacle. This effect was, however, only 
statistically significant when only the first trial that subjects received was included in the analysis 
(and not when all trials that individuals received were analysed jointly). This was possibly 
because the novelty value of the stimulus decreased after repeated exposures, where 
communicators were allowed to examine the stimulus for up to 30s, and thus the strength of 
their responses and potential interest in directing others to the stimulus (for e.g., potential social 
referencing purposes) diminished. None the behaviours that the bonobos produced upon 
viewing the stimulus significantly predicted whether conspecifics looked to the stimulus area, 
however, like the chimpanzees, they intriguingly preferentially produced visual stimulus 
directional cues when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific. 
 In Chapters 7 and 8, I reported the results for orangutans, who, overall, followed the 
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attention of conspecifics, but neither showed evidence of geometric attention following, nor of 
selective production of stimulus directional cues when viewing the stimulus in the presence of 
conspecific.  
 
9.2.2 Species comparison 
This section provides a brief comparison of the behaviour of the three species 
(including direct statistical assessment of key behaviours). 
9.2.2.1 Attention following 
Although the stimulus was removed immediately before it was detected, individuals of 
all three species looked longer towards the stimulus area during the stimulus than pre-stimulus 
phase of experimental trials, suggesting an expectation of a point of interest. Overall, all the 
three species co-oriented to the stimulus when facing a conspecific viewing it. Bonobo targets 
were, however, statistically more likely than both chimpanzees and orangutans to look to the 
stimulus area during the 30s of experimental trials that the stimulus was shown to a conspecific 
than the preceding 30s when it was not (GLMM with ‘phase’ and ‘species’ entered as factors 
and participant as a random factor: Bonobos: Est. = 5.2, SE = 0.90, z = 5.81, p = 0.000; 
Chimpanzees: Est. = 0.18, SE = 0.43, z = 0.42, p = 0.676; Orangutans: Est. = 0.16, SE = 0.46, 
z = 0.349, p = 0.727). This apparent species difference appears to have been a ‘true’ difference, 
as the bonobos received a higher proportion of experimental trials that required conspecifics to 
follow communicators’ attention under unfavourable geometric conditions that required them 
to first locomote around a visual barrier (thus reducing the probability of adventitious stimulus 
detection, due to scanning or simply movement (proportions of experimental trials requiring 
geometrical attention following: Bonobos: 82%, Chimpanzees: 41%, Orangutans: 43%).     
Given the small proportion of geometrical attention following trials that the chimpanzees and 
orangutans received, no direct tests of the three species’ performance on this type of trials was 
conducted. Bonobos, however, consistently followed conspecific attention geometrically. 
There was no evidence that bonobo communicators produced more salient cues, as to 
the focus of their attention. Thus, this apparent species difference in readiness to follow 
conspecific attention, suggest that either the bonobos were more interested in the attention of 
conspecifics than members of the other two species tested, or the bonobos were more 
motivated to move and locomote in order to co-orient to others’ focus of attention, possibly 
underscored by the species’, seemingly overall, more ‘active’ way of life. 
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9.2.2.2 Attentional cues 
Overall, all three species seemed to show stronger behavioural responses to the stimulus 
when viewing it in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific (see Figures 3.5, 6.4 and 8.1 for 
the behaviours that the three species, respectively, produced across the three main conditions). 
Likewise, interestingly, both chimpanzees and bonobos preferentially produced visual stimulus 
directional behaviours when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific. 
Some individuals of these species consistently and selectively preceded stimulus directional 
behaviours by an auditory behaviour when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-
attentive conspecific, suggesting that the individuals may have considered conspecific presence 
and visual attention. Nonetheless, given that all three species produced a higher proportion of 
stimulus directional behaviours (and in the case of orangutans, visual non-stimulus directional 
behaviours49) when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific, it may 
simply be that the apes increased their overall responses to the stimulus (and potentially, 
communicative efforts, without resorting to auditory behaviours) when there was little chance 
conspecifics might detect the stimulus on their own. 
There was no species-wide evidence for active attention calling in any of the species, 
although the chimpanzees were more than three times as likely to produce an auditory 
behaviour when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific, and six 
times more likely to do so than when they viewed the stimulus on their own. Nor was there any 
species-wide evidence of sequential auditory and stimulus directional behaviours for any of the 
species tested, yet there were, particularly for the chimpanzees, noticeable individual differences; 
Some individuals consistently followed an auditory behaviour by a stimulus directional 
behaviour only when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a non-attentive conspecific, and 
reliably lead conspecifics’ attention to the stimulus location.  
Contrary to previous studies, which have found no evidence that apes actively call the 
attention of non-attending human experimenters (in a food begging experiment) and 
conspecifics (based on a 75 hour observational study of chimpanzees) before producing a more 
specific visual cue, but tend to locomote into the visual field of a desired recipient (Liebal et al. 
2004a,b), some of the chimpanzees and bonobos in the present experiment consistently 
attracted the attention of non-attending conspecifics by means of auditory behaviours, before 
                                               
49 The selective production of this behaviour when orangutans viewed the stimulus in the 
presence of a non-attentive conspecific was non-significant, yet closely approached significance 
(p = 0.051). 
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adopting a stimulus directional behaviour (and did so only when viewing the stimulus in the 
presence of a non-attentive conspecific). 
Chimpanzees showed a strong trend to produce a stimulus directional ‘hunching’ 
behaviour when viewing the stimulus in the presence of a conspecific rather than alone (the 
effect was statistically non-significant but closely approached significance [p=0.056]), while this 
behaviour was never observed in any of the trials involving bonobos and orangutans. Moreover, 
in all cases where chimpanzees adopted the posture, while viewing the stimulus in the presence 
of a non-attentive conspecific, it was preceded by an auditory behaviour. The posture may 
represent a naturally occurring (albeit very rarely deployed) intentional, declarative-like 
behaviour. 
The most distant human relative studied, orangutans, showed few signs of actively 
calling and re-directing conspecific attention, and neither showed individually consistent, nor 
species-wide evidence of active attention manipulation, stimulus directional behaviours, or 
multimodal communication. Indeed, associations between the orangutans’ responses to the 
stimulus and conspecifics’ looks to the stimulus area were conspicuous by their absence. It is 
frequently argued that the social communication of the evolutionary line leading to Pan and 
Homo may have become increasingly sophisticated since the split from the ancestor shared with 
orangutans 10-12 m.y.a., and indeed, that the social communication of orangutans is less 
sophisticated than that of the Pan species (e.g., Bennett 1998, cited by Liebal et al. 2006). It is, 
however, likely that orangutans’ poorer performance in a number of experimental paradigms 
may owe to motivational factors, rather than cognitive and communicative capabilities. 
Anecdotally, orangutan mother-offspring dyad interactions in the present experiment contained 
a number of cases of e.g., repeated communicator gaze alternation and consequent conspecific 
looks to the stimulus area, and of auditory behaviours followed by gaze alternation between the 
stimulus and the communicator’s mother or offspring. While only anecdotes, these observations 
emphasise three things: (i) the importance of the social relationships of interlocutors on the 
nature of the communication; orangutans are most likely more likely to engage in triadic 
interactions with individuals, with whom they are emotionally close (as in the case of e.g., 
mother-offspring dyads); (ii) individual differences may be related to particular life-history 
periods, such as those that – in the apes’ natural habitats – would entail more frequent and 
intense social interactions and be under selective pressure for closer social attention (i.e., the 
infant and juvenile stages, and thus, by implication, again mother-offspring interactions; and (iii) 
while orangutans engage in triadic interactions with conspecifics (see e.g., Pitman & Shumaker 
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2009), their social communication may involve more subtle and less action-based behaviours 
than that of the (seemingly overall more motile) Pan species, thus making such behaviours less 
conspicuous. The implication is that care should be exercised when attributing socio-cognitive 
performance to species differences, without careful consideration of ontogeny and motivational 
factors, and indeed individual differences (and consequently the potential problem of testing 
relatively small sample sizes). 
There was no overall statistically significant evidence that the three species used gaze 
shifts as an ostensive signal to secure and direct others’ attention, however the behaviour of 
some animals was consistent with the suggestion that apes may use gaze and gaze alternation as 
ostensive (Menzel 1973, 1974; Gómez 1990, 1991; O’Connell 1994) and intentionally referential 
signals (de Waal 2001). In all species, communicators shifted gaze from the stimulus to the 
conspecific and back to the stimulus while being within the conspecific’s ‘open’ or ‘peripheral’ 
field of vision in 50% or more of trials where gaze behaviour could reliably be coded 
(chimpanzees: 60% [14 of 23 trials], bonobos: 50% [14 of 28], orangutans: 72% [8 of 11]). 
Moreover, analysis of 45 naturally occurring attention following episodes (see Chapter 4), 
showed that in 24% (11 of 45) chimpanzee targets alternated gaze between the communicator 
and the communicator’s focus of attention, and back to the communicator. While none of these 
behaviours reached statistical significance, they suggest that individuals may have had some 
awareness that conspecifics were in some way connected to object of their attention.  
 
9.3 Methodological issues 
9.3.1 Strengths 
Previous studies of conspecific gaze following in apes have included controls that have 
used a control condition similar to the ‘Target Alone’ control deployed the present design (“no 
conspecific present in the immediate vicinity of the subject”: Tomasello et al. 1998, p. 1065), or 
have used a version of the ‘No Stimulus’ control, in which a human either held up an empty hand 
(‘No Stimulus’ condition: Pitman & Shumaker 2009) or an object (‘Experimental’ condition: Ibid.). 
The absence and design of key controls in these studies, however, opens the possibility for ‘low 
level’ explanations underlying the observed visual co-orientation. For example, eliminating the 
possibility that conspecific presence increases the scanning frequency, and consequently 
accidental stimulus detection by target animals, requires inclusion of a control where the 
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stimulus is consistently presented outside the view of target animals, while in the presence of a 
conspecific ignorant as to the presence of the stimulus (i.e., a consistent implementation of the 
‘Target and ignorant communicator’ control; multiple targets critique).50 
 In contrast to the two studies of conspecific gaze following (Tomasello et al. 1998; Pitman 
& Shumaker 2009), the present design did not require target animals to re-orient to points 
where interesting events, such as human presence, frequently occurred (interesting events 
critique). While such presence does not raise question, as to the animals’ demonstrated gaze 
following, it may increase readiness to co-orient on the basis of observed adventitious cues 
emitted by conspecifics. Indeed, this suggestion receives some support from findings that, while 
one infant chimpanzee followed human gaze and pointing cues to a target located next to its 
mother, behind the infant’s back (i.e., potentially interesting event: Okamoto-Barth & Tomonaga 
2006), Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello et al. 2001) found no evidence that infants followed 
human gaze cues to a point at the ceiling outside the infants’ own visual field (i.e., no 
expectation of an interesting event). 
 In both of these studies (Tomasello et al. 1998; Pitman & Shumaker 2009) social group 
sizes ranged from two to seven individuals, with several conspecifics viewing and providing cues 
as to the location of the stimulus. The inclusion of several individuals as communicators 
precludes conclusions as to whether targets reacted to the attentional cues of one or several 
individuals, and viewing multiple individuals sharing a visual referent may reduce the threshold 
for initiation of automatic visual co-orientation (multiple communicators critique). In contrast, 
the experiment reported in this thesis entailed that only one individual served as the 
‘communicator’. 
 Tomasello and colleagues did also not examine target looks to the stimulus area while in 
the presence of a conspecific but absence of the stimulus (controlled in the present experiment 
by means of the ‘No Stimulus’ control and the ‘Pre vs. Post’ control, comparing target looks to the 
stimulus area prior to and during the presentation of the stimulus). Instead, the studies by 
Tomasello and colleagues compared only target animals’ looking behaviour across the stimulus 
phase of experimental trials and the equivalent of the stimulus phase of the ‘Target Alone’ control 
deployed in the current experiment. As the experimental pre-stimulus phase, in the present 
                                               
50 In the design deployed in this thesis, all subjects received at least two ‘Target and Ignorant 
Communicator’ trials per trial sequence, and for some subjects (who could not be tested alone) the 
‘Target Alone’ control trial was exchanged for an additional ‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’ 
control trial. 
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experiment, seemed to evoke somewhat higher proportions of target conspecific looks to the 
stimulus location than the stimulus phases of either of the control conditions, it is likely that 
pre-stimulus vs. stimulus phase control yields slightly different information. This type of control 
(‘pre versus post’) does not seem to have been included in previous studies of neither child nor 
non-human primate studies of attention following, but seems to represent a more conservative 
baseline measure (i.e., it produces slightly higher looks to the stimulus location than the other 
control conditions), and thus represents a crucial measure for comparison to be included in 
future gaze following studies. 
 
9.3.2 Limitations 
There were a number of limitations to the design and data collection and consequently the 
ability draw unequivocal conclusions from the data. First, subject dyads were not pre-selected, 
but chosen opportunistically. While dyad pre-selection, involving permutations of a subordinate 
communicator and dominant target (and vice versa) is preferable for a comparison of the effect of 
rank relationships (in light of evidence that readiness to follow others’ attention is coloured by 
social dominance in chimpanzees, see Chapter 4), this was unfeasible due to the rarity of 
favourable inter-animal constellations and the preferred interactions and locations of the animals.  
A second limitation was that the species received different proportions of trials that 
required conspecifics to ‘only turn’ or first ‘locomote’ around a barrier to co-orient to the 
communicator’s attention (‘direct’ and geometric attention following; Percentage experimental 
geometric attention following trials: chimpanzees: 41%, bonobos: 82%, orangutans: 43%). While 
orangutans did not co-orient to communicators’ attention in any geometric attention following 
trials (suggesting that the effect represents a genuine species difference, rather than being an 
artefact of the design), the study would have benefited from an even proportion of turn and 
locomote trials, to ensure that species differences between the Pan species were not masked (e.g., 
at species level, bonobos passed all control conditions involving geometric attention following 
trials [based on the first ‘locomote’ trial that subjects received in the various conditions], while 
chimpanzees failed all).  
A third limitation was that the design did not control for the possibility that the 
permutation of an arousing stimulus and conspecific presence accounted for different 
communicator behaviour in experimental trials versus trials, in which communicators viewed 
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the stimulus while alone. If, however, cues emitted by communicators were caused by only 
increased arousal levels related to conspecific presence, one might predict an positive 
association between the production of noticeable cues and ‘degree’ of conspecific attention, i.e., 
a larger proportion of noticeable behaviours produced when communicators viewed the 
stimulus in the presence of an attending than non-attending conspecific or alone (i.e., 
‘Experimental-facing towards’ > ‘Experimental-facing away’ > ‘Communicator Alone’). In contrast, 
chimpanzees and bonobos showed an (albeit statistically non-significant) increasing trend 
towards producing auditory, visual stimulus directional and visual non-stimulus directional 
behaviours in a larger proportion of trials when they viewed the stimulus in the presence of a 
non-attending conspecific, than either alone, or in the presence of a conspecific facing them (i.e., 
‘Experimental-facing away’ > ‘Experimental-facing towards’/‘Communicator Alone’). This suggests that 
rather than reflecting merely arousal levels, the difference in cue production may have reflected a 
consideration of conspecific attention, and perhaps an attempt to secure conspecific attention to 
(minimally) self, which was more vigorous when conspecifics were non-attentive than attentive. 
 
9.4 Ape communication and joint attention  
 The study of similar abilities in closely related species, allows one to ascertain homologies 
(i.e., shared evolutionary ancestry), as abilities, motivations and signals shared by closely related 
species are likely to have been present in their last common ancestor. There has been some 
suggestion that bonobos may have a greater language-like ability in the vocal domain than 
chimpanzees (de Waal 1988; Hopkins & Savage-Rumbaugh 1991; Taglialatela et al. 2003) and 
some studies (Pollick and de Waal 2007; though not all, see Pika et al. 2005) suggest that they 
use gestures more flexibly than chimpanzees (i.e., use gestures less consistently within specific 
contexts). Curiously, while a comparative study of Pan communication suggested that 
chimpanzees were more likely to engage in multimodal communication than bonobos, the 
multimodal cues of bonobos were found to be more effective than gestures alone, in eliciting a 
response from a conspecific, while this was not the case for chimpanzees (Pollick & de Waal 
2007). Bonobos’ high responsiveness to combinatorial signalling led to the suggestion that, 
despite the genetic equidistance of the Pan species to humans, bonobos may represent a better 
model of the symbolic communication of early human ancestors. The present results do not 
immediately support this; Chimpanzees’ multimodal cues were effective in eliciting conspecific 
co-orientation to the stimulus location, while this was not the case for bonobos. This species 
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difference may, however, partly have been caused by the small number of trials, in which 
bonobos combined auditory and visual stimulus directional behaviours. Moreover, the study by 
Pollick and de Waal (2007) included differentiation between three facial expressions (‘relaxed 
open mouth’, ‘silent bared teeth’, ‘silent pout face’), which may have influenced the discrepancy 
of the results of that and the present study. There was, in the present study nonetheless, some 
suggestion that bonobos were more attentive to conspecific behaviour than chimpanzees.  
 There is considerable evidence that captive apes engage in imperative communication 
with humans (e.g., Leavens & Hopkins 1999; Leavens et al. 2009; Zimmermann et al. 2009), and 
although few, there are reported instances of intra-specific imperative pointing gestures among 
orangutans (Pele et al. 2009) and chimpanzees (Savage-Rumbaugh 1986; Pika & Mitani 2006). 
Structurally and functionally, these pointing behaviours are good approximations of human 
pointing, although they mostly include the whole hand, and no index-finger-extension (Leavens 
& Hopkins 1999). Considerable evidence (for a recent review, see Leavens & Racine 2009), 
including that presented in this thesis, suggests that apes engage in joint attention behaviours, 
such as attention following, gaze alternation and some form of ‘pointing’. While this no longer 
seems controversial, it is widely argued that the joint attention behaviours of humans and great 
apes are qualitatively different (e.g., Povinelli et al. 2003; Tomasello & Carpenter 2005; Gómez 
2007). That is, while great apes and humans may engage in morphologically similar behaviours 
(gaze following, gaze alternation, whole-hand pointing, etc.), the behaviours are underpinned by 
different psychological processes and/or motivations. Joint attention (versus joint attention 
behaviours) is widely defined as involving the mutual awareness that two or more individuals 
attend to a common focus, which is most convincingly demonstrated if one individual 
spontaneously initiates attentional contact with another. Controversy, however, remains about 
whether apes’ initiation of attentional contact and subsequent production of pointing behaviours 
imply that they point in a truly referential way, and if pointing by captive apes represents a 
natural communicative capability, or a by-product of life in a human environment, including in a 
limited referential space (Tomasello & Call 1997; Leavens et al. 2005) where it represents a 
sophisticated form of (human) tool-use to attain object related goals. That is to say, whether the 
producer’s half of the Gricean bargain is upheld, and the animals produce the gestures assuming 
that they carry a symmetrical meaning for signallers and recipients.   
The present results add to the growing body of evidence suggesting that functional 
referential communication (i.e., signals that function, but are not necessarily intended, as referential 
signals: Crockford & Boesch 2003; Slocombe & Zuberbühler 2005, 2006) and seemingly 
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referential communication (i.e., signals that both function and are intended as referential signals: 
Pika & Mitani 2006) are a part of chimpanzee’s intra-specific communicative repertoire. The 
finding that chimpanzees may use subtle and multi-modal cues to follow and direct others to 
distal locations, suggests that intra-specific ape ‘pointing’ may involve elements other than the 
arm, hand and index finger. Moreover, it provides the first systematic empirical evidence to 
support Menzel’s (1973) suggestion that apes may engage in some form of inconspicuous body 
pointing. These observations accord with naturalistic observations of human infant pointing, 
which is typically combined with other gestures, gaze alternation and vocalisations (Zinober & 
Martlew 1985). Indeed, this form of chimpanzee manipulation of conspecifics may have been 
overlooked in previous studies because it is expressed through multiple and inconspicuous 
behaviours that may involve auditory behaviours, the head and the whole body, rather than a 
conspicuous, specialised (and consistently produced) referential signal, such as a hand or index 
finger point. 
Apes engage in a variety of collective activities, including food sharing (e.g., Mitani & 
Watts 2001), coalitionary mate guarding (Watts 1998), territorial patrolling (Watts & Mitani 
2001; Boesch & Boesch-Achermann 2002) and aggression (e.g., de Waal 1988), as well as 
consolation of victims of aggression and (based on anecdotal reports) treatment of injured 
individuals, suggesting that they engage in some form of empathy (Flack & de Waal 2000; 
Preston & de Waal 2002). Still, there is considerable evidence that they find it difficult to 
understand human cooperative pointing in food-finding situations (e.g., Herrmann & Tomasello 
2006, though for recent positive results, see Lyn et al. 2009 and Mulcahy & Call 2009), and show 
little altruistic behaviour towards conspecifics when given the opportunity to costlessly provide 
them with food (Silk et al. 2005; Jensen et al. 2006). Overall cooperative ape behaviour is limited 
to mainly kin and reciprocating individuals.  
That non-human apes do not engage in non-imperative pointing, such as informative 
and declarative pointing, has been interpreted as being underpinned by a lack of a cooperative 
desire to share information and experiences (e.g., Tomasello 2006). Non-imperative pointing 
does, however, not need to involve a cooperative motive. Individuals may direct others to distal 
locations, not to request an object, but to provoke an attentional and/or emotional reaction that 
they can use to discern ambiguity and provide information about how the subject should 
respond (termed ‘social referential pointing’ in Chapter 1). As detailed in Chapter 1, social 
referential pointing is neither about spurring others into action to obtain an object for the subject 
(imperative motivation), nor to express or share interest, or provide information (informative 
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pointing and high-level cognitive interpretation of declarative pointing), but to provoke an 
attentional response that the individual can use to guide its own behaviour and response. That is to 
say, one may point and direct others to distal locations for non-imperative, yet still selfish 
purposes. Such pointing, minimally, implies that individuals conceive others as having emotional 
and/or behavioural responses towards the environment that can be elicited by manipulating 
their attention.  
The present design did not address the question as to whether the apes behaved to 
influence others’ mental states (frequently interpreted to underlie a declarative motivation, e.g., 
Baron-Cohen 1989, 1995; Tomasello 1999, Liszkowski et al. 2004), or to evoke an attentional 
and/or emotional reaction as reflected in overt manifestations that could be used for social 
referential purposes (social referential motivation). The results for the chimpanzees were, 
however, overall consistent with both interpretations. Differentiating between the two 
motivations would have required that the target animals were allowed to actually detect (i.e., 
examine) the stimulus, so that the subjects’ responses to the target animal’s reaction to the 
stimulus could be examined. More specifically, the distinction would have required analysis of 
whether the subject appeared satisfied, if the conspecific simply looked to the stimulus and then 
engaged with the subject (i.e., declarative motivation, to simply share attention), or if the subject 
appeared to modify and adjust its behaviour towards the stimulus according to the valence of 
emotional response of the target (social referential motive). In the present design, however, the 
stimulus was removed before it fell within the visual field of the target animal (to preserve the 
novelty value of the stimulus, for targets who also served as communicators), thus preventing 
analysis of whether the subject modified its behaviour as a function of the other’s response to 
the stimulus. In the light of past research, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that apes, 
under some circumstances, engage in social referential pointing, in which they direct 
conspecifics to hidden objects for ‘selfish’, interrogative purposes, so as to elicit an attentional 
response (as reflected in overt manifestations) that may be used to disambiguate the situation 
(see also Gómez et al. 1993). Future adaptations of the design would benefit from allowing 
targets would to actually look to and examine the stimulus. This would, however, require letting 
the animals serve as, either only communicator or only target (not both, as in the present design), 
and thus that the test be run with a considerably larger sample of subjects. 
This interpretation is consistent with the claims by Bates and colleagues (Bates et al. 
1975) that prior to actual declarative pointing, human infants engage in earlier types of 
declarative communication, including e.g., the showing of objects. Indeed, the frequently cited 
Discussion 
 
188 
anecdotal observation of a feral bonobo soliciting conspecifics to human researchers (which is 
typically given a [tentative] cooperative declarative interpretation) may, equally, be interpreted 
with reference to a (selfish) motive of calling others’ attention, so as to ascertain how to respond 
to the discovery of ambiguous stimuli. It is also consistent with the observation by Menzel 
(1973) that chimpanzees led conspecifics to discover the location of e.g., novel toys, which 
might have been underpinned by fear of travelling alone, or a desire to ascertain how to 
respond. 
 
9.5 Concluding remarks 
Non-human primates almost invariably fail tests based on the cooperative object-choice 
task  (Itakura et al. 1999; Call et al. 2000; Povinelli et al. 2000; Hare & Tomasello 2004). Recent 
research, however, has shown that the object-choices of lemurs are primed by the gaze cues 
provided in pictures of adult males from the animals’ own groups (Ruiz et al. 2009). That is, 
when shown a picture of an adult male lemurs selectively chose the box upon which gaze of the 
individual in the picture was directed. Importantly, the study suggested that the failure of 
previous studies to find evidence that non-human primates successfully use others’ gaze cues to 
make object choices, may owe to a failure to take into account the animals’ overall low levels of 
gaze following. Intriguingly, the study suggested that data from many primate species are likely 
to show correct object-choices as a result of gaze following if the data are reanalysed 
(considering only the association between gaze following and object-choice in trials, in which 
subjects actually follow the model’s gaze). In conjunction with the present finding that 
chimpanzees were more likely to follow the gaze of the dominant male of their group, this lends 
promise for future tests using the object-choice paradigm. It suggests that although the strong 
gaze following skills of many non-human primates have rarely translated into an ability to use 
others’ gaze and gestural cues to locate hidden resources, primates may perform better on the 
object-choice task if the directional cues are provided by socially dominant members of their 
own species. 
The results of this thesis suggest that chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans followed 
the attention of conspecifics, and provide the first empirical support for Menzel’s (Menzel 1973, 
1974) suggestion that apes may include particular postural components to direct others’ 
attention to novel objects in their environment. The results suggest that the paucity of reported 
instances of observed pointing behaviours in apes may owe to the inconspicuousness and multi-
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faceted nature of the signals. Moreover, the overall results and anecdotal observations of 
mother-offspring dyad interactions suggest that the lack of evidence of ‘social referential 
pointing’ behaviours during interactions with humans does not necessarily equal evidence of 
lack ability to produce such during interactions with conspecifics, but that the cause may be 
partly motivational, and that such behaviours are more likely to occur between individuals with 
close emotional bonds. Perhaps important for the present results, the experiment removed 
possible constraints, such as competition and fear, by presenting a non-food stimulus of 
potential, but ambiguous, significance. The results suggest that the capacity to communicate 
about novel distal events during close-contact joint attentional episodes may have been present 
in the ancestor of the hominids and Pan species.  
Overall, the results of the research presented in this thesis lends support to the growing 
body of evidence that suggests that although infant apes rarely coordinate attention between 
others and external objects (Bard & Vauclair 1984; Okamoto-Barth & Tomonaga 2006), 
juveniles and adults do (Pitman & Shumaker 2009; Tanner & Byrne 2010). Thus, while some 
controversy still remains in the literature, regarding apes’ ability to share attention in a 
coordinated, triadic manner, the animals’ behaviour in the present experiment, and in an 
extensive amount of reports involving different species and contexts (social games, bonobos: 
Pika & Zuberbühler 2008; gorillas: Tanner & Byrne 2010; tests of social referencing: 
Chimpanzees: Russell et al. 1997: repeated gaze alternation during imperative food-, object-, and 
action requests: Chimpanzees: e.g., Gómez 1996; Leavens & Hopkins 1998) suggests that apes 
are capable of some form of basic joint and coordinated attention.   
Many conclusions regarding ape cognition and communication are based on the 
behaviour of a small number of repeatedly-tested animals in rather contrived laboratory settings. 
In the light of the growing body of evidence that suggest that apes engage in a number of 
collaborative and joint activities during less formalised and more dynamic contexts, such as e.g., 
play contexts, and indeed in contexts involving conspecifics, it seems that observing the animals 
during naturalistic interactions with conspeciﬁcs is a far more fruitful avenue for uncovering the 
true nature their abilities. 
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9.6 Proposed further research 
9.6.1 Elaboration of present design 
There are a number of avenues for expanding this research program. First, the use of a 
laser stimulus with an optical diffractive element that produces a biologically relevant image 
(e.g., animals or faces) is promising for further exploration of triadic interactions, as its display 
can be adapted to the animals’ ranging patterns and locations, rather than requiring the 
positioning a stationary object and awaiting animal detection thereof. The nature of the 
experiment (requiring calm, interactions between the animals, without disturbance and potential 
indication as to the stimulus’ location by the public) meant that many trials were abandoned, 
due to the arrival and/or disturbances from the public (during pre-stimulus phases). Moreover, 
the presence of a glass barrier separating the animals and the experimenter meant that the 
stimulus, when displayed through the glass at certain angles, produced a visible reflection on the 
glass itself. Opportunities to conduct trials where stimulus display to undisturbed participants 
remained covert were therefore rare. While a field application of the design would be 
complicated by issues, such as the poor visibility of dense forest vegetation, hampering 
identification of the locus of the animals’ attention, the absence of human disturbance and glass 
barriers would facilitate the ease and speed, with which trials could be conducted.  
Second, the effectiveness and seemingly intentional production of the ‘hunch’ in 
chimpanzee attention following contexts, calls for the experimental design to be adapted to 
examine the prevalence of this behavioural component in attention following contexts in wild 
chimpanzee populations. Third, the promising, but exploratory, study of the effect of social 
dominance on attention following in chimpanzees (reported in Chapter 4) requires further 
confirmation by a controlled study, using e.g., a focal animal sampling method. 
Fourth, the procedure could be administered to species other than those examined in 
this thesis. I conducted pilot trials with individuals from number of additional species: captive 
gorillas (N = 2, three experimental, one ‘Target and ignorant communicator’ and three ‘No stimulus’ 
trials), wolves (N = 2, two experimental and two ‘Target Alone’ trials), Diana monkeys (N = 8, 17 
experimental and a number of ‘Target Alone’ trials), Hamadryas baboons (Papio hamadryas), 
Hamlyn’s monkey (Cercopithecus hamlyni), siamangs (Symphalangus syndactylus), leopards (Panthera 
pardus), capybaras (Hydrochoerus hydrochaeri) and meerkats (Suricatta suricatta). Siamangs and 
Hamlyn's monkeys were fearful of the stimulus, while leopards, capybaras and meerkats 
appeared to ignore it. Gorillas, Diana monkeys, baboons and wolves were promising candidates 
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for future studies, as at least one individual of each species engaged and played with the 
stimulus, and both gorillas and wolves seemingly referenced conspecifics upon seeing the 
stimulus. A simplified version of the design (involving three experimental and two ‘Communicator 
Alone’ trials) has been administered to capuchin monkeys (G. Barclay, B.Sc. Thesis 2009), but 
produced no evidence of triadic interactions. Another simplified version is currently being 
adapted and conducted with chimpanzee mother-infant dyads in the field, to explore social 
referencing and triadic communication about the stimulus. Infant ‘communicators’ here receive 
the equivalent of an ‘Experimental-facing away’ trial, and mothers and infants receive trials, in 
which the stimulus is presented to both, simultaneously. While the design lacks a number of 
controls implemented in the present design (e.g., ‘Target Alone’/‘Target and Ignorant Communicator’, 
‘No Stimulus’, ‘pre-stimulus vs. stimulus phase control’), which complicates discrimination of 
chance behaviours and looks among infants and mothers, from behaviours evoked by and 
communicated about the stimulus, the study will contribute information about the prevalence of 
intra-specific social referencing, to evidence of this among human-raised chimpanzees and their 
caregivers (Russell et al. 1997). 
 
9.6.2 The efficacy of different forms of deixis  
9.6.2.1 Gestural pointing  
Despite the prevalence of index finger pointing in the West, and the consequent typical 
inclusion of index finger extension in the definition of pointing, other morphological forms of 
deixis are prevalent, and in some cases dominant, in non-Western cultures. Experiments by 
Menzel (e.g., 1974) and results presented in this thesis suggest that chimpanzees may deploy 
behaviours other than hand and index finger extension to intentionally direct others to locations 
in the environment. Moreover, lip pointing (a quick shifting of the eyes towards an intended 
entity, and raising of the eyebrows and head, during which the mouth is first opened, and then 
closed with the lower lip thrust outward from the face: Wilkins 2003) bears some affinity with 
the ‘chin pushed towards the stimulus’ component of the ‘hunching’ posture observed in 
chimpanzees. It has been argued that other forms of deixis but index finger pointing are less 
efficient and precise (e.g., Hewes 1981; Butterworth 2003), yet there is little direct comparative 
evidence thereof. Indeed, the efficacy and precision of different types of pointing on human 
target localization have not been examined empirically. The proposed experiment is repeated 
measures design with five gesture types presented in each of two light levels (ambient and dim 
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light): (i) Gaze only, (ii) lip pointing, (iii) lip pointing without gaze, (iv) hand positioned close to 
chest, hand extended, (v) hand positioned close to chest, index finger extended. Numbered 
locations would be positioned on the floor in front of, and walls behind and to either side of a 
participant (Figure. 9.1). Participants would be required to determine, which of twenty-four 
numbered locations in four sections was indicated by the gestures. 
 
Figure 9.1: Experimental setup. The participant sits on a chair facing an experimenter, 
positioned 4m from the participant. 
 
9.6.2.2 Vocal pointing 
Visibility in rain forest habitats is generally poor and the acoustic domain thus represents 
a more effective means, than gestures, for communication between individuals beyond 
immediate proximity. The ability to direct the attention of others to objects and events in the 
environment using vocal stimuli (‘vocal pointing’) may therefore represent a more efficient 
means of attention manipulation for forest dwelling primates, than visual gestures (see also 
Gómez 2004). While sound localization acuity has been extensively studied, and is well 
established within a number of species (e.g., blackbirds, Turdus merula: Larsen & Dabelsteen 
1990; chimpanzees: Kojima 1990; humans: see Middlebrooks & Green, 1991 for a review), no 
study could be found in the published literature that investigated discriminative abilities 
regarding the broadcast direction of sound (rather than its origin). The proposed experiment tests 
the hypothesis that humans are capable of directional auditory discrimination. If so, it opens the 
possibility that directional auditory sound could be deployed intentionally to direct others to 
outside entities.  
The experiment is a repeated measures design with four levels: (i) stimulus type (the 
discrete sound ‘ba’ and continuous sound ‘there’ emitted for 3s by an experimenter), (ii) distance 
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between the experimenter and participant (4m, 6m and 8m), (iii) obstruction (none/foliage 
positioned 2m in front of the experimenter’s face), (iv) sound direction (four directions relative 
to the participant (45°, 135°, 225°, 315°) at two angles (horizontally and at a 45° upward angle, 
Figure 9.2). Blindfolded subjects would wear headphones with white noise for 10s in between 
trials, to minimize the potential for direction judgements, made on the basis of volume 
comparisons across trials. Half of subjects would receive trials facing the experimenter, the 
other half while facing away from the experimenter. Subjects should receive a minimum of 20 
trials in each condition, presented in a randomised order, and indicate the perceived sound 
direction by the raise of an arm. In an exploratory pilot with human subjects (N = 3), in which 
the two stimulus types were emitted in four horizontal directions from an unobstructed distance 
of 2.5m behind subjects, subjects correctly determined the direction of vocalising in 89 % (161 
of 180) of trials. The results were promising, and the design has scope for adaptation to 
intraspecific studies of e.g., non-human primates, dogs and dolphins. 
 
Figure 9.2: Broadcast directions and spatial alignment of a blindfolded subject and experimenter. 
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APPENDICIES 
 
Appendix 1: Images of outside chimpanzee enclosure (Twycross Zoo) 
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Appendix 2: Images of inside orangutan enclosures (Twycross Zoo) 
 
 
Inside enclosure 1 at Twycross Zoo. 
 
 
Inside enclosure 2 at Twycross Zoo. 
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Appendix 3: Bonobo and orangutan subjects used in some key studies 
Table 1. Bonobos used in key studies. HR = hand-reared; MR = mother-reared. * = Excluded 
from test phase. 
 
Table 2. Orangutans used in pointing experiments of Zimmerman et al. 2007 and Pele et al. 
2009. 
Species Individual Zimmermann et al. 2009 Pele et al. 2009 
Orangutan Dokana X X 
Orangutan Dunja X X 
Orangutan Padana X X 
Orangutan Pini X X 
Orangutan Toba    X *  
Orangutan Walter    X *  
Orangutan Bim  X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigators Aim Kuno Limbuko Joey Ulindi Yasa
HR HR HR MR MR
Bräuer et al.  2005 Direct & Geometiric gaze 
following of humans 
X X X X
Kaminski et al. 2004 Food begging from human in 
various attentional states
X X X
Liebal et al. 2004 Ibid. X X X X X
Okamoto-Barth et al. 
2007
Gaze following through 
windowed & opaque barriers
X X X X X
Bräuer et al.  2005 Human point following X X X X
Call 2007 Pointing to indicate selection X X X X X
Zimmermann et al. 
2009
Pointing to inform humans 
about a tool
X X    X *    X * X
Pele et al. 2009 Pointing to request object 
from conspecifics
X X X X
